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SAE and Descartes’ MeditationsSAE笛卡尔沉思集SAE笛卡爾沉思集 · 02 / 06

One Doubt Remains

之二 · 我只剩一点疑虑

之二 · 我只剩一點疑慮

The famous circle was not discovered behind the author’s back. He printed the objection himself.

阿尔诺指出一个循环;笛卡尔的回答,把读者领回这本书前面几处。

阿爾諾指出一個循環;笛卡爾的回答,把讀者領回這本書前面幾處。

Han Qin (秦汉秦汉秦漢) · 2026

One objection in this book acquired a name of its own. It appears as a charge of circular reasoning in the Fourth Objections. Mersenne’s group had already raised the underlying difficulty. Both exchanges are in the volume Descartes sent to press.

What is supposed to go in a circle?

Here is the route as Arnauld lays it out. Whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true. On that basis I establish that God exists. Since God does not deceive, what I perceive clearly and distinctly must indeed be true.

Arnauld wonders how Descartes avoids a circle. We are certain that clear and distinct perceptions are true only because God exists; yet we are certain of God’s existence only because we perceive it clearly and distinctly. Must we not already trust that kind of perception before establishing God?

The problem came to be known as the Cartesian Circle. It has outlived both men and remains a subject of philosophical dispute.

The person who objected, and the person who printed it

What matters here is where the objection appears. It was not an embarrassment dug up centuries afterwards. It arrived in a solicited report before publication, and the author placed it after his own main text.

Arnauld’s manner is courteous. He does not announce that he has caught a fatal error. He says one doubt remains. He has divided his report between philosophy and theology; this doubt closes the philosophical portion.

Then he adds something else he had nearly forgotten: Descartes’ claim that the mind is aware of everything within it seems wrong. Consider a child in the womb.

A challenge to the foundations of the argument is followed by an additional item almost as an afterthought. It is the voice of someone doing the job he was asked to do.

The distinction in the reply

Descartes answers within the same volume. He separates two conditions: attending to something clearly now, and remembering that one attended to it clearly before.

On his account, the first does not require an appeal to God. While the mind attends to the reasons establishing God’s existence, their evident force is present. The difficulty concerns what happens afterwards, when one is no longer considering the reasons and remembers having understood them.

That later confidence requires a guarantee. God is invoked for it, not to supply the immediate force of the original insight. In Descartes’ view, distinguishing the two prevents the supposed circle from closing.

Whether the answer succeeds is not decided here. There is something else to notice about how it is delivered.

A book that sends you back through itself

When he replies to Arnauld, Descartes says he has already explained the point sufficiently in the third and fourth sections of his response to the Second Objections. Rather than start over, he sends the reader to an earlier reply.

That reply answers a difficulty raised by Mersenne’s group. If nothing can be known with certainty before God’s existence is known, how can Descartes already be certain that he is a thinking thing? And what about an atheist geometer who clearly understands that a triangle’s angles equal two right angles?

Replying to them, Descartes again says he has already made the point clear. He means the certainty of conclusions remembered after their grounds are no longer before the mind. The earlier place he invokes is the Fifth Meditation.

The path therefore runs backwards. A distinction appears in the Fifth Meditation. Mersenne’s group challenges the position, and the reply points back to that distinction. Arnauld raises the difficulty again as a circle; Descartes points back to the answer he gave Mersenne.

These are not merely detachable appendices. Objections, replies and meditations refer into one another. The author has already asked us to read the exchanges before passing judgment on the main text. Skipping them means missing part of the argument the book asks us to assess.

A reference, and a gas tap

The alleged circle has an everyday counterpart. You ask whether someone is trustworthy and consult a reference they themselves supplied. That alone need not be circular: the reference may genuinely know them. The circle begins if you trust the referee only because this person recommends them, and trust the person only because the referee recommends them. Neither judgment has an independent support.

