SAE and Spinoza’s EthicsSAE斯宾诺莎伦理学SAE斯賓諾莎倫理學 · 01 / 10
By This, I Understand
之一 · 我理解为
之一 · 我理解為
The first verb in a geometrical system belongs to someone speaking in the first person.
开头说的是“我理解为”,到了附释里,成了“他们会这样理解”。
開頭說的是「我理解為」,到了附釋裡,成了「他們會這樣理解」。
The Ethics begins by defining a cause of itself: by this, Spinoza understands something whose essence involves existence, or whose nature can be conceived only as existing.
The first verb in the main text of a book demonstrated in geometrical order is a first-person verb. I understand.
Eight definitions
Part I has eight definitions. Six follow this pattern: name a term, then say what I understand by it. Cause of itself, substance, attribute, mode, God and eternity all enter in this manner.
The other two use a different construction: something is called finite in its kind if another thing of the same nature can limit it; something is called free if it exists solely through the necessity of its own nature and is determined to act by itself alone.
After defining God, Spinoza adds an explanation. Again there is a speaker: I say absolutely infinite, not merely infinite in its kind.
Compare the opening of Euclid’s Elements. A point is that which has no part. That definition does not introduce itself through an “I.”
When the speaker falls quiet
Seven axioms follow Spinoza’s definitions. The first-person singular falls away.
Then comes the first proposition: substance is prior in nature to its modifications. The demonstration is one sentence, referring us to Definitions Three and Five.
Sentences originally introduced as what I understand have become numbered premises. Definition Three. Definition Five. Subsequent proofs refer to definitions, axioms and propositions in turn. Through the first eight propositions, the singular speaker does not return in that earlier manner.
The statement has not vanished. It has changed its role in the page’s machinery.
When he returns
Proposition Eight has two scholia. At the beginning of the second, the first person returns. Spinoza does not doubt that readers who judge things confusedly, and are unused to knowing them through their first causes, will find the demonstration of Proposition Seven difficult.
Proposition Seven says that existence belongs to the nature of substance. Spinoza describes the confusions of people ignorant of causes: they imagine trees speaking like people, or people arising from stones as readily as from seed.
Then he says that if people attended to the nature of substance, they would not doubt the proposition at all. It would be an axiom for them, because they would understand substance as what is in itself and conceived through itself.
At the beginning: what I understand. Here: what they would understand.
In the same scholium he explains what a true definition should contain. It expresses nothing beyond the nature of what is defined. A triangle’s definition expresses the nature of a triangle, not the existence of a particular number of triangles.
In a classroom
A physics teacher begins a lesson: for the constant force we are considering, by work I mean force multiplied by the displacement in its direction.
The lesson proceeds on that basis. The teacher need not keep saying what I mean at every calculation. The “I” appeared at the beginning; what it established continues to support later steps.
At a difficult point the teacher pauses: I know this is not easy to see. The voice returns where an anticipated reader or listener needs attention.
At the end
The opening speaker tells us how he understands his terms. Returning in the scholium, he says that anyone attending properly would understand them in that way.
