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← SAE Theory of Government← SAE 政府论
SAE Theory of Government · Essay 04
SAE 政府论 · 第四篇
Essay 04 of 06
第 04 篇,共 06 篇

Downstream

下游

Han Qin (秦汉)Independent English edition中文原作 · 简/繁

Willow Ferry

Willow Ferry lies downstream of Apple City. The Town Water Works draws water from the river to supply the whole town with drinking water. Apple City’s Sewerage Office releases treated city wastewater into the same river, under an effluent permit issued by the State Environmental Agency, and in compliance with it. From Year 5 on, the Water Works has been detecting at its intake a substance above the state drinking-water standard. The residents of Willow Ferry want Apple City to explain, and to change. Apple City replies in two sentences: “Our releases comply with the permit. The residents of Willow Ferry are not residents of Apple City.”

Three things first. Whom it concerns: the residents of Willow Ferry; and the residents of Apple City, on whom the cost of an upgrade falls if a change is made. Which line: the life-substrate of Willow Ferry’s residents in their drinking water, if the exceedance reaches a harmful level. Baseline: the state drinking-water standard.

Three governments are in this matter: Apple City, which releases; Willow Ferry, which draws the water; and the Kingdom State, which issues the permit and sets the standard. There is a nearer level too: Orchard Court, the residential complex in Apple City from the second essay. A resident of the complex is in the interior of three levels at once: the complex, Apple City and the Kingdom State. That several levels have a hand in one matter is the normal state of government; this essay is about levels.

Every Level a Construct

That resident swipes her entry card to go in and out of her building every day; the entry system is the complex’s to manage, and so is the surface parking space where she keeps her car. Outside the gate, the street belongs to the city. Her line of work requires a license issued by the state. Three things, three levels of government. Orchard Court counts as a government in the series’ sense by the public decision-making and carrying-out functions it actually carries; the property-management company that serves the complex does not.

Every level is a construct. The series sets up no separate ought for levels: the five oughts of Institution Theory fall whole on every level, the complex included. Each level has its own interior, and Institution Theory says plainly how it is drawn: “those in the entanglement the construct handles, together with those its acts reach who have no way to avoid it by exiting, make up the interior.” That she is in the interior of three levels does not turn on what identity she has registered where; it turns on whether she is in the entanglement each handles, and whether the acts of each land on her. She can avoid none of the three.

The levels are both nested and overlapping. Nested: jurisdictions sit one inside another, the complex within Apple City’s, Apple City within the Kingdom State’s. Overlapping: the interior does not follow the jurisdiction; someone who lives in Willow Ferry and works in Apple City is in the interior of both towns, and, as will be seen, Willow Ferry’s residents may be in Apple City’s interior without working there at all.

The Permit Slot

Between an upper and a lower level one relation must first be stated precisely. The State Environmental Agency issues Apple City an effluent permit, and its conditions rein in what the Sewerage Office can do. What does Apple City hold in that slot? Accountability, not duty. On Accountability says: “Only a subject can hold a duty; construct and subject alike can hold accountability”; for “A duty’s source must lie inside the bearer, and a construct has no inward source,” while “Accountability’s source lies in the power that converges upon the position, and a construct can be converged.” Apple City has no law of its own; the load it holds in the permit slot comes from the power that reins it in.

In one respect this accountability does not look like accountability: it “has its source in the power that converges upon the position, binds the position, and is released by exit,” yet Apple City cannot exit the state’s permit system. On Accountability gives a close example, “A government converged by a constitutional order cannot exit unilaterally,” and says that in such cases exit has no availability, yet efficacy is present. Released by exit means that if the slot actually ends, the load is no longer held, not that there is always a way out. So what Apple City holds in the permit slot is still accountability, and whether it has been fulfilled is checked by the conditions of the permit.

So two things hang on one construct and do not stand in for each other: the ought toward its own interior, which the series addresses to it, and the accountability it holds in the slot where the level above reins it in, which comes from that level’s power. Fulfilling the second is not achieving the first. “Our releases comply with the permit” is caught at exactly this point.

Levels change one more thing: against whom the independence of a channel is checked. Institution Theory says of independence that “it is checked against the party actually questioned, and when the party questioned changes level, independence must be checked again.” The Office of the State Ombudsman takes residents’ complaints against every level of government in the state. For Apple City’s decisions it stands outside Apple City, and Apple City cannot seal it off; but if what is questioned is a permit the State Environmental Agency itself issued, the ombudsman and the Agency are both inside the state. “Independence is functional and does not require being outside the institution”; what must be checked is whether the Agency can, on its own, seal off review of itself. The same ombudsman is independent with respect to the city and must be checked again with respect to the state.

