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SAE and Spinoza’s EthicsSAE斯宾诺莎伦理学SAE斯賓諾莎倫理學 · 03 / 10

Why People Will Not Believe Him

之三 · 他自己解释人为什么不信

之三 · 他自己解釋人為什麼不信

Before refuting a prejudice, he asks why it is so easy to keep.

三十六条命题推完,他转过身来看读者手里还攥着什么。

三十六條命題推完,他轉過身來看讀者手裡還攥著什麼。

Han Qin (秦汉秦汉秦漢) · 2026

Part I reaches Proposition Thirty-Six and finishes its sequence of demonstrations. Then an appendix begins. The text no longer divides itself into proposition and proof.

Spinoza gathers what he takes himself to have established: God necessarily exists, is unique, exists and acts through the necessity of his own nature, and is the free cause of all things, which are all in God.

He then turns to the reader. Whenever he had the opportunity, he says, he tried to remove prejudices obstructing his demonstrations. Many remain, especially those that make it hard to accept the connections among things in the way he has explained them. He will now bring those prejudices before reason.

One assumption underneath the others

The prejudices depend chiefly on one assumption. People suppose that natural things act for ends as they do, and that God directs everything toward an end. God made the world for human use, and made humans to worship him.

Spinoza does not begin by attacking the conclusion. He announces three tasks: discover why so many people accept the prejudice and why everyone is naturally disposed toward it; show why it is false; then explain how further notions—good and evil, merit and fault, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness—grow from it.

Before asking why an opinion is wrong, he asks why people find it believable.

A different starting point

He explicitly sets a limit. This is not the place to deduce everything from the nature of the human mind. He begins instead from something he expects everyone to acknowledge: people are born ignorant of causes; they desire what benefits them; and they are conscious of that desire.

The explanation unfolds from there. People know what they want without knowing the causes that make them want it, so they imagine themselves free. Because they act for their advantage, they ask for the purposes of things. Once a purpose is supplied, inquiry tends to stop.

They see eyes that enable sight, teeth that chew, plants and animals that feed them, sunlight and a sea full of fish. They infer one or more rulers of nature who prepared these conveniences for human beings.

The effort to prove that nature does nothing useless—that is, nothing without human benefit—ends, Spinoza says, by making nature and the gods look as irrational as people.

Look where matters have arrived, he asks. Alongside the conveniences stand storms, earthquakes and disease. Those must then be explained as divine anger at human offences.

Mathematics offered another standard of truth. It considers the essences and properties of figures rather than their purposes. Without that example, he suggests, the prejudice could have kept truth hidden from people indefinitely.

When he reaches the promised refutation, he refers back to earlier propositions and adds further explanation. Much of the appendix has instead been occupied with how the belief takes hold.

After the car wash

Someone is convinced that it rains the day after every car wash. You show them a month’s weather records. They nod. The next time they wash the car, they still look anxiously at the sky.

Rather than turn another page of the records, you ask what made this association so persuasive in the first place.

That changes the inquiry. Evidence against a belief and an account of its persistence are not the same kind of work.

At the end

Spinoza closes by saying these are the prejudices he intended to identify. If others of the same sort remain, a little reflection should enable readers to correct them.

Thirty-six propositions have been demonstrated. Now the writer turns to see what the person reading is still holding onto.

第一部分推到第三十六条命题,推完了。然后是一篇附录,里头不再分出命题和证明。

附录开头,他把前面证过的收成一段:神必然存在,只有一个,只凭自己本性的必然存在和行动,是万物的自由的原因,万物都在神之内。然后他说:

凡有机会的地方,那些会妨碍人领会我的证明的成见,我都设法清除了;可是剩下的还不少,而且恰恰最会妨碍人照我讲的样子去接受事物的联系。所以我认为值得在这里,把它们叫到理性面前来审。

系在一条上

这些成见,他说,都系在一条上:人们一般以为,自然万物都像他们自己一样,是为了某个目的而动的;还认定神也把万物引向某个目的。他们说,神为了人造了万物,造人,是要人敬拜他。

他没有先驳这一条。他说他分三步:先找原因,为什么大多数人安于这个成见,而且人人天生都倾向于接受它;再指出它错在哪儿;最后讲善和恶,功和罪,赞美和责备,秩序和混乱,美和丑,这些成见怎样从它长出来。

还没说它为什么错,先说人为什么会信。

不在这里推

讲原因之前,他先声明一句:从人的心灵的本性把这些推出来,不是这里的事。这里只拿一件人人都得承认的事作根基:人生下来都不知道事物的原因;人人都有追求对自己有利的东西的欲求,并且知道自己有这个欲求。

往下就从这根基一步一步讲。人知道自己想要什么,却连做梦也想不到是什么让他想要,于是以为自己是自由的。人做什么都为了对自己有利,于是事事只问它的目的,听到了目的就不再往下问。看见眼睛能看,牙齿能嚼,草木禽兽能吃,太阳能照,海能养鱼,就断定有一位或几位管着自然的,给人预备好了这一切。他们想证明自然不做一件白做的事,也就是不做一件不为人所用的事,证明出来的,看上去只是自然和神跟人一样发疯。