The distinction in Descartes’ answer also has an everyday counterpart. Two streets from home, you cannot remember whether you turned off the gas. You did turn it off, and watched yourself do so. But what you have now is a memory.

The difference between seeing the closed tap then and recalling it now is more than elapsed time. One person goes back because the memory does not settle the matter; another keeps walking because it does.

Descartes wants the later confidence to have a secure footing. Underneath it, he places God. The household example makes the distinction visible; it does not vindicate his guarantee.

At the end

Later readers gave the difficulty a name. Two groups asked it, and Descartes printed both. Arnauld’s courteous opening and his next, almost casual objection remain there too.

To answer Arnauld he directs us to Mersenne’s exchange; that exchange directs us to a meditation. Before judging the final answer, we have to follow the route by which it arrives.

这本书有一条反驳,后来有了自己的名字。它以循环这个名目说出来,是在这本书自己的第四组反驳里;同样的疑问,梅森那一组已经问过。两回都是作者收进书里的。

那条反驳是什么

先说它要打的是什么。

照阿尔诺的排法,笛卡尔在六个沉思里走的是这么一条路:凡是我清楚分明看见的,就是真的;我凭这一条证出神存在;而神不骗人,所以凡我清楚分明看见的确实是真的。

阿尔诺疑心这里转了个圈。他写:

我只剩一点疑虑,就是他怎么才算没有犯循环。他说我们之所以确知凡清楚分明所见为真,只因为神存在。可我们要确知神存在,又只因为这一点是我们清楚分明看见的。那么在确知神存在之前,我们就得先确知凡清楚分明看见的都是真的。

这段话后来有个名字,叫笛卡尔循环。三百多年过去,它还在被人讨论。

说它的人,和印它的人

要紧的是它出现在哪里。

不是后人翻出来的破绽。是付印之前要来的反对意见里的一条,作者收进书里,排在正文后面。

而且阿尔诺说得很客气。他不说我抓到一个漏洞,他说我只剩一点疑虑。全组反驳他先作哲学家说了一段,再作神学家说一段,这一条是哲学家那一段的收尾。

收完他还添了一句:再补一句刚漏掉的。跟着又提出一条新的:笛卡尔断定心灵里凡有的它都自知,这一点我看是错的;比如胎儿。

一条足以动摇全书的反驳,末尾接着一句顺手补的。这是被请来挑毛病的人的口气。

他怎么答

答在同一本书里,隔了几十页。

他的答法是切开:此刻正在清楚看见,和记得自己先前清楚看见过,这是两件事。

头一件不需要神。当你正盯着那几条理由看的时候,神存在这一条就立住了,靠的是你此刻在看。第二件才需要:过后你不再盯着看了,只剩一个记得。要让那个记得还算数,得有别的东西在底下托着。神托的是第二件,不是头一件;所以在他看来,圈没有转起来。

这个答案是不是够,本书不判。这里要看的是另一样。

一套自己引自己的装置

他答这一条的时候,写的是:这我在答第二组反驳的第三节和第四节里已经讲够了。

他没有重讲一遍,他指回这本书前面的一篇答辩。而那一篇答的,是梅森那一组早先提过的同一个疑问:您既然说确知神存在之前什么都确知不了,那您连自己是一个在思想的东西,都还不能确知;何况一个不信神的几何学者,照样清楚分明地知道三角形三个角等于两个直角。

答梅森的时候,他也没有新造什么。他说:这一点我在那里已经明明白白说过了,我讲的只是那些结论的确知,是我们不再盯着推出它们的理由,只剩下记得的那一种。那个那里,是第五个沉思。

所以这条路是这样走的。第五个沉思里先有这个分别;梅森问了一回,他指回沉思;阿尔诺换个说法又问一回,叫它循环,他指回答梅森的那一篇。同一个疑问被问了两回,他两回都往回指。

到这一步,这本书的摆法就清楚了。反驳和答辩不是一沓附录,它们跟六个沉思互相指着。他在书前就请读者,先把反驳和答复读完,再对沉思下判断。跳过去只读六个沉思,读到的是一本缺件的书。

