SAE and Spinoza’s EthicsSAE斯宾诺莎伦理学SAE斯賓諾莎倫理學 · 04 / 10
Truth Is Its Own Standard
之四 · 真理是它自己的标准
之四 · 真理是它自己的標準
The light reveals the room—and, in doing so, reveals itself.
一个真观念，需不需要另一把尺子来担保它是真的？
一個真觀念，需不需要另一把尺子來擔保它是真的？
Proposition Forty-Three of Part II says that a person with a true idea also knows that they have a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of what is understood.
The demonstration begins with God. A true idea in the human mind is an adequate idea in God insofar as God is expressed through that mind. There must also be an idea of this idea, belonging to the same mind. The person therefore has a true idea of their own knowledge. At the last step, this is said to amount, self-evidently, to certainty.
Clear enough in itself
The scholium first points back to the explanation of an idea of an idea in the scholium to Proposition Twenty-One. Then it tells the reader that Proposition Forty-Three is already clear enough in itself.
Having a true idea, Spinoza says, involves the highest certainty. It means understanding something fully, or in the best way. To doubt this would be to think of an idea as something mute, like a picture on a panel, rather than as an act of understanding.
What could be clearer or more certain than a true idea and thus serve as its standard? As light reveals itself along with darkness, truth is the standard of itself and of falsity.
The point is not that an independently visible object happens to carry a certificate. The activity of understanding is doing the work.
When the lights return
The power fails at night. Then the lamp comes on. Tables and chairs become visible; so does the light that reveals them.
Nobody takes a torch to the lamp to check whether it really is shining.
The scene helps us enter the image. It is not a separate proof of Spinoza’s account of certainty.
The questions he thinks he has answered
Spinoza says he believes this answers several questions. If a true idea differs from a false one merely by agreeing with its object, what greater reality does it possess? How do false ideas arise? How can a person know with certainty that an idea agrees with its object?
He says again that he thinks the questions have been answered, then directs the reader backwards.
For the difference between true and false, look to Proposition Thirty-Five: falsity lies in a lack of knowledge, and a true idea differs from a false one as something present differs from what is absent. For the causes of error, consult Propositions Nineteen through Thirty-Five.
As for knowing that the idea agrees with its object, his answer is that one knows through having the idea itself. Truth is its own standard.
At the end, the explanation returns to God. In truly perceiving things, the mind is part of God’s infinite intellect. Clear and distinct ideas in the mind are true with the same necessity as God’s ideas.
At the end
The demonstration begins with God, and the scholium closes by returning there. Between those points stands a question: how could anyone know that they understand something unless they had first understood it?
