Edition note: A complete English rendering of the Chinese essay, restoring its scenes and argument with documented factual corrections and limited interpretive qualifications. Full-book spoilers.
When Blanche’s death is discussed, Strickland insists that he never offered what she wanted. In his account he had made clear what he was after; she would not accept it. He treats her death as her affair, not his.
We should not turn his version into an independent certificate of innocence. Even if he made no promise of lasting love, the absence of that promise does not dispose of what happened. Blanche is still dead.
Strickland is a bastard, people say, but he is a genius, so it was worth it. There are more polished versions. Great art has a cost. Had he remained a London stockbroker, the world would have lost those paintings. Ordinary moral standards cannot apply to an exceptional artist.
The problem is not merely that such claims sound cruel. We should look at what the sentence is doing.
It makes a balance sheet. On one side: the abandoned family, the ruined marriage, the death. On the other: the paintings. Then it announces that the gain exceeds the loss.
That calculation assumes he exchanged the former for the latter. But he did not describe his departure as an undertaking to compensate his family with art. Asked about his wife, he did not say that her suffering would be worthwhile. He behaved as though it were irrelevant to his decision.
Nor did he promise masterpieces. When challenged about his ability, he did not produce genius as a reason. Stroeve supplies that word, then critics, then readers. They provide a justification that was not his own.
We calculate on someone’s behalf and use the result to defend him, although he has not asked to be defended on those terms. Our defence may tell us more about our need to reconcile the story than about what drove him.
The usual exemption for genius says: this person has done harm, but possesses something special that places him outside ordinary rules. Strickland does not appeal to that provision. He does not patiently explain that the misunderstood artist deserves a different standard.
He paints. He treats Stroeve with contempt. When confronted, he often refuses the moral conversation rather than arguing for a privileged place within it. He can even agree that his conduct is monstrous without changing course.
That refusal does not grant him immunity. It simply means that the licence later issued in his name is not the reason he offered for acting. We should not mistake indifference to judgment for a successful answer to it.
In Tahiti, he lives with Ata and their children away from European society. He develops leprosy, and the household becomes increasingly isolated. Dr. Coutras visits. Years later, called back when Strickland is dying, the doctor arrives after his death.
Inside the house the walls are covered in painting. Coutras, no trained connoisseur, is shaken by what he sees: a world at once beautiful, bodily, mysterious, and frightening. He feels that someone has reached into things ordinarily concealed.
Strickland had been blind for almost a year. The next chapter says he sat in the rooms he had painted, facing the work with sightless eyes.
Before his death he made Ata promise to burn the house after the burial. Coutras tries to dissuade her. She keeps the promise. The work has had witnesses, including Ata and the doctor, but it will have no continuing public life.
The destruction is not simply one more picturesque detail in an artist’s legend. It breaks the familiar structure of an achievement preserved for a future audience. If the murals were intended as humanity’s eventual compensation, why remove the very thing that was supposed to pay the debt?
This does not mean all his paintings disappear, or that nobody ever gains anything from them. Works survive, and his reputation grows. The narrower point concerns the final work: its meaning for him does not require that the world inherit it.
On this reading, completion is enough. There is no commissioner to satisfy, no public acceptance to secure, no final recipient whose benefit explains the act. Doing the work and delivering a valuable product to posterity are not the same thing.
So the fire undermines the particular defence that presents him as sacrificing people to give us a masterpiece. He has not agreed to that contract, and here he withholds the supposed payment.
It would be easy to make another defence out of that refusal: how pure, how independent of fame, therefore how justified. That would merely repeat the conversion with a more flattering currency.
The picture cannot cancel Blanche’s death, not because it is insufficiently valuable, but because these are not exchangeable things. His necessity can be real, and the injury to his wife, to Blanche, and to Stroeve can also be real. Neither proves or disproves the other.
The fire does not absolve him. It makes one of our preferred ways of absolving him harder to sustain.
The novel provides no neat final judgment. Strickland’s illness can be read by a character as punishment, but the book does not thereby certify divine retribution. It gives us no repentance that resolves the injury, and no declaration that the paintings paid for it.
