Abstract

The previous essay raised the source. A source is a synchronic fact: it says which classes of content are able to land in a bearer, not which ones have landed. This essay is about what happens in time.

The head structure is a geometry. One axis of occurrence, crossed by one axis of recognition. On the axis of occurrence there are two places — appearance, which puts a content into candidacy, and first-person avowal, which is the sole constituting place. Social recognition is not a third rung. It is a second axis crossing the first: real, consequential, able to give a public place and to take it back, unable only to claim anything on your behalf.

Then the modal asymmetry that makes auditing possible: appearance is plastic, avowal is constitutive and cannot be granted or revoked from outside, recognition is grantable and revocable and constitutes nothing. Then shaping — what outside action can legitimately do to the conditions of occurrence — and its two forms, cultivation and evocation. Whichever form it takes, the last step stays with the bearer.

1. A Source Gives the Slot; Occurrence Fills It

Say of someone that he has the row of source that runs toward others. You have said something structural, and you have said nothing whatever about his afternoon. You do not know whom he cares for. You do not know whether he has yet met anyone at all.

A value-source is a synchronic structural ground, given with the bearer's structure. The occurrence of value is the process, in time, by which a class of concrete content comes to be that bearer's value-content. It has a before and an after, it has steps, it can be completed, and it can stop halfway.

A bearer that has just unfolded the row of source oriented toward others may not yet have met any particular other, and so nothing has yet occurred on that row. The source is there; occurrence has not begun. That is not a defect. It is two things belonging to two levels.

The first consequence of the two levels is that they are stable to different degrees. Within the range where the bearer's structure still stands, the presence of a source is given by structure and does not vanish because one concrete content has vanished. Concrete contents, by contrast, arise and pass: a content can occur, can decay, can be suppressed, can surface again. Fuse the two and you get an absurd inference — a man's particular devotion fades, and therefore that entire row of his value-source is gone.

The second consequence is that they give different things. The source gives a structural possibility: which class of content can enter this bearer's field of end-value. Occurrence makes good on this particular one. The source is the slot; occurrence is the filling of it. An empty slot is still a slot.

Decoupled is not severed. Occurrence always runs inside what the source makes possible. Without the corresponding row of source, that class of content has nowhere to land. The source gives the range; occurrence lands inside it.

And occurrence does not presuppose any dimension-opening. The vast majority of concrete contents occur within source-domains the bearer already has, and involve no new structural dimension at all.

2. One Axis of Occurrence, One Axis of Recognition

Three layers is the most natural thing to say here, and it is wrong. Three layers suggests three homogeneous steps in order, with nothing finished until the third has been taken.

Appearance and first-person avowal are two places on one axis. Appearance sends a content into candidacy; avowal makes it the bearer's own value-content. At avowal the occurrence is complete. From then on, though no one knows of it and no one grants it anything, it is already this bearer's value-content.

Social recognition does not add a station to that axis. It belongs to another one. It changes where this content stands in a field of many subjects — seen or unseen, sayable or unsayable, supported or blocked. It does not change whether the content is this bearer's value.

The geometry is one axis of occurrence plus one axis of recognition. Not three rungs of a ladder.

Nor can the three be reduced to one another. A content showing up in your view, and that content becoming yours, are two things. Avowal is not seeing it more clearly; it is a constituting event. Another holding this content to be valuable, or holding this content to be your value, is not you having avowed it. And the converse holds as well: a man may settle something for himself and gain thereby no place at all in which to say it.

Once the three are apart, a content's state in a given bearer can be read exactly. Let A stand for appearance, F for first-person avowal, S for social recognition.

The S in the table differs by its object. In the rows without F, S can only be content-recognition — the community holds this class of content to be valuable. Subject-place recognition, the community's holding that this content is a value this bearer has claimed, is not yet defined before F, since it presupposes a first-person place already there.

Four things are read off the table. F is the constituting place: only at F does a content become the bearer's value-content. A runs in the modality of plasticity, not of grant and revocation — the outside can present, block or suppress, so that a content shows up in the candidate field, or disappears, or becomes hard to enter. That is causal action on the conditions of appearing, not some relational subject granting or withdrawing candidacy. Grantable-and-revocable, as a relational modality, lands only on S.

A plus S does not impersonate F. A content pushed in front of you and held valuable by the community is still not your value-content so long as you have not avowed it. This is the row most easily counterfeited in the whole field of occurrence.