介绍人,和煤气

阿尔诺指的那个圈,日常里也有。

打听一个人靠不靠谱,找个熟人问问,而那个熟人是他介绍给你的。这还不算圈,熟人可能真认识他。圈是这样的:你信这个熟人,只因为他说这熟人可靠;你信他,又只因为这熟人说他可靠。两头各靠对方撑着,中间没有第三样东西。

至于他那个切开的答法,日常里也有。

出门走出两条街,忽然想不起煤气关没关。你确实关了,而且关的时候是看着关的。可现在手上只剩一个记得。当时看着的那一眼,和此刻的这个记得,隔着的东西不是时间那么简单。有人会掉头回去,那是不认这个记得;有人接着走,那是认了。

笛卡尔要的,是让这个记得站得住。他在底下放了神。

收束

这个疑问,后人给它起了名字。

问它的有两组,把两回都印出来的是笛卡尔。没有摆在不显眼的地方,连阿尔诺那句客气的开场和顺手补上的下一条,都一并印着。

他答阿尔诺,指回答梅森的那一篇;那一篇又指回沉思。要读懂最后那个答案,得先读梅森那一条和他当时的答复。

這本書有一條反駁,後來有了自己的名字。它以循環這個名目說出來,是在這本書自己的第四組反駁裡;同樣的疑問,梅森那一組已經問過。兩回都是作者收進書裡的。

那條反駁是什麼

先說它要打的是什麼。

照阿爾諾的排法,笛卡爾在六個沉思裡走的是這麼一條路:凡是我清楚分明看見的,就是真的;我憑這一條證出神存在;而神不騙人,所以凡我清楚分明看見的確實是真的。

阿爾諾疑心這裡轉了個圈。他寫:

我只剩一點疑慮,就是他怎麼才算沒有犯循環。他說我們之所以確知凡清楚分明所見為真,只因為神存在。可我們要確知神存在,又只因為這一點是我們清楚分明看見的。那麼在確知神存在之前,我們就得先確知凡清楚分明看見的都是真的。

這段話後來有個名字,叫笛卡爾循環。三百多年過去,它還在被人討論。

說它的人,和印它的人

要緊的是它出現在哪裡。

不是後人翻出來的破綻。是付印之前要來的反對意見裡的一條,作者收進書裡,排在正文後面。

而且阿爾諾說得很客氣。他不說我抓到一個漏洞,他說我只剩一點疑慮。全組反駁他先作哲學家說了一段,再作神學家說一段,這一條是哲學家那一段的收尾。

收完他還添了一句:再補一句剛漏掉的。跟著又提出一條新的:笛卡爾斷定心靈裡凡有的它都自知,這一點我看是錯的;比如胎兒。

一條足以動搖全書的反駁,末尾接著一句順手補的。這是被請來挑毛病的人的口氣。

他怎麼答

答在同一本書裡,隔了幾十頁。

他的答法是切開:此刻正在清楚看見,和記得自己先前清楚看見過,這是兩件事。

頭一件不需要神。當你正盯著那幾條理由看的時候,神存在這一條就立住了,靠的是你此刻在看。第二件才需要:過後你不再盯著看了,只剩一個記得。要讓那個記得還算數,得有別的東西在底下托著。神托的是第二件,不是頭一件;所以在他看來,圈沒有轉起來。

這個答案是不是夠,本書不判。這裡要看的是另一樣。

一套自己引自己的裝置

他答這一條的時候,寫的是:這我在答第二組反駁的第三節和第四節裡已經講夠了。

他沒有重講一遍,他指回這本書前面的一篇答辯。而那一篇答的,是梅森那一組早先提過的同一個疑問:您既然說確知神存在之前什麼都確知不了,那您連自己是一個在思想的東西,都還不能確知;何況一個不信神的幾何學者,照樣清楚分明地知道三角形三個角等於兩個直角。