The narrator’s distaste matters, but it is not a court’s concluding verdict. He continues to describe things that do not fit his liking. Maugham lets the necessity and the damage remain visible together.
That can feel evasive only if we think a novel must finish by clearing the account. Here the refusal of closure is part of its force. The reader has to keep holding what a tidy answer would let us set down.
Finding something entirely one’s own is one thing. Recognizing that other people contain something no less their own is another. There is no guaranteed passage from the first to the second.
The next essay stays with that separation. It will not offer a new total score for Strickland as a human being. Refusing that score does not make the harm weightless. It means we must say both things without using either to silence the other.
Source: W. Somerset Maugham, The Moon and Sixpence. The Chinese essays use Fu Weici’s translated character names. Plot details checked against the English text, chapters XII, XXXIX, LVI–LVIII. Dialogue is paraphrased, not quoted from a published translation.
版本说明:中文原作;简体与繁体同页切换。人物、版本与关键情节表述已按作品文本校订。全书剧透。
勃朗什死后,有人跟思特里克兰德提起这件事。
他的反应大意是:她自己要死的,这跟他没有关系。他没有骗过她,他一开始就说清楚了自己要的是什么。是她自己不肯听。
他说的全是事实。
他确实没有承诺过任何东西。他确实说过他要的只是画完那幅画。他确实没有骗她。
而她还是死了。
关于这本书,流传最广的一种说法是:
思特里克兰德是个混蛋,但他是天才,所以值了。
这句话有很多种说法。有的说得体面一点:伟大的艺术需要代价。有的说得直白一点:如果他留在伦敦当经纪人,世界上就少了那些画,这个交换是划算的。有的说得更聪明一点:道德标准不适用于这种人。
这一篇要说明,这句话是这本书里最不该说的一句。
而理由不是它太冷酷。
先看这句话在做什么。
"他画得那么好,所以值了"——这是一次结算。左边是代价:一个被抛下的家,一个被夺走的妻子,一条人命。右边是收益:那些画。然后判断左边小于右边。
要做这笔结算,必须先有一个前提:思特里克兰德是拿这些东西去换那些画的。
而他从来没有做过这个交换。
回到第一篇。他走的时候没有说过"我要用我的家庭去换我的艺术"。他被问到妻子怎么办的时候,说的是那与他无关——不是"值得",是"无关"。
他从来没有说过他会画出伟大的作品。被问到画得好不好的时候,他说他不知道。他从来没有拿"我是天才"当过任何一件事的理由。
说这话的一直是别人。
第一个说的是施特略夫。后来是评论家。再后来是读者。
所以"值了"这句话,是替他做的一笔账,而这笔账他本人从来没有报过。
我们替一个人算账,然后用算出来的结果替他辩护——这件事的荒唐之处在于,被辩护的那个人从头到尾没有申请过辩护。
这一点值得再说一层。
一个通常的"天才豁免论"是这样运作的:这个人做了伤害别人的事,但他有一样特殊的东西,这样东西让他不适用于普通的规矩。
思特里克兰德没有引用过这条规则。