And the solitary subject's A plus F stands entire. In a universe with no second subject, recognition has no object and the S column stays empty forever, while A plus F goes through exactly as before, and that one bearer has its own value-content just the same.

3. Two Roads by Which a Content Appears

A content must first appear in the bearer's field before it can be avowed. But appearing is not being avowed.

Appearance is a content's taking a candidate place in the bearer's field. It does not ask where the content came from.

There are two roads. One comes from outside: a way of living, a craft, a person, handed over by the world — heard of, met, demonstrated. What a man has never come near cannot become his value-content, because it has not yet shown up in his field.

The other is endogenous. A content surfaces out of the bearer's own experience and doing. A man sings, and goes on singing, and singing shows its weight; he finds that he cares about it. No one handed singing to him saying this is worth cherishing. He met it in the doing.

Endogenous appearance has to be kept clear of two things. It is not the value-source: the source is a structural place, saying which class of content can land here, while endogenous appearance is one particular content within that range surfacing from within. And it is not experiential valence itself: the pleasure of that moment of singing is valence; what takes the candidate place is singing, not the pleasure.

What comes from inside is still only a candidate. It is not, by virtue of coming from inside, already yours. A man may notice that he enjoys wounding people in an argument. The noticing is an endogenous appearance, and he is entirely free to refuse to claim it. The distinction between appearing and being avowed holds on this road too — and it is on this road that it is most easily flattened, because what surfaces from within looks native.

Both roads are needed. If only the outside road counted, the solitary subject would have no candidates at all, and its value-content stands nonetheless. Endogenous appearance is where its candidates come from.

Both roads can also be acted on from outside. The outside road can be pushed or blocked. The endogenous road can be pressed down so that nothing surfaces, so that a man never notices what he cares about. What is locked there are the conditions of appearing — not avowal being ghostwritten. Ghostwriting is another matter, and it lands elsewhere.

4. “I Like Singing” and “Singing Matters to Me”

A great many things take a candidate place, and nearly all of them will never be anyone's value-content. A content appearing says only that it is now a candidate, standing in line for a first-person disposition. That disposition may be avowal, may be refusal, may be a long suspension.

Preference is the thing most often filed in the wrong place here. A preference can be a candidate content's first appearance — a man takes a liking to some way of living for the first time, and that really is still only at the layer of appearance. But a preference can equally be an established value-content expressing itself in present action: a man who has long cherished caring for his family therefore chooses to come home early today. That choice is a particular preference, and it is the showing-forth of value-content already there, not some new candidate appearing.

So preference does not lock to a single layer. And on whichever layer it falls, preference does not constitute avowal. Wanting a thing is not thereby valuing it. The present preference is not enough to establish that a content already is value-content, and not enough to establish that it is not: a preference at the layer of appearance does not become value-content by being intense, and a preference at the layer of action does not fail to be the showing-forth of value-content by being merely one choice.

I like singing and singing matters to me are two sentences. The first reports a state, and the state may be nothing more than a present feeling. The second says this content is already among my value-contents. Between the first and the second stands first-person avowal.

5. Avowal Is a Claiming, Not a Verification

First-person avowal is the constituting event in which a content, already holding a candidate place within one of the bearer's legitimate value-source domains, comes to hold — in the working of the bearer's own law — a first-person status of being invocable, restatable and revisable. It is the only place on the axis of occurrence that constitutes value-content.

The first clause of that cannot be dropped. Avowal does not manufacture value from nothing. It works only on a content that has already taken a candidate place in some value-source domain; it cannot turn an arbitrary announcement into value-content. A bearer declaring some matter unrelated to any of its sources to be its value has made a declaration that lands nowhere.

To hold first-person invocable status is to say that this content can from now on be called upon by the bearer itself, in its self-interpretation, its choices, its revisions, its local ordering of action. It does not require that any action follow immediately, and action is not a condition of its constitution. It says the content has entered the web its own law can work on, and no longer merely stands in view.

Avowal is not a verbal declaration. It does not require saying I avow this, does not require a complete account of reasons, does not require an explicit announcement. A great many value-contents are embodied and tacit: the bearer keeps them within the space of its own reflexive operation, and keeps a first-person place of revision and exit open for them, while never being able to say them clearly. That does not stop them being its value-contents.