A proposition must be followed by its demonstration. That latter statement is not presented as another proposition. It is written in a scholium.
《伦理学》的正文,从一条定义起头:
自因,我把它理解为这样的东西:它的本质包含存在;或者说,它的本性只能被设想为存在着。
一本按几何次序证明的书,正文里头一个动词是第一人称的:我理解。
八条定义
第一部分一共八条定义。六条都照这个样子写:先说一个词,接着说我把它理解为什么。自因,实体,属性,样式,神,永恒,都是这样。
另外两条不带这个我,用的是称为。一条说,一样东西若能被同性质的另一样东西限住,就称为在它那一类里有限的;一条说,一样东西若只凭自己本性的必然而存在,只由自己决定去行动,就称为自由的。
定义神的那一条后面,他又补了一段说明,头一句是:我说的是绝对无限,不是在它那一类里无限。
欧几里得《几何原本》开头的定义,不带这个我。第一条是:点,是没有部分的东西。
往下这个我就不开口了
定义之后是七条公则,里面没有一个我。
再往下是命题。第一条:实体在本性上先于它的种种状态。证明只有一句:由定义三和定义五即明。
前面用第一人称说出来的那几句,到这里成了按编号援引的东西:定义三,定义五。往下的证明一条接一条,引的是定义几,公则几,命题几。一直到第八条命题,这个我没有再出现过。
他回来的时候
第八条命题后面跟着两条附释。第二条一开头,那个我回来了:
我不怀疑,凡是对事物判断得混乱,又不习惯从第一因去认识事物的人,都会觉得第七条命题的证明难以领会。
第七条命题说的是:存在属于实体的本性。不知道事物真正原因的人,他接着写,什么都混在一起:想象树也像人一样会说话,人既能从种子长成,也能从石头变成。
再往下是这一句:人们要是留意实体的本性,就绝不会怀疑第七条命题是真的;这条命题对所有人都会是一条公则。因为他们会把实体理解为在自身之内,凭自身被设想的东西。
定义里说的是我理解为。到了这里,成了他们会这样理解。
同一条附释里,他还交代了真定义该是什么样:它除了被定义的那样东西的本性,什么也不包含,什么也不表达。三角形的定义表达的,只是三角形的单纯本性,不是某一个数目的三角形。
一堂课上
一堂课开头,老师先说:这里先讨论恒力做功:我指的是力乘上沿着力的方向发生的位移。
往下一整堂课,功都照这个算,他不用再说一遍我指的是什么。那个我只在开头出现过一回,后面每一步都靠着它。
讲到某一步,他料到底下会有人卡住,才又停下来说一句:我知道这一步不好懂。
收束
这本书开头那个我,说的是他怎样理解这几个词。它在附释里回来,接着说的是:只要留意,谁都会这样理解。
命题底下要跟证明。这一句不是命题,写在附释里。
《倫理學》的正文,從一條定義起頭:
自因,我把它理解為這樣的東西:它的本質包含存在;或者說,它的本性只能被設想為存在著。
一本按幾何次序證明的書,正文裡頭一個動詞是第一人稱的:我理解。
八條定義
第一部分一共八條定義。六條都照這個樣子寫:先說一個詞,接著說我把它理解為什麼。自因,實體,屬性,樣式,神,永恆,都是這樣。
另外兩條不帶這個我,用的是稱為。一條說,一樣東西若能被同性質的另一樣東西限住,就稱為在它那一類裡有限的;一條說,一樣東西若只憑自己本性的必然而存在,只由自己決定去行動,就稱為自由的。
定義神的那一條後面,他又補了一段說明,頭一句是:我說的是絕對無限,不是在它那一類裡無限。
歐幾裡得《幾何原本》開頭的定義,不帶這個我。第一條是:點,是沒有部分的東西。
往下這個我就不開口了
定義之後是七條公則,裡面沒有一個我。
再往下是命題。第一條:實體在本性上先於它的種種狀態。證明只有一句:由定義三和定義五即明。
前面用第一人稱說出來的那幾句,到這裡成了按編號援引的東西:定義三,定義五。往下的證明一條接一條,引的是定義幾,公則幾,命題幾。一直到第八條命題,這個我沒有再出現過。
他回來的時候
第八條命題後面跟著兩條附釋。第二條一開頭,那個我回來了:
我不懷疑,凡是對事物判斷得混亂,又不習慣從第一因去認識事物的人,都會覺得第七條命題的證明難以領會。
第七條命題說的是:存在屬於實體的本性。不知道事物真正原因的人,他接著寫,什麼都混在一起:想像樹也像人一樣會說話,人既能從種子長成,也能從石頭變成。
再往下是這一句:人們要是留意實體的本性,就絕不會懷疑第七條命題是真的;這條命題對所有人都會是一條公則。因為他們會把實體理解為在自身之內,憑自身被設想的東西。
定義裡說的是我理解為。到了這裡,成了他們會這樣理解。
同一條附釋裡,他還交代了真定義該是什麼樣:它除了被定義的那樣東西的本性,什麼也不包含,什麼也不表達。三角形的定義表達的,只是三角形的單純本性,不是某一個數目的三角形。
一堂課上
一堂課開頭,老師先說:這裡先討論恆力做功:我指的是力乘上沿著力的方向發生的位移。
往下一整堂課,功都照這個算,他不用再說一遍我指的是什麼。那個我只在開頭出現過一回,後面每一步都靠著它。
講到某一步,他料到底下會有人卡住,才又停下來說一句:我知道這一步不好懂。
收束
這本書開頭那個我,說的是他怎樣理解這幾個詞。它在附釋裡回來,接著說的是:只要留意,誰都會這樣理解。
命題底下要跟證明。這一句不是命題,寫在附釋裡。
Alongside SAE · an optional marginal note与SAE并读 · 可选旁注與SAE並讀 · 可選旁注
The SAE First Critique assigns different work to different voices: an impersonal account of objects, a first-person examination of its own position, and a “we” that undertakes or withdraws commitments. Spinoza’s distribution is different. The speaker introduces definitions, recedes during the initial proofs, and returns to address a reader. The comparison concerns the distribution of voices, not an equivalence between the systems.
《SAE第一批判》也给自己的声音分了工:讲外面的对象用客观的写法,审查自己用第一人称,承担什么或者收回什么,署名用我们。斯宾诺莎这边分得不同:定义里说话的是我,头八条命题推下来这个我不出声,到附释里又回来。这是旁注,不是论证。
《SAE第一批判》也給自己的聲音分了工:講外面的對象用客觀的寫法,審查自己用第一人稱,承擔什麼或者收回什麼,署名用我們。斯賓諾莎這邊分得不同:定義裡說話的是我,頭八條命題推下來這個我不出聲,到附釋裡又回來。這是旁注,不是論證。
The SAE First Critique essays →进入 SAE第一批判 →進入 SAE第一批判 →Text, editions & sources文本、版本与来源文本、版本與來源
Locations: Part I, Definitions 1–8; Axioms 1–7; Propositions 1–8; Proposition 8, Scholium 2. The reading observes shifts in grammatical voice; it does not claim that first-person wording makes a definition arbitrary.
The classroom example is limited to the simple constant-force case. It illustrates how an initial definition supports subsequent calculation, not Spinoza’s doctrine of truth.
对应第一部分定义1—8、公则1—7、命题1—8及第八条命题附释二。本文观察语法人称怎样分工,不据“我理解为”断定定义只是任意意见。
课堂例子限于恒力做功,用来说明定义如何支撑后续计算,不拿它证明斯宾诺莎的真理观。
對應第一部分定義1—8、公則1—7、命題1—8及第八條命題附釋二。本文觀察語法人稱怎樣分工,不據「我理解為」斷定定義只是任意意見。
課堂例子限於恆力做功,用來說明定義如何支撐後續計算,不拿它證明斯賓諾莎的真理觀。