SAE尼各马可
这不是一套由 SAE 替亚里士多德补写的伦理学，而是十三次局部对读：从朋友与真理、自足、幸福与品格，走到责任、明智、明知故犯、友爱、养成，以及全书最后从说理转向法律与政治的那一步。
每一篇先把《尼各马可伦理学》的具体段落读准，再看它与 SAE 在哪里相接、在哪里分开，最后让亚里士多德反过来指出 SAE 尚未写出的那一栏。简体中文保留原作声音，只作事实与措辞校订；繁体中文为同页编辑版。
反驳朋友的理论，是否也在审判朋友本人？亚里士多德批评普遍善，SAE则追问：论证可以拆到哪里，人的名字该不该跟着进去。
终极目的可以截断无穷追问，却不能自动划定谁应算进一份自足的人生；目的链和成员表，是两种不同的无穷。
索伦要人看结局，亚里士多德却把幸福定义为活动。生命可以结束，关于一生的判断却不会因此自动取得终局。
做出公正的事，不等于已经成为公正的人；习惯、选择与稳定品格之间，还隔着一条不能由单次结果替代的路。
中道不是一条可计算的刻度线。亚里士多德给出偏向性的实践办法，SAE则提供拆账的格式；两者都不能替人做最后那一判。
品格由自愿行动形成，却不能像单次动作那样随时撤回。责任如何穿过习惯、可见性与已经变高的改变成本？
严格的正义需要关系双方；当同一个人兼任行为者、受害者和审判者时，名分为什么只能以类比成立？
明智不是高效抵达既定目标的聪明。亚里士多德把目标、手段与品格缠在一起，迫使 SAE 面对“什么会进入判断”的前置问题。
“知道”不是单一状态。拥有、调用、落到具体情境与真正同化之间的错位，解释了为什么知识会在行动现场缺席。
朋友不是拿来填补缺口的工具。亚里士多德把友爱放进幸福的活动里，SAE则把他者放进判断的有效性与结算里。
亚里士多德让对他人的友爱从理顺的自我关系向外延伸，并一路追到习惯、法律与立法者；SAE只有前提，没有养成链。
幸福来自学习、习惯、神授还是运气？亚里士多德先拆开来路与分量，再让最高者反过来限制它可能的来路。
讲清德性，不等于把人变好。亚里士多德由说理的限度转向习惯、法律与政治；SAE则把最后的效力交给尚未必会到场的读者。
SAE's Nicomachean Ethics
This is not an SAE replacement for Aristotle's ethics. It is a sequence of thirteen local encounters with the Nicomachean Ethics: friendship and truth, self-sufficiency, happiness, character, responsibility, practical wisdom, akrasia, moral formation, and the final turn from ethical argument toward law and politics.
Each essay begins with a specific Aristotelian problem, identifies a genuine point of contact or divergence with SAE, and then lets Aristotle expose a debt SAE has not yet paid. The English texts are independent rewrites shaped for readers who know the argument through Anglophone philosophical vocabulary.
Aristotle criticizes the universal Good without turning intellectual disagreement into a verdict on its authors. SAE asks how arguments can remain answerable without putting persons on trial.
A final end may stop an infinite regress of purposes, yet it does not decide whose life belongs inside a self-sufficient good. Aristotle exposes two different infinities.
Solon says to look to the end, but Aristotle defines happiness as activity. A life can end without making every judgment about that life final.
A just act does not by itself make a just person. Aristotle separates the right result from knowledge, choice, and stable character; SAE asks how ownership persists across time.
The mean is not a calculable midpoint. Aristotle offers directional rules for correcting bias; SAE offers a form for separating claims. Neither can make the final perception for us.
Character grows from voluntary acts but cannot be reversed like a single motion. Aristotle's thrown stone reveals a responsibility that begins in choice and survives diminished control.
Strict justice requires distinct parties. When one person is agent, victim, and judge, Aristotle changes the name to analogy; SAE asks what self-audit cannot independently verify.
Practical wisdom is not cleverness at reaching a given target. Aristotle binds ends, means, and character together, forcing SAE to ask what becomes visible before judgment starts.
Knowledge is not one state. Aristotle distinguishes possession, use, particular perception, and assimilation to explain how someone can know and still act otherwise.
Friends are not tools for filling a deficit. Aristotle places friendship inside the activity of flourishing; SAE places the other inside the validity and settlement of judgment.
Aristotle traces friendship outward from an ordered relation to oneself, then backward through habit, law, and the legislator. SAE has a condition for recognition, but not yet a chain of formation.
Does happiness come by learning, habituation, divine allotment, or luck? Aristotle first separates origin from worth, then lets the highest good constrain what origins are fitting.
Explaining virtue does not make people virtuous. Aristotle turns from argument to habit, law, and politics; SAE entrusts its effect to readers who may never arrive.