Nor need it happen in an instant. Some avowals occur in a moment; some take shape by degrees and settle only after years. Calling it a constituting event says what it completes structurally, not that it must fall on a single point in time.

And it is not a verification. The bearer is not ascertaining a fact that already obtains, not determining whether it really does care about some thing; it is claiming the thing in the working of its own law. So avowal is not a test of how long a feeling lasts. A liking that has held for thirty years and was never claimed is still a durable preference. A content claimed today is that bearer's value-content today, even if it is revised later. Length of time does not decide this.

People do often have to try living a thing for a while before it settles. What happens during that while is not the gathering of evidence; it is avowal itself taking shape by degrees. And to feel later that this was not, after all, what one cared about — that is a revision, not the discovery that the original avowal was counterfeit.

6. After the Claiming, the Door Stays Open

Two things hold at once in an avowal. The first is the claiming: the candidate content is taken into the bearer's own value-contents, becomes its own, and is no longer merely an option set before it.

A word about its own law, since it is easily pictured as a container. One's own law is the structural form by which a bearer legislates, unfolds and revises itself. It is form, not content. So the claimed content does not become a part of the law, as if the law were a box for holding contents. What happens is that the bearer, in the working of its own law, claims this content as its own value-content.

The second is the keeping of the revisable place: from then on the content stands continuously where the bearer can, in the first person, question it, rewrite it, abandon it. If after being claimed a content can never again be questioned, altered or let go, then it is not there in the manner of value-content but in some other manner — and that other manner belongs to the essay on colonization.

Avowal is also not a rubber stamp on whatever appeared. In avowing, the bearer may negate, restate, split apart, or recontextualize the candidate that showed up. What society hands over is usually a whole script, and what the bearer claims may be one small piece of it, or a version it has rewritten, or something assembled out of halves taken from two unrelated sources. What is avowed need not stay identical with what first appeared.

So a man who has taken up some content that came from society is not thereby occupied by that script. He may have taken it apart already and kept only the piece he claims. What an audit of ghostwriting looks for is exactly whether that place of reconstruction is still there.

And the other cannot exhaustively verify, from the third person, whether an avowal really occurred. What is auditable from outside is whether the candidate place has been occupied, and whether the bearer's space of reconstruction and revision is still there. What is not auditable is a judgment, made on the bearer's behalf, about what it really avows. That line has to hold, or a regulator has only to announce I can see what you really avow to have taken the place all over again.

7. Three Borders of the Avowal Place

The first border runs between the two layers of the domain of bearers. For a complete subject, first-person avowal is done by the subject itself. For a subject-to-be the case differs: it already stands entire within the domain of end-value bearers, while its capacity for first-person avowal is still coming into being — and coming into being by domains. Where that capacity has begun to run on its own, contents in that domain can be avowed; in domains where it has not, the guardianship network only keeps the candidate place and the future place of revision.

So what is gradual is the bandwidth of each domain and the range of self-running. What is not gradual is whether any given content has, at this moment, been avowed. What guardianship can do is maintain the reachability of candidate contents, maintain their expression, maintain their future revisability. What it cannot do is fix any candidate configuration as a first-person value-content the subject-to-be has completed. Everything guardianship maintains presupposes that the subject-to-be's first-person place stands permanently — that place being exactly what the maintaining is for.

The second border runs through the gaps in time. An avowed value-content does not blink out during sleep, anesthesia, unconsciousness or any other temporary incapacity. What persists is not the act of avowing — avowal does not need to run continuously. What persists is the first-person belonging and that revisable place. A man falls asleep, and his value-contents do not fall back into candidacy for the hours he is out.

The third border runs alongside valuing. First-person avowal and valuing are two things, and there is no general order between them. Valuing is the name, in value theory, for the event in which a legitimate possibility of dimension-opening is taken up by the bearer from its first-person place into its own process of construction; it answers the question of whose the momentum is. First-person avowal answers a different question: whether a particular content has become the bearer's value-content.

In ordinary occurrence inside existing source-domains, a content appears in a source the bearer already has, is avowed, and the matter is finished — valuing is never called on, and no dimension-opening happens at all. In the case of structural dimension-opening the order reverses: the bearer takes up a bridge by valuing, gains a new source-place, and only afterwards can concrete contents on that new place appear and be avowed.

8. No One Can Revoke It for You

First-person avowal cannot be granted by another, and cannot be revoked by another.

