对邻人的友爱从哪儿来
Where Does Friendship for Others Begin?
第九卷第四章讲完友爱的那些标志，他自己摆下一问，又自己把它放下了：
一个人跟他自己之间到底有没有友爱，这一问眼下先放下。
放下的是这一句。可紧挨着的下一句他又给了半个答案：
从前面说过的那些看，一个人在他"是两个或更多"的那一面上，看来是有友爱的；而且友爱到了过头处，样子就像人对自己的那一种。
所以他不是干净地搁下。他搁下一个名分，同时在旁边填了点东西。
有两件事在这儿粘着，得先分开。
他搁下的是名分，没搁下的是来源。一个人跟自己算不算得上有友爱，这个名分他放下了；而这一章开头那一句他照用不误，整章都靠它撑着：对邻人的那些友爱的表现，看来是从对自己的那些关系里过来的。
名分那一头另有一篇管：之七跟的是从正义那边往里移的那一路。这一篇跟的是来源这一头，方向相反，是从里往外走。
那么他说的对自己的那些关系，是什么样的关系。
不是随便谁跟自己相处的那种关系。原文写得很死：那几样标志，是对好人才成立的；其余的人，只在他们自以为是那样的人的那一面上成立。
好人是什么样子。他跟自己想到一处去，整个心都朝着同一批东西。他为自己想要好的东西，也真去做，而且是为着他自己；他要自己活着，要自己保全，尤其要保全那个用来想的部分。往下几行他还添一句：那个想的部分，看来最是每一个人自己。
还有一句短的：他不后悔。
坏人正相反，而且亚里士多德写得毫不留情。
坏人跟自己合不上：他们贪的是一样，想要的是另一样。比方不能自制的人，明明有他们自己认作好的东西，却挑了那些让人快活而其实有害的。
坏起来的人到处找人一块儿消磨白天，自己却躲着自己：一个人待着，他们会想起许多难受的事，还料着往后也是这样；跟别人在一块儿，就忘掉了。
他们也不跟自己同乐，不跟自己同苦。因为他们的心是内讧的：一头因为坏而在忍着不去碰什么，忍得难受；另一头正快活着；一头往这边拽，一头往那边拽，像要把人扯开。
所以他收得很硬：这样的人对自己都做不成朋友，因为他们身上没有一样可爱的。
这就是他那条路的起点：不是"人都跟自己有点关系"，是一种已经理顺了的自我关系。友爱的那些标志先在这一种关系里成立，然后往外，成为对邻人的友爱。
这边那条路上有一站，正好站在他这个起点的位置上。
那条路上有一站叫意义：不无理由地行动，把自己当作目的本身。这一站是一个人自己那一头的顶。再上去那一站是伦理：不只有我是目的。
而这两站中间，走这条路的人自己留下一句警告：这一站要是运作过了头，或者把自己关起来，那正是最精致的一种侵占；健康的这一站，是上一站的必要前提。
侵占这个词在那边有个准确的用法：一条路被另一条压着走，走不成它自己。而最精致的那一种，是被自己压着。
他说：坏人跟自己内讧，所以对别人也长不出友爱。这边说：自己那一头要是拧了或者闭上了，往上那一步就没有条件。两边在这里有同一种依赖的形状：往外那一步的条件，在自己那一头。
而两边的病理也挨得近。他写坏起来的人到处找人消磨白天，自己却躲着自己；这边写那一站运作过头或者把自己关起来。一头是躲开自己，一头是把自己关严实；两样都不是不够看重自己，两样都是那一头出了毛病。
只碰这一句，再往前推就不是同一件事了：他那一套里心分几部分，这边不接；这边那条路上一层一层的编号，他那边也没有。
而往外这两个字，两边走的不是同一种往外。
他把对邻人的友爱说成对自己那一种关系往外展开。外面那一份，形状是里面那一份的形状；朋友是另一个自己，所以对朋友的那一份跟对自己的那一份是同一种。里面那一头是来源。
这边把自己那一头只算作前提，不算作来源。从"把自己当目的"到"不只有我是目的"，这边登记的是一步有岔的路，而且明写着岔口那边是有人真住过的：把价值收归自己一个人的那一支，历史上实住。既然有岔，这一步就不是前一步长出来的；它是在那儿另下的一判。
一个是把同一种关系推出去，一个是在同一处另起一手。
这两条路在日子里分得出来。
一种常见的说法是：一个人先得跟自己过得去，才谈得上跟别人过得去。它说的是同一样东西往外长。
另一种说法不这么走。一个人跟自己过得去，完全可以过成一个谁也不需要的人。他自己那一头越顺，往外那一步越没有非发生不可的理由。那一步不是前一步的延长，它是另外一件事。
两种说法都不假。分歧不在哪一种对，在那一步是长出来的，还是做出来的。
而在他那一边，长出来这件事是有一根链子的，一环一环都写在纸上。