The question does not introduce another external measuring instrument. It directs us back toward the understanding whose certainty is under discussion.
第二部分第四十三条命题：有真观念的人，同时就知道自己有真观念，对那件事的真不能怀疑。
证明从神讲起。人心里的一个真观念，就是神里面那个落在这个人心灵上的充分的观念；神里面既有这个观念，也必定有这个观念的观念，而这第二个观念，也在同一个人的心灵里。所以有真观念的人，必定同时有关于他这份认识的真观念。最后一步是：也就是说，这是自明的，他必定同时是确定的。
本身就够明白
附释头一句先交代：什么是观念的观念，第二十一条命题的附释里我讲过了；可要注意，前面这条命题本身就够明白的。
理由只有几句。有真观念的人，没有一个不知道真观念带着最高的确定；有真观念，说的无非是把一样东西认识得完满，认识得最好。谁要对这一点起疑，除非他以为观念是个哑巴东西，像画板上的一幅画，而不是一种思想样式，就是理解本身。
再往下，是这一句：还有什么比真观念更清楚，更确定，能拿来作真理的标准呢。正像光既照出自己，也照出黑暗，真理是它自己的标准，也是错误的标准。
来电的时候
半夜停电，灯忽然亮了。屋里的桌椅看得见了，那盏灯本身也看得见。
没有人再拿一支手电筒，去照一照那盏灯是不是真亮了。
我想我已经答了
说完这一句，他说：我想，这样我就答了下面这些问题。一，真观念要是只凭跟它的对象相合，才跟假观念分开，那它比假观念多出什么实在，有真观念的人又比只有假观念的人强在哪里；二，人怎么会有假观念；三，一个人凭什么确知自己的观念跟对象相合。
列完，他又说一遍：这些问题，我再说一遍，我想我已经答了。
然后一条一条指回前面。真观念和假观念的差别，看第三十五条命题，假在于认识的欠缺，前者对后者，像有对没有；错误的原因，第十九条到第三十五条讲过了；至于人凭什么知道自己的观念跟对象相合，他说，这只能是从他有这样一个观念来的，或者说，真理是它自己的标准。
附释最后，他又添了一句：我们的心灵真知觉事物的时候，是神的无限理智的一部分；所以心灵清楚分明的观念是真的，跟神的观念是真的一样必然。
收束
证明从神讲起；附释收尾，也回到神。夹在中间，有这样一句问话：
试问，谁能知道自己理解了一样东西，除非他先理解了它。
第二部分第四十三條命題：有真觀念的人，同時就知道自己有真觀念，對那件事的真不能懷疑。
證明從神講起。人心裡的一個真觀念，就是神裡面那個落在這個人心靈上的充分的觀念；神裡面既有這個觀念，也必定有這個觀念的觀念，而這第二個觀念，也在同一個人的心靈裡。所以有真觀念的人，必定同時有關於他這份認識的真觀念。最後一步是：也就是說，這是自明的，他必定同時是確定的。
本身就夠明白
附釋頭一句先交代：什麼是觀念的觀念，第二十一條命題的附釋裡我講過了；可要注意，前面這條命題本身就夠明白的。
理由只有幾句。有真觀念的人，沒有一個不知道真觀念帶著最高的確定；有真觀念，說的無非是把一樣東西認識得完滿，認識得最好。誰要對這一點起疑，除非他以為觀念是個啞巴東西，像畫板上的一幅畫，而不是一種思想樣式，就是理解本身。
再往下，是這一句：還有什麼比真觀念更清楚，更確定，能拿來作真理的標準呢。正像光既照出自己，也照出黑暗，真理是它自己的標準，也是錯誤的標準。
來電的時候
半夜停電，燈忽然亮了。屋裡的桌椅看得見了，那盞燈本身也看得見。
沒有人再拿一支手電筒，去照一照那盞燈是不是真亮了。
我想我已經答了
說完這一句，他說：我想，這樣我就答了下面這些問題。一，真觀念要是只憑跟它的對象相合，才跟假觀念分開，那它比假觀念多出什麼實在，有真觀念的人又比只有假觀念的人強在哪裡；二，人怎麼會有假觀念；三，一個人憑什麼確知自己的觀念跟對象相合。
列完，他又說一遍：這些問題，我再說一遍，我想我已經答了。
然後一條一條指回前面。真觀念和假觀念的差別，看第三十五條命題，假在於認識的欠缺，前者對後者，像有對沒有；錯誤的原因，第十九條到第三十五條講過了；至於人憑什麼知道自己的觀念跟對象相合，他說，這只能是從他有這樣一個觀念來的，或者說，真理是它自己的標準。
附釋最後，他又添了一句：我們的心靈真知覺事物的時候，是神的無限理智的一部分；所以心靈清楚分明的觀念是真的，跟神的觀念是真的一樣必然。
收束
證明從神講起；附釋收尾，也回到神。夾在中間，有這樣一句問話：
試問，誰能知道自己理解了一樣東西，除非他先理解了它。
Alongside SAE · an optional marginal note与SAE并读 · 可选旁注與SAE並讀 · 可選旁注
The SAE First Critique makes the standing of knowledge answerable to subsequent checking rather than to an independently available ruler measuring correspondence with the thing itself. Spinoza’s scholium locates the standard differently: having a true idea does not require another measure to certify it. The difference matters as much as the resemblance.
照《SAE第一批判》的说法，认识所得的东西成色如何，由后来的复核去结，不由它跟那样东西本身对不对得上来担保，那把对应的尺子从来没有给出来过。斯宾诺莎这条附释里，知道自己有真观念，用不着另拿一把尺子：真理是它自己的标准。这是旁注，不是论证。
照《SAE第一批判》的說法，認識所得的東西成色如何，由後來的復核去結，不由它跟那樣東西本身對不對得上來擔保，那把對應的尺子從來沒有給出來過。斯賓諾莎這條附釋裡，知道自己有真觀念，用不著另拿一把尺子：真理是它自己的標準。這是旁注，不是論證。
The SAE First Critique essays →进入 SAE第一批判 →進入 SAE第一批判 →Text, editions & sources文本、版本与来源文本、版本與來源
Locations: II.43, its demonstration and scholium, with the backward references to II.21 and II.35. Spinoza’s claim is presented as his argument, not as an endorsement of every feeling of subjective certainty.
The lamp is an explanatory scene developed from the text’s image of light. The precise word count of the demonstration is not needed for the reading.
对应第二部分第四十三条命题、证明及附释，并回指第二十一条、第三十五条。本文转述斯宾诺莎的论证，不把它换成“只要我很确定，就是真的”。
来电的灯是沿原文光的比喻展开的生活场景，不是另立的证明。
對應第二部分第四十三條命題、證明及附釋，並回指第二十一條、第三十五條。本文轉述斯賓諾莎的論證，不把它換成「只要我很確定，就是真的」。
來電的燈是沿原文光的比喻展開的生活場景，不是另立的證明。