Not grantable: no external authorization, naming or proclamation can make a content some bearer's value-content. A community can declare a thing valuable; it can declare that a person ought to hold that thing as a value. Those declarations land somewhere else; they do not land on this place. To make a content this bearer's value-content, only the bearer's own claiming, in the working of its own law, will do.

Not revocable says something modal. The outside can of course do a great deal. It can suppress the expression of a value-content, block its reachability, distort the bearer's memory, make a content decay in actual running until it hardly operates at all. All of this really happens, all of it is serious, and each has its own place in the theory. But not one of them completes a revocation in the modality of avowal. External relations hold no constituting authority to pronounce that a first-person avowal no longer belongs to this bearer.

Causal interference and modal revocation are two things. A man's value-content is suppressed until he cannot act on it, and it remains his value-content — which is precisely why suppression is suppression, and not transfer.

That the outside cannot revoke by a relational pronouncement does not mean outside action cannot causally destroy a content's memory, reachability and running conditions, even to the point of making it vanish in the dynamical sense. That is a fact about violation, not the outside acquiring a first-person power of revocation. Three things therefore stay apart: a community withdrawing a content's public place; outside action causally destroying a content's operation; the bearer itself withdrawing a content's belonging. The first is common. The second is grave. The third only the bearer can do.

Non-revocability points only outward. The bearer may of course revise, abandon, avow again. Always revisable says exactly that this place stands structurally open to the bearer itself. It does not require the bearer to be always willing to change, and it does not forbid holding some content as a commitment for life. A man may settle on something to keep all his life and never alter it, and this does not conflict with revisability: revisable says the place is open, not that it must be used.

9. What a Community Can Give and Take Back

Social recognition is the only place on which grantable-and-revocable lands. A community can give recognition, and can take it back.

It has at least two different objects. The first is content-recognition: the community holds that some class of content has value-standing in this community. It is not aimed at any particular bearer. It is the ready-made appraisals, ideals and identity-scripts already lying about, and it can perfectly well exist before any bearer's first-person avowal — indeed many contents take their candidate place in a bearer's field precisely through it. In that respect content-recognition falls on the side of appearance; it is one of the forces that shape the outside road. The endogenous road is not given by it, though it can be pressed down by it.

The second is subject-place recognition: the community holds that some content is a value this bearer has claimed, and gives it a public place. This one presupposes that the bearer already has a first-person place. If the bearer has not avowed, then what the community is doing is not recognizing its value but attributing a value to it.

Grantable-and-revocable holds on both objects, but a revocation takes away different things. Revoking content-recognition takes away a class of content's appraisal-standing in the community. Revoking subject-place recognition takes away this bearer's this-content's public place and support: it may no longer be held legitimate, no longer given occasions for expression, no longer granted practical ease. What is taken away is social place and support. Not the bearer's own value-content.

The case of the subject-to-be cannot be forced into subject-place recognition. Before a subject-to-be has formed first-person avowal, the social network can still recognize and protect its standing as a bearer, its candidate configuration, and its future place of revision. Those protections are real and necessary. They are not subject-place recognition, and still less have they completed the belonging of any content on its behalf. Any claim that some determinate content is already this subject-to-be's final value, made before first-person avowal, is an external attribution, or a recognition by legal fiction.

Social recognition is real, and has its own structure and its own force. It does not constitute value-content.

A content can be a bearer's value-content with no social recognition whatever: unknown, unapproved, opposed by the whole world, and still its value-content. The solitary subject makes this plainest — one subject in the universe, recognition with no object at all, and its value-content stands.

Conversely, having recognition does not give you value-content. Another holding some content valuable is content-recognition, and has nothing to do with whether I avow it. Another holding some content to be my value is subject-place recognition, and if I have not in fact avowed it, then what that recognition recognizes does not exist; it is an external attribution. That he holds it does not mean I hold it.

Social recognition is therefore an independent relational axis, crossing the axis of occurrence without merging into it. Where they cross it really works: it affects appearance, it supports or suppresses expression, it grants or withdraws a public place. It cannot step across the one place of first-person constitution.