性格上的那些好是从习惯来的，连名字都是从"习"上稍稍偏出来一点。而习惯不是自己长的：立法的人靠让公民养成习惯把他们变好，每一个立法者要的都是这个，做不好的就是失手；好政体和坏政体的分别就在这一处。
到了第十卷他把人变好的那几条路一条一条过。天生那一条明摆着不由我们做主，那是某些神样的原因给真正有运气的人的；而讲道理和教不是对谁都管用，听的人那颗心得先被习惯耕过，像地得先能养得住种子。
往下他说得更死。从小得着一条正路这件事，没有那样的法养着就难。父亲的吩咐没有强制的力气，法有，因为法是从某种明智和心思来的道理。
这里得补一句，不补就把他写窄了。他没有说只剩下法这一条路。他明写：最好是城里有一份公共的照管；可公共的照管要是荒着，那就该由各人替自己的孩子和朋友出力，至少也该存着这个心。他还说，一个一个地教反倒更到家，就像看病：发烧的人一般该静养忌口，可某一个人也许不该；教拳的也不会给所有人排同一套打法。
可他接着把这条私路也送回了同一处。一个一个地教要教得最好，还得是懂那个普遍的人；而一个人想靠照管把别人变好，不管是多是少，都得试着成为会立法的那种人。
两条路合到一处：好人的自我关系从习惯来，习惯从法来，法从会立法的人来。私养这一条不是绕开了立法，是绕了一段以后还是走了进去。
这边没有这一根链子。
这边最靠近的一样叫涵育：替别人那条路做出不被侵占的条件，明写含着不去挡着和主动帮着两面。可它的效力被整条交给了第二批判，而且它说的是不去挡着别人长，不是怎样把一个人养成。
这不是这边漏掉了一格。这边这条路是一层一层往上走出来的，每一层记出口有几个，记担保从哪儿来，记岔在哪儿，一共六栏。至于那一层在一个具体的人身上实际怎么长起来，靠谁养，靠什么养，靠哪一套安排一年一年地养，逐层那张总表上没有开这一栏。
登记了站位，分支，担保和条件，不等于已经铺出一条养成的路。
这一层学手艺的人最清楚。
一个人手艺学得好，未必是因为他自己想学得好。也可能是他跟的那个师傅规矩严，铺子里的活按老法子排，做坏了要重做。等他自己带徒弟，传下去的还是那套规矩。
你问他这套规矩打哪儿来，他答得出上一辈。再往上问，就没人答得出了。
而亚里士多德不是没往上问。
第十卷最后，他问：接下来是不是该看看，一个人是打哪儿来的，又是怎么成得了会立法的人。他试了一条现成的路，跟办政事的人学，走不通：真能办事的那些人不写也不讲，连自己儿子都没教成。于是他把同一句话又问了一遍。
问完他说：前人把立法这件事留着没人查过，不如我们自己来查。
而他没有停在这一句上。接着他把要查的一条一条排了出来：先看前人说得好的那些部分，再从收集来的那些政体里看什么保得住一座城，什么毁得掉一座城，然后才判得出哪一种政体最好，该怎么摆，该用哪些法和哪些风俗。
《尼各马可伦理学》的最后一句是：那么我们就开讲吧。
所以这一笔债的形状要说准。不是他没写养成，不是他把问题往后挪了一站，也不是他站在尽头指着一块空地停笔。他把那条链子铺到头，铺到头才发现头上那一问自己答不了，于是他把那一问改写成了一张工单，当场开了工。
这跟上一本第九篇那一问是同一个回退：头一个肯认别人是个人的人是从哪儿来的；他认的时候没有人认过他，他是跟谁学的。只是那一篇是从外头往里问，这一篇是顺着他自己那条链子走到了头。
而上一本那三处，是明写空着不补的。
记下一个回退，和把它改成一张工单，不是同一件事。
A Question Set Aside—and Half Answered
In Book IX, chapter 4, Aristotle traces the marks of friendship to a good person's relation with himself. Then he pauses: whether a person can literally be a friend to himself may be set aside. The next sentence almost retracts the postponement. Friendship with oneself seems possible insofar as a person is “two or more,” and extreme friendship is compared with self-love.