“Our Releases Comply”

Back to Apple City’s two sentences, each checked in turn. “Our releases comply with the permit.” This is the fact; it says that Apple City’s accountability in the permit slot has been fulfilled. It cannot answer three things. First, whether the line of Willow Ferry’s residents has been crossed. Institution Theory’s first ought says that an institution’s acts cross no line against any internal subject, “also those who hold no registered position at the construct yet have no way to avoid it by exiting.” The line is set by structure, and “crossing the line does not require that anyone intend it”; doing what the permit says changes nothing here: “That a demand bears the name of procedure does not prove that complying with it is within the line.”

Second, where the substance comes from. What Willow Ferry measures is an exceedance at its intake; whether it comes from Apple City’s releases the paper does not assume. That is exactly what Apple City must explain. Third, whether the permit itself was set adequately. That is the State Environmental Agency’s account. The accounts of two constructs are each checked by their own source: Apple City’s does not pass to the state because the state issued the permit, and the state’s is not closed because Apple City complied. This step is the series’ own, grounded in Institution Theory: “Nesting is only an example, not a guarantee: a layer above is not necessarily there, and if it is there it does not necessarily have this authority.” It puts it more bluntly still: “If there is a further institution above, with the corresponding authority, that layer also undertakes the guarding within its own range; but ‘there is a layer above’ cannot be a reason for this layer to be absent.”

“Not Residents”

“The residents of Willow Ferry are not residents of Apple City.” Residence is an identity within a jurisdiction; the interior is drawn not by identity but by entanglement. What Apple City releases into the river flows to Willow Ferry’s intake; the people of Willow Ferry are within the reach of its acts, and they cannot avoid it: to avoid it they would have to give up the river the town draws from, or leave their homes. So they are in Apple City’s interior, not in its jurisdiction. A jurisdiction is the stretch of ground where decisions and compulsion land; the interior is the people in the entanglement. Apple City’s ordinances do not reach Willow Ferry, and its police do not patrol there; but Apple City’s acts have arrived there.

Being in the interior does not mean being under Apple City’s management. Institution Theory says that “reach of influence is not reach of authority.” That the people of Willow Ferry are in its interior gives Apple City no authority to manage their water, fine them or make rules for them. What being in the interior adds is laid on Apple City itself: its acts cross no line against them; the channel through which it is questioned is within their reach, since the fifth ought’s “can initiate” extends to all internal subjects, “including those who hold no registered position”; and when they ask, it must answer, and answer the very matter asked. What Willow Ferry’s residents asked was where the exceedance comes from and whether Apple City will change. What Apple City answered was: we comply with the permit, and you are not residents. That answer does not answer the matter asked; what is missing is the burden of explanation.

The relation between Apple City and Willow Ferry’s residents is thin. Relational thickness is how far a construct actually organizes the lives of those in its interior, and “it counts arrangement, not harm”; Institution Theory gives the same example: “If the wastewater the mill releases ruins the livelihood downstream, that is being affected, not being arranged.” Apple City hardly arranges the lives of Willow Ferry’s residents, so the third ought scarcely reaches here; but that takes nothing from the rest: “The first and fifth oughts, the ‘not sealing the channels’ half of the fourth, and the trigger of the second do not vary with it.” Thin as the relation is, the line still may not be crossed, and a question still must be answered.

Whose task is it to write about this? Institution Theory hands “conflict among all institutions” to the Theory of the State, and itself treats only the interior of one particular construct, with possible nesting above and below. The series does not take Willow Ferry’s case as a conflict between two towns: Willow Ferry’s residents are in Apple City’s interior, the interior of one particular construct; above both towns stands the Kingdom State, and that is nesting. What goes to the Theory of the State is the state’s outward face and borders, and membership; spillover across jurisdictions within one state is taken up here. The paper does not judge whether Willow Ferry’s line was actually crossed; that turns on whether the exceedance is harmful and where it comes from, matters of fact. What it says is what each of Apple City’s two sentences fails to answer.

Who Checks Apple City?

Willow Ferry’s residents asked, and Apple City answered beside the point. Where else can they ask? Who checks Apple City? The paper answers in three steps. Step one: every government is subject to questioning, and not on the precondition that exit is hard. Apple City must be open to questioning, and so must Willow Ferry, the Kingdom State and Orchard Court; whether one can leave does not change this. Apple City’s residents can move away; moving away does not answer “where does the exceedance come from?” How Is Institution Possible, setting out the self-correction at each level, lists for the community level, where exit is easiest, that “organizers can be questioned” all the same. Exit and questioning are two things, and the first does not stand in for the second.