10. The Modal Asymmetry of the Three Places

The three places sit on two axes, and their modalities differ as well. Appearance is plastic: the outside can influence what shows up in a bearer's field and what does not, what shows up clearly and what shows up dim. First-person avowal is constitutive, and cannot be granted or revoked from outside: it is the only place at which content becomes value-content, and the outside cannot get into it. Social recognition is grantable and revocable, and constitutes nothing: it can be given, held, weakened, withdrawn, and none of that motion makes a content become, or cease to be, the bearer's value-content.

This asymmetry is not an incidental arrangement. Precisely because the modalities differ, any given influence gets a determinate reading from the place it lands on. Legitimate outside action and colonization both happen at these three places. The difference is not whether outside action occurs, but whether it counterfeits a modality across places.

The shape of colonization is exactly this: to use the grantable-and-revocable manner of social recognition to force through the constituting work of first-person avowal, and then to lock the revisable place shut. What is grantable and revocable never had constituting authority to begin with, so the step does not go through. How it is managed in fact — how it takes the place, how it is introjected, how it locks — has its auditable criteria in the essay on colonization.

This is also why the row with A and S but no F is the one most easily counterfeited: it is exactly the state in which outside action is fully present and the first-person constituting place is still empty. What colonization does is read that row as the A-plus-F-plus-S row, and get the bearer to read it that way too.

11. Shaping: First, Rule Out Locking

A person's value does not occur in a vacuum. What others do, the books they write, the institutions they raise, all bear on which contents can show up in his field, whether he can say what he cares about, whether he can go back and change it. That kind of outside action falls on the conditions of occurrence.

Shaping is outside adjustment, in the direction of release, of a bearer's conditions of value-occurrence: it widens the range of candidate appearance, and the room for reachability, expression and revision.

Shaping usually lands at the layer of content. More candidates get to appear; what could not be said gets said; what could not be moved gets moved. This is not the same as structural dimension-opening. Dimension-opening is a bearer gaining a new structural dimension, and it is rare; what shaping widens is mostly room to move within source-domains already there. In a few cases a shaping really does prepare the conditions for a dimension-opening, but that is a special case of it, not its definition. Equate the two, and every clarifying conversation, every demonstration, every exchange that lets someone dare to speak, gets read as a leap of structural level.

What shaping can reach stops at conditions. Whether a particular content becomes the bearer's value-content is completed in its first-person avowal. Whether a structural dimension-opening happens is completed in its valuing. The outside can build the bridge right up to you; whether you walk it is yours. These are not two stages of one thing. They are the completion-places of two different outcomes.

The character of an act of outside action is judged in two steps.

First, rule out locking: look at whether the bearer's interruption, refusal, revision and first-person place have been cancelled. What cancels them is locking, and such action is not shaping. Motive and goodwill do not enter this judgment — cancelling another's revisable place out of kindness is still locking, and an act that offends, that is ungracious, even humiliating, has not yet fallen to the locking side so long as those places remain.

Suppressed appearance or expression does not automatically equal cancelled refusal and revision. Not seeing some candidate may mean only that this one did not appear, or that the range of candidates narrowed. Not being able to say a thing publicly does not by itself cancel internal restatement and revision — a man can be unable to speak and still, in himself, refuse it, rewrite it.

Suppression has to reach a structural threshold to fall into locking: some content-domain systematically excluded until the relevant candidates cannot enter the bearer's space of reflection, restatement and revision; or the bearer's refusal, reconstruction and revision in that domain pre-voided in the structure of the relation. At that point the place has failed, even if no one ever reached in and touched it. An evaluation no one enforces, a climate no one is answerable for, if it presses a man's appearance in some domain down that far — so that he neither thinks it nor says it, and so has nothing to revise — falls on the locking side. Compression and narrowing short of that do not, and have their own place elsewhere.

That the places remain says only that this act has not become locking. It is not yet enough to call it shaping. Shaping requires the positive effect: the bearer's appearance, reachability, expression, revision or bridging room really is maintained, restored or widened. Outside action that neither locks nor produces that releasing effect is non-shaping action — noise, friction, offence, or an interference with no structural consequence. Taking up all of someone's time so that his candidates shrink drastically, while never touching his revisable place, falls here: it narrowed the room without reaching locking, and so is not shaping, and certainly not release.

12. Cultivation and Evocation

The second step runs only on the release side, and what it judges is the type of the relation.