答梅森的時候,他也沒有新造什麼。他說:這一點我在那裡已經明明白白說過了,我講的只是那些結論的確知,是我們不再盯著推出它們的理由,只剩下記得的那一種。那個那裡,是第五個沉思。

所以這條路是這樣走的。第五個沉思裡先有這個分別;梅森問了一回,他指回沉思;阿爾諾換個說法又問一回,叫它循環,他指回答梅森的那一篇。同一個疑問被問了兩回,他兩回都往回指。

到這一步,這本書的擺法就清楚了。反駁和答辯不是一沓附錄,它們跟六個沉思互相指著。他在書前就請讀者,先把反駁和答復讀完,再對沉思下判斷。跳過去只讀六個沉思,讀到的是一本缺件的書。

介紹人,和煤氣

阿爾諾指的那個圈,日常裡也有。

打聽一個人靠不靠譜,找個熟人問問,而那個熟人是他介紹給你的。這還不算圈,熟人可能真認識他。圈是這樣的:你信這個熟人,只因為他說這熟人可靠;你信他,又只因為這熟人說他可靠。兩頭各靠對方撐著,中間沒有第三樣東西。

至於他那個切開的答法,日常裡也有。

出門走出兩條街,忽然想不起煤氣關沒關。你確實關了,而且關的時候是看著關的。可現在手上只剩一個記得。當時看著的那一眼,和此刻的這個記得,隔著的東西不是時間那麼簡單。有人會掉頭回去,那是不認這個記得;有人接著走,那是認了。

笛卡爾要的,是讓這個記得站得住。他在底下放了神。

收束

這個疑問,後人給它起了名字。

問它的有兩組,把兩回都印出來的是笛卡爾。沒有擺在不顯眼的地方,連阿爾諾那句客氣的開場和順手補上的下一條,都一並印著。

他答阿爾諾,指回答梅森的那一篇;那一篇又指回沉思。要讀懂最後那個答案,得先讀梅森那一條和他當時的答復。

Alongside SAE · an optional marginal note与SAE并读 · 可选旁注與SAE並讀 · 可選旁注

The SAE First Critique uses a test for claims that cannot be withdrawn in the act of making them. Arnauld’s test has a different task: identifying a conclusion already borrowed by the argument supposed to support it. The resemblance is a reason to compare them, not to treat them as the same test.

《SAE第一批判》用过一把测试,找的是说出来就撤不掉的东西。阿尔诺用的是形状相近的另一把,指认的是辩护里预支了的结论。两把不是同一把;这是旁注,不是论证。

《SAE第一批判》用過一把測試,找的是說出來就撤不掉的東西。阿爾諾用的是形狀相近的另一把,指認的是辯護裡預支了的結論。兩把不是同一把;這是旁注,不是論證。

The SAE First Critique essays →进入 SAE第一批判 →進入 SAE第一批判 →
Text, editions & sources文本、版本与来源文本、版本與來源

Read the Fourth Objections, the corresponding Fourth Replies, sections III–IV of the Second Replies, and the Fifth Meditation together. The account distinguishes Descartes’ proposed answer from a judgment that it resolves the Cartesian Circle.

The examples of a personal reference and checking the gas are explanatory analogies, not historical examples used by Descartes.

对应第四组反驳及答辩、答第二组第三至第四节、第五沉思。本文转述笛卡尔区分当下直观与事后记忆的答法,不据此裁定“笛卡尔循环”已经解决。

介绍人与煤气的场景是本系列的说明性比喻,不是笛卡尔原书举的例子。

對應第四組反駁及答辯、答第二組第三至第四節、第五沉思。本文轉述笛卡爾區分當下直觀與事後記憶的答法,不據此裁定「笛卡爾循環」已經解決。

介紹人與煤氣的場景是本系列的說明性比喻,不是笛卡爾原書舉的例子。