Step two: diagnosis level by level. The checks on a level of government can come from three places: people can leave; there are other routes outside to complain by; there are other positions inside to check. How Is Institution Possible wrote at the level of the nation-state: “Exit is constrained, so the check of voting with one’s feet fails and the check must come from elsewhere”; its conditional is that where exit cannot bear the check required and there is no independently invocable external route, then, if the member protections already undertaken are to be kept, a real and usable checking function must be kept inside. It adds at once that this is written within that case, “not as a general theorem.” The series borrows the shape of the conditional, not a general theorem; hence the diagnosis level by level, with exit and the outer layer each read for what they are.

Read Apple City. Exit: residents can move away, but moving has a cost; more to the point, exit does not answer the everyday. A patrol officer pinning someone down and cuffing him, the Tax Office freezing an account: these land before anyone could move. Moving away answers “I no longer want to be governed by this city,” not “this city pinned me down today, froze my account today.” Willow Ferry’s residents do not even have moving: move or not, the river flows on to them. External routes: the Kingdom State has them. The State Environmental Agency issues permits and monitors the river; the state courts hear appeals and suits against city decisions; the state ombudsman can call for the file, require a written explanation, issue a public report and refer a case to the state courts, but cannot itself annul or rewrite the city’s decisions. These routes exist, and a single major matter can go down them. But Apple City makes rules and carries them out every day; the state courts are distant, expensive and slow, and do not reach the everyday; the ombudsman is within reach but cannot carry the day-to-day check. These are facts of the Apple City case, not evidence that “external remedies are unavailable to cities in general.”

The threshold is now clear. It lies in conditions, not head count: holding compulsion, where neither exit nor the outer layer’s routes can carry the day-to-day check. Apple City holds compulsion, and neither exit nor the outer layer can carry the day-to-day check on it: it has reached the threshold. Here the series undertakes a statement: from the city level up, the threshold is reached. This is a normative undertaking, a practical judgment, not a factual assertion about cities in general; holding compulsion, and exit and the outer layer being unable to carry the everyday check, are its reasons and explanation, not antecedents to verify case by case beforehand. Whether a given city’s outer layer actually reaches the everyday is a fact about that city and does not change the conclusion. “The city level” is drawn by function: general local governments that make their own rules and carry out compulsion themselves are all included; Willow Ferry, with its own Town Council and mayor, making and carrying out its own rules, is included too.

You Cannot Question Yourself

Step three: why, at the threshold, powers must be separated. This step the series takes on its own account, on two legs. One is independence, which Institution Theory already has: “Questioning must be independent, and the reason is that the party under review may not monopolize the decision on whether a challenge exists and whether it is over; self-checking can be done, and does not replace the position of being questioned independently.” Apple City makes its own rules and carries out its own compulsion, and the outer layer does not reach the everyday; so checking must be placed inside Apple City, and a check placed inside must be independent of the party checked.

The other is keeping three functions apart, borrowed from the Law Series. Its third paper divides power into three: rule-making, execution and checking. Rule-making produces rules; execution brings rules down onto particular matters, and those who carry them out cannot help bringing their own deviations in; checking asks whether the first two have deviated. It says: “Three branches form the minimum closed loop for processing remainder”; take one away and the chain short-circuits somewhere. And if one person or one institution holds more than one branch, its fourth basic law, that law cannot not be questionable, is rendered nominal: “You cannot genuinely question yourself.”

Both places were set up at the scale of the nation, and borrowing them means saying which half is borrowed. The Law Series says, “In a small group, this recursion chain is short: every link can be observed by other members”; at national scale the chain is too long, and “The solution is not to lengthen the chain (that only multiplies breakpoints) but to fold the chain into a closed loop.” These two turn on scale, and the series does not borrow them. It borrows only the two reasons that do not depend on scale: take one function away and the chain short-circuits; no party can genuinely question itself. Why a level of government needs the closed loop rests not on the length of a chain but on the threshold of step two.

Put the two legs together: at the threshold, checking is placed inside the level, independent of the party checked; rule-making, execution and checking are not held by one and the same position. Holding together means one position holding the whole of two; partial participation and mutual control do not count, and what the Law Series calls “Multi-cornered balancing: the remainder of each branch is questioned by the others” needs exactly these. This is a strong claim. Where the upstream has a strong and a weak form of one point, the series takes the weak by default; the separation of powers is one place where it says outright that it takes the strong. The weak form is in How Is Institution Possible: “The separation of powers taken here is one implementation of that function, not the only one”; the strong is in the Law Series: a minimum of three, more possible.