If opening the space of value-occurrence of some identifiable receiving end is the constitutive orientation of this relation, that is cultivation: a teacher clearing a road for this student, a person making room for the one beside him to speak — the orientation landing determinately on that end. The receiving end need not be a single person; it may be an identifiable group. The acting source need not be a person either: an institution, an arrangement of relations, counts as cultivation so long as its orientation is to open room for appearance and revision for those within it. That is the word's oldest use — it was proposed in the first place as the opposite of the colonization of subjects by institutions and relations.

If the acting source merely expresses, exists or occurs, and does not take the constituting of some receiving end's value-occurrence as the purpose of the relation, that is evocation.

Subjective intention judges neither direction nor type by itself. An acting source may intend to express, may even wish to be seen and understood, and this is still evocation. The dividing line is whether it takes opening some receiving end's space of occurrence as the orientation of the relation. An author writes a book, hoping to be read and to be understood, and arranges no particular reader's value-occurrence: evocation. Awareness and goodwill are not where cultivation differs either. A man works with his workshop door open, glad to have people learn the craft by watching, and teaches no one; he is clear-eyed and he means well, and his orientation is toward no identifiable receiving end. Still evocation. The same source in a different relational shape changes type: if he begins to teach one of them, clearing a road for this one person, that is cultivation.

The occasion-end of evocation lies in the acting source's expression, manner of existing, or the character of an event. The acting source need not be a subject at all: a work, an institution, an event, a landscape can each be the occasion of a receiver's value-occurrence. Nor need it be undergoing any dimension-opening. Whether the source can get some content into the receiver's candidate field depends on whether that content appears for the receiver; whether it can further become the receiver's value-content depends on the receiver's first-person avowal. Those two questions must not be run together.

The line between evocation and endogenous appearance lies in where the trigger came from. In evocation there is an identifiable external expression, event, work or environmental feature supplying the trigger, or the content-source, for this candidate's arrival. In endogenous appearance there is no external trigger bearing this content; the candidate forms out of the bearer's own ongoing experience, practice or self-reorganization. There is a mixed road between them, where external trigger and internal practice both take part — a man hears a song elsewhere, later sings it himself, and only in the singing finds that the thing has weight for him. That road need not be forced into one of two boxes. What has to be held down is that evocation and endogeny are an analysis of provenance, not two ontologies of candidate-place: every candidate takes its place only in the bearer's own field of occurrence, without exception.

Unintended does not automatically mean benign. Action no one is answerable for can fall on the locking side just as well — the climate above is the example. The judgment of direction does not ask after intention, precisely for this reason.

So the criteria are used differently. For cultivation you can judge the act directly: was this act release or locking. For evocation, where often there is no identifiable actor's act at all, there is no need to force an agent-reading onto it; you look only at the signature it leaves in the result — are the receiver's revision, interruption and refusal places still there.

Two closing notes on scope. Shaping is not a necessary condition of value-occurrence: the solitary subject has no outside action to undergo, and its appearance and avowal are completed all the same. What shaping changes is the conditions of occurrence, not the constitution of occurrence itself. And cultivation is not coined here — it comes down from upstream, where it first named the opposite of the colonization of subjects by institutions and relations, was later drawn more finely between persons, and was given a criterion of direction by power theory. This essay keeps the same extension and narrows nothing: cultivation has always been an act with a receiving end, and an act falls by its nature toward some identifiable receiving end, so orientation was always its implicit condition and is only written out here. Evocation is not a piece carved off cultivation; it is newly opened ground. A work, an institutional text, an event, a landscape met and found stirring were never under the name of cultivation, because they are not acts toward anyone at all.

13. Two Roots That Never Merge

Institutional cultivation does not raise the institution into a subject. Institutions and arrangements of relations can carry an act of cultivation, can distribute it, can keep it running steadily. They have no law of their own, and make no first-person acknowledgment. So the acting root of this kind of cultivation still has to be traceable to the subjects who designed, maintain or run the arrangement, and to their law as turned toward the receiving end. An arrangement that merely stands open, with no attributable acting end, can constitute a condition of releasing shaping, but does not on its own acquire the full two-root structure described below.

In an act of cultivation, the acting end's root lies in the other-directed showing of its own law: it acknowledges that this particular other is an end, and takes up this content in the manner of clearing a road for it.

At the receiving end the case is different. If the receiver's appearance, expression, revision or bridging room really has been released, the act has already succeeded at the level of conditions. Even so, the two roots are not yet complete, because the receiving end has not taken its own step.