说到这里,他停下来说:我请你看看,事情最后落到了什么地步。自然里那么多方便,免不了也有不少不便:风暴,地震,疾病。他们就说,这是神发了怒,因为人得罪了他们。

他接着提到数学:这个成见本来足以让真理永远对人类藏着,要不是数学给人看了真理的另一种标准。数学不管目的,只管图形的本质和性质。

至于这个成见错在哪儿,他说不必多讲,指回前面的命题,再补了一段。

洗车

有人觉得,他一洗车,第二天准下雨。你把一个月的天气记录拿给他看,他点点头;下回洗完车,还是抬头看天。

你没再往下翻记录,改问他:是什么让你认定了这一条。

收束

附录收在这两句上:这些,就是我在这里着手要指出的成见;这一类的要是还有剩下的,谁稍加思索都能改正。

三十六条命题推完了,他转过身来,看读的人手里还攥着什么。

第一部分推到第三十六條命題,推完了。然後是一篇附錄,裡頭不再分出命題和證明。

附錄開頭,他把前面證過的收成一段:神必然存在,只有一個,只憑自己本性的必然存在和行動,是萬物的自由的原因,萬物都在神之內。然後他說:

凡有機會的地方,那些會妨礙人領會我的證明的成見,我都設法清除了;可是剩下的還不少,而且恰恰最會妨礙人照我講的樣子去接受事物的聯繫。所以我認為值得在這裡,把它們叫到理性面前來審。

繫在一條上

這些成見,他說,都繫在一條上:人們一般以為,自然萬物都像他們自己一樣,是為了某個目的而動的;還認定神也把萬物引向某個目的。他們說,神為了人造了萬物,造人,是要人敬拜他。

他沒有先駁這一條。他說他分三步:先找原因,為什麼大多數人安於這個成見,而且人人天生都傾向於接受它;再指出它錯在哪兒;最後講善和惡,功和罪,贊美和責備,秩序和混亂,美和醜,這些成見怎樣從它長出來。

還沒說它為什麼錯,先說人為什麼會信。

不在這裡推

講原因之前,他先聲明一句:從人的心靈的本性把這些推出來,不是這裡的事。這裡只拿一件人人都得承認的事作根基:人生下來都不知道事物的原因;人人都有追求對自己有利的東西的欲求,並且知道自己有這個欲求。

往下就從這根基一步一步講。人知道自己想要什麼,卻連做夢也想不到是什麼讓他想要,於是以為自己是自由的。人做什麼都為了對自己有利,於是事事只問它的目的,聽到了目的就不再往下問。看見眼睛能看,牙齒能嚼,草木禽獸能吃,太陽能照,海能養魚,就斷定有一位或幾位管著自然的,給人預備好了這一切。他們想證明自然不做一件白做的事,也就是不做一件不為人所用的事,證明出來的,看上去只是自然和神跟人一樣發瘋。

說到這裡,他停下來說:我請你看看,事情最後落到了什麼地步。自然裡那麼多方便,免不了也有不少不便:風暴,地震,疾病。他們就說,這是神發了怒,因為人得罪了他們。

他接著提到數學:這個成見本來足以讓真理永遠對人類藏著,要不是數學給人看了真理的另一種標準。數學不管目的,只管圖形的本質和性質。

至於這個成見錯在哪兒,他說不必多講,指回前面的命題,再補了一段。

洗車

有人覺得,他一洗車,第二天準下雨。你把一個月的天氣記錄拿給他看,他點點頭;下回洗完車,還是抬頭看天。

你沒再往下翻記錄,改問他:是什麼讓你認定了這一條。

收束

附錄收在這兩句上:這些,就是我在這裡著手要指出的成見;這一類的要是還有剩下的,誰稍加思索都能改正。

三十六條命題推完了,他轉過身來,看讀的人手裡還攥著什麼。

Alongside SAE · an optional marginal note与SAE并读 · 可选旁注與SAE並讀 · 可選旁注

The SAE First Critique distinguishes exposing an illusion once from ending the conditions that produce it. Spinoza observes in this appendix that daily experience contradicts the prejudice without dislodging it: keeping an inborn ignorance is easier than dismantling and rebuilding the whole house. These passages can be compared without treating either as proof of the other.

《SAE第一批判》里有一句:一次识破,不终结产生幻相的条件。斯宾诺莎在这篇附录里说,天天的经验都在反驳那个成见,人们也没有放下它,因为留着生来的无知,比把整座房子拆掉重盖容易。这是旁注,不是论证。

《SAE第一批判》裡有一句:一次識破,不終結產生幻相的條件。斯賓諾莎在這篇附錄裡說,天天的經驗都在反駁那個成見,人們也沒有放下它,因為留著生來的無知,比把整座房子拆掉重蓋容易。這是旁注,不是論證。

The SAE First Critique essays →进入 SAE第一批判 →進入 SAE第一批判 →
Text, editions & sources文本、版本与来源文本、版本與來源

Primary location: Part I, Appendix. The account distinguishes the author’s announced explanation of prejudice from the formal demonstrations preceding it.

The car-wash scene is the essay’s analogy. It is not presented as a scientific account of every superstition, nor as an example from Spinoza.

对应第一部分附录。本文区分斯宾诺莎对成见为何生成的解释,与附录前面的形式证明。

洗车的场景是本系列的类比,不是斯宾诺莎原书中的例子,也不主张它足以解释所有迷信。

對應第一部分附錄。本文區分斯賓諾莎對成見為何生成的解釋,與附錄前面的形式證明。

洗車的場景是本系列的類比,不是斯賓諾莎原書中的例子,也不主張它足以解釋所有迷信。