The name is suspended; the source is not. Wishing good for someone for that person's sake, wanting the person to live, sharing pleasure and pain, and living together first appear in the good person's relation to himself and extend to a friend, who is another self.
Not every self-relation qualifies. The good person's desires and judgments are in harmony. He wishes and does what is genuinely good for himself, wants the thinking part of himself to continue, enjoys living with himself, and has little to regret. Bad people are divided. Appetite pulls one way and rational wish another. They seek company to escape themselves, remember painful acts when alone, and cannot share their own joy or grief without inner faction.
Friendship for others therefore does not grow from mere self-concern. It grows, in Aristotle's account, from an ordered self-relation.
Extension or a New Judgment?
SAE places a related condition between treating oneself as an end and recognizing that one is not the only end. The self-directed position must not become enclosure or self-colonization; a healthy relation to oneself is necessary for an ethical relation outward.
The structures touch, then divide. Aristotle treats friendship toward another as an extension of the form already present within the good person. The friend is another self; what is wished inwardly is carried outward in a cognate relation.
SAE treats the inward position as a condition, not a source. “I am an end” does not entail “you are an end.” History contains stable, self-possessed people who reserve value entirely for themselves or their group. The outward step has a real branch. It must be made as another judgment rather than generated automatically from self-regard.
In ordinary language, the disagreement appears as two sayings. One says that a person must first be at peace with himself before loving others. The other says that a person entirely at peace with himself may discover no need to recognize anyone else. The first imagines growth; the second insists on a decision.
Where the Good Self Comes From
Aristotle's deeper advantage emerges when we ask how the ordered self was formed. Virtues arise through habituation. Legislators make citizens good by forming habits, and the success or failure of that project distinguishes good constitutions from bad ones. By Book X, argument alone is insufficient. The learner's soul must already have been cultivated by habit, as soil is prepared to receive seed.
Law becomes essential because paternal instruction lacks comparable force and because formation must extend through life. Aristotle prefers public care, but if the city neglects it, individuals should help children and friends. Private education can be more exact, as a physician treats a particular patient rather than a generic fever. Yet even private care returns to universal knowledge: anyone who aims to make a few people better should seek the competence of a legislator.
The chain is visible: ordered self-relation depends on character; character on habituation; habituation on law and education; good law on someone capable of legislation.
SAE has no equivalent chain. Its concept of cultivation names the creation of conditions in which another path is not blocked or annexed. It can include active support as well as restraint. But making space for a path is not an account of how a person becomes capable of walking it.
A Map of Positions Is Not a Curriculum
SAE can register levels, branches, guarantees, and conditions. It can show where a path is colonized, where recognition fails, and where another subject's answer is required. None of this explains how these capacities are formed over years in a body, household, school, or city.
A craft tradition illustrates the gap. An apprentice learns under a demanding teacher, in a workshop whose order precedes both of them. The apprentice later transmits the same standards. Ask where the standard came from and each person can name the previous generation until the chain vanishes into custom. A structural map can describe the responsibility at each stage without explaining the origin and reproduction of the practice.
Aristotle follows the chain until it becomes a research program. At the end of the Ethics, he asks how one becomes capable of legislation. Politicians do not articulate their knowledge or reliably transmit it, and sophists who promise political expertise confuse it with rhetoric. Aristotle therefore proposes to examine existing constitutions: what preserves and destroys them, which arrangements work, and which laws and customs the best constitution requires. The Ethics does not end by pointing toward an empty lot. It issues a work order that leads into politics.
The First Recognizer
SAE's earlier question returns here: where does the first person who recognizes another as a person come from, if no one previously recognized and formed him? Naming contingent initiative identifies whose act it is. It does not explain the act's cultivation or reproduction.
Aristotle does not supply a frictionless answer. His reliance on law raises questions about coercion, exclusion, and who defines virtue. But he does identify the missing dimension: ethical capacity has an institutional history. Good reasons address an already formed listener; formation requires practices and laws; those practices require people able to design and revise them.
The lesson is not that SAE omitted one box. A framework for registering judgments and a theory of moral education do different work. The mistake would be to treat the completeness of the first as the completion of the second.
Friendship for others may begin from a person's relation to himself, as Aristotle argues, or it may require a distinct outward judgment, as SAE insists. Before either movement, someone had to become capable of seeing a friend. Aristotle follows that debt backward and, when the chain reaches legislation, turns the unanswered question into the next inquiry. Recording a regress and opening a project are not the same act.