他不是那种一边做混蛋事一边说"你们不懂,我是艺术家"的人。他从来不解释,不辩护,不搬出任何身份。
他对施特略夫说的那些难听话,理由不是"我是天才你是庸才"。他就是觉得那个人蠢。
他抛下妻子,理由不是"我要成就伟大"。他就是要去画画。
他甚至没有认为自己是对的。他压根不在这个坐标里——对不对这个问题,他没有回答过,因为他没有接受这个提问。
所以豁免这件事也是别人给的。
我们给了他一个他没有要过的许可证,然后拿这张证去回答一个他没有提出过的问题。
现在说结尾,因为结尾把这套辩护的最后一块地基抽走了。
思特里克兰德最后住在塔希提,跟一个土著女人在一起,生了孩子,住在很远的山里。
他得了麻风。
那是一种缓慢的病。他的样子变得可怕,村里人躲着他,医生来看过,说没有办法。
后来他瞎了。
失明之前,他已在小屋的墙上画下巨幅壁画。失明以后,他常在已经画好的房间里坐上很久,用看不见的眼睛朝着那些画。
医生后来进过那间屋子,看见了。书里借医生的眼睛写了这幅画——那是一个震撼到让人恐惧的东西,医生站在那里,觉得自己在偷看一件不该看的秘密。
这是思特里克兰德一生最好的作品。
而他临死之前吩咐那个女人:等他死了,把房子烧掉。
她照做了。
那面墙烧成了灰。除了那个女人和那个医生,没有第二个人看见过。
这个结尾常常被读成一种极致的悲壮,或者读成艺术家的孤高。
它的实际功能要冷得多。
它取消了"他在攒一样东西"这个可能。
假设他画那些画,是为了将来有人看见——那么整件事就还在一个交换的结构里。他付出了家庭、别人的性命、自己一生的舒适,换取那些画将来的存在和被看见。这个交换可以被评价、被计算、被辩论。
烧了那面墙,这个结构就不成立了。
他不是在攒。他画完了,画完就够了。他没有想留下什么给谁,也没有想让任何人承认。
所以那句"他画得那么好,所以值了",问题在这里:"值了"这个词需要有人收货。
而他不交货。
他做的那件事,从头到尾没有对手方。没有人给他派任务,没有人验收,没有人受益,没有人被留下什么。这件事的全部意义就在做它本身,做完就结束了。
那面被烧掉的墙,是这本书能给出的最强的一个证明:那件事对他有全部的意义,而对任何人没有一点用处。
到这里必须掉转方向,因为上面那些话很容易被读成一种更高级的辩护——你看,他这么纯粹,所以更值得原谅。
不。
这一篇要说的正好相反。
取消"值了"这个说法,同时也取消了替他脱罪的可能。
如果他是在做一笔交换,那么至少还有一个东西可以拿来讨价还价——你可以说那些画很了不起,可以主张收益大于成本,可以争论汇率。辩护是可能的,因为账本是打开的。
而现在没有账本。
那些画不能被拿来抵消勃朗什的死,不是因为它们不够好,是因为它们跟那件事不在同一个账户里,兑换不了。
第二篇里施特略夫做的就是这件事:他同时看见了两样真实的东西,而且没有把它们混着算。
这一篇是把那个动作说清楚:
思特里克兰德找到了一件只属于他自己的事,这件事是真的。
他毁掉了三个人,这件事也是真的。
这两件事不互相抵消,也不互相证明。
第一件不能用来赦免第二件——因为它不是拿第二件换来的,它跟第二件没有交易关系。
而第二件也不能用来否定第一件——他确实找到了那样东西,勃朗什的死不能让那件事变成假的。
它们只是同时存在,而且必须同时被看见。
值得注意的是这本书的作者做了什么。
他一样也没有裁决。
他没有让思特里克兰德受到惩罚——麻风不是报应,书里没有一处暗示这是他应得的,那只是他碰上的一种病。
他没有让思特里克兰德忏悔。这个人到死没有一句后悔的话,也没有一句关于勃朗什的话。
他没有替艺术辩护。书里没有任何一处说"这些画值得那些代价"。
他也没有让谁站出来控诉。"我"始终不喜欢这个人,但"我"从来没有做出过判决。
毛姆做的事,是把两边都摆出来,然后走开。
而这个"走开"不是回避。它是这本书在方法上最讲究的地方——因为一旦下了判决,判决就会替读者把这件事结掉,读者可以合上书,觉得这件事有答案了。
这本书不给这个出口。
那么这本书到底要说什么?
如果找到自己非做不可的事是真的,毁掉别人也是真的,两边都不能抵消——那读者拿这本书怎么办?
下一篇收尾。会讲一件事:
找到自己的那件事,和承认别人身上也有同样的东西,是两件不同的事。
后一件更难。而且没有任何东西保证,做到前一件的人会做到后一件。
思特里克兰德是这两件事分得最开的一个标本。
而这一篇不会给他判决。因为一旦判了,就等于说他的价值取决于他对别人怎么样——那正好又回到了一个外部的评分表上,而这本书从头到尾在做的,就是让人看清那张表是靠不住的。
《月亮与六便士》,威廉·萨默塞特·毛姆著。本文人名从傅惟慈译本。