That step falls in one of two ways. If the outcome lands on the occurrence of a particular content, the receiving end's completion is its first-person avowal. If the outcome lands on structural dimension-opening, its completion is its valuing. These are the completion-places of two different outcomes, not a first rung and a second. Rank them as a ladder and you re-imply a general order between avowal and valuing, and there is none.

Only when the receiving end's completion actually occurs does the cultivation acquire its full two-root structure. The two roots never transfer and never merge. The actor cannot pipe its own law across into the other's value; what the receiver avows is always what it avowed. And the receiver's completing it on its own does not, by virtue of the cultivation, generate a corresponding lateral obligation: the actor took part in forming the conditions, and holds no constituting share in the receiver's first-person completion.

14. Where This Resembles Rights Theory, and Where It Stops

The structure raised here has one shape in common with the one on the rights side. It is worth stating, and worth bounding.

The resemblance is in the distribution of modalities. Value theory separates value-source from social recognition: the source is given with the bearer's structure and is not constituted by social relations, while recognition can be given, held, and withdrawn. Rights theory separates basic rights from recognitional rights: basic rights likewise are not constituted by social relations, while recognitional rights have their candidate place established in their source by constitutive recognition, and stand, lapse or are withdrawn as that source and its operational support change. The modality of variability falls, on both sides, on the relational layer and not on the structural one.

The resemblance stops there. Value theory's social recognition constitutes only public place — expression, support, practice — and does not constitute the bearer's first-person value-content. Rights theory's constitutive recognition does establish, in its source, the candidate place of a recognitional right. On one side the relational layer is not a constituter; on the other it is exactly the constituter. The functional signatures are opposite. So this is a local correspondence of modality, not an isomorphism.

Nor does first-person avowal have a strict counterpart there. It is a diachronic constituting event falling on one particular content; the core of rights theory is an incompressible structural condition running across all layers. They are of different types, and should not be translated into each other.

And the reason social recognition does not constitute value-content is not that the recognized party has no place. He has a place: subject-place recognition gives exactly that — the occasions for expression, the support for practice, the public legitimacy, all of it real. The reason is a difference of logical type. A social place and a first-person value-content are not the same kind of thing, and no thickness of external relation crosses the one constituting place of the first person. A man may be recognized in earnest by an entire community, and that content is still not his value-content, so long as he has never claimed it.

15. What Remains

How an alien end takes the place of value-occurrence is the subject of the essay on colonization. It has at least three ways in. Appearance can be occupied: whole scripts pushed in, and the endogenous road pressed down so that a man never notices what he cares about. Social recognition can impersonate first-person avowal: the community's appraisal of a content told back to the bearer as a value he has already claimed, or a passing liking called his value outright. And the revisable place can be locked: a content, once claimed, made unquestionable, unalterable, unabandonable.

All three need criteria, and the floor of those criteria is given here. Alien content is not itself colonization — taking a content from society and claiming it is the ordinary way of occurrence. Colonization is counterfeit across places: using what is grantable and revocable to complete a constitution, and locking the place that ought to stay open. The modal asymmetry of the three places, and the fact that avowal can reconstruct its candidate, are where that set of criteria can stand.

How an established value-content changes afterwards is the subject of the essay on dynamics: the presence and reachability of the source, contents and the shifting centre of gravity, and one thing that joins directly onto this essay — colonization does not change the presence of the source; what it locks is the source's reachability and the paths of occurrence.

What to do when one bearer's several avowed contents demand incompatible actions is the subject of the essay on conflict. Unranked in being and decided in practice do not conflict: a decision gives a first-person order of action, not a rank of value-standing.

How two bearers recognize each other at the layer of recognition, and why another's value cannot be exhaustively read, cannot be compared by an outside ruler, cannot be unified, is the subject of the essay on the other.

What has been raised on this side is this. A value-source gives the possibility. A particular content walks, in time, through appearance and first-person avowal, and becomes the bearer's own value-content. Appearance has two roads, one from outside and one from within. Avowal is a claiming, not a verification, and not a test of how long a feeling lasts. Social recognition stands alongside on an axis of its own, grantable and revocable, able to give a place and to take it back, and unable only to claim on anyone's behalf.

Outside action can release these conditions. It can be oriented toward one particular person, or it can be no more than an occasion — a source expressing itself, arranging no one's value-occurrence. Whichever it is, the last step stays with the bearer.