The strong form and “no form is fixed” hold together by what is counted: functions and independent checking positions, not agencies; no constitutional form is fixed. Apple City has the City Council, the mayor with the city departments, and the City Court: three agencies; counting three agencies is not the same as checking being independent. The City Court’s judges are nominated by the mayor and confirmed by the Council; the second essay said this appointment relation must be checked and does not by itself prove capture; if the party checked can remove or suspend the checking position, no number of agencies counts. To Willow Ferry’s case: the outer layer has routes here too, but the threshold is read by level, not by case. Apple City has reached it, so a check inside Apple City must exist, and must be within Willow Ferry’s reach: one that the Sewerage Office and the mayor cannot seal off, and whose answer answers the matter asked. The paper does not design this position for Apple City; it says only that there must be one.

With The Federalist

How power is kept from collecting in one place, and how a party is kept from checking itself: The Federalist made this famous, and two of its papers bear on it, each differently. No. 47 says: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The same paper says that Montesquieu “did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other”; only that “where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.” Here the two run the same way: total concentration is refused, without demanding that the departments have nothing to do with each other. Holding together, in the series’ sense, is exactly the whole-against-whole kind.

No. 51 says: “But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others”; “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” Both stand under a premise: “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” At the auxiliary layer it relies on giving each department’s people the means and the motive to resist one another; that is not the same thing as “You cannot genuinely question yourself.” And of the compound republic it says: “The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.” Control from the outer layer and separation inside are two things, not substitutes for each other; this too runs the same way. They part in that The Federalist treats the two as stacked safeguards, while the series requires the inside check on the ground that the outer layer cannot carry the day-to-day; requiring it from the city level up is the series’ normative undertaking, and does not wait on checking each city’s outer layer.

The paper drafts the strongest objection on behalf of No. 51: count only functions and ignore people’s motives, and the separation of powers is a boundary on paper; unless each department’s people have the means and the motive to resist encroachment, the checking position will sooner or later be swallowed. The reply: the half about means is just what Institution Theory’s independence speaks of; independence is such that “what it guards against is the party under review sealing off review of itself on its own”; a checking position that the party checked can abolish, restaff or defund is not independent. They part only on motives: the series writes no motives into people and counts on no one’s ambition; it puts that half in channels that those inside can reach and use without retaliation. The objection has its weight: the series does not vouch that the checking position will never be swallowed. It gives a criterion: once independence is gone, there must be explanation and correction; a channel fallen into the hands of the party questioned is capture, which the sixth essay takes up.

The Complex

The Orchard Court covenant was passed by the owners’ assembly in Year 3. The second essay used its clause on arrears: a household six months in arrears on the management fee is fined monthly and loses the clubhouse and the surface parking; the owners’ committee decides, and the property-management company carries it out on instruction. How the six months are counted, how much the monthly fine is, from what day use is suspended, are set in detailed rules made by the committee. A household that objects makes representations to the committee, and the committee hears them. It can sue the committee in the City Court, but needs a lawyer, and a first-instance case usually takes a year. Whom it concerns: the households in arrears; the other owners. Which line: fines and the suspension of clubhouse and parking act on facilities and property that may be agreed upon: within the line. Baseline: owners who pay on time.

Take the three steps. Step one needs little comment: the complex is subject to questioning, and owners being able to sell and move does not exempt it. Step two, diagnosis. Holding compulsion: fines and suspensions are decided by the committee and carried out by the company, passing through no position outside the complex from start to finish; when the complex enforces its own covenant, the fines and suspensions are compulsion it holds. The outer layer: when the complex enforces itself, the outer layer’s check is not in each act of enforcement; what is left is the route after the fact, a lawyer and a year’s wait, which cannot carry the day-to-day check on a fine that grows monthly and a parking space stopped today. Exit: selling takes time and needs the committee’s written consent, and does not answer a space stopped today. All three are present: the complex is at the threshold. This too is the series’ normative undertaking: enforcing its own covenant is the normative trigger; a complex that enforces its own covenant reaches the threshold, one that does not, does not. The outer layer and exit being unable to carry the check are its reasons and explanation; the year-long suit and the consent to sell are facts of this case that explain it.

Step three: see whose hands the three are in. The covenant was passed by the owners’ assembly, so part of rule-making lies elsewhere; but the detailed rules for enforcement are made by the committee, the measures are taken by the committee, and representations are heard by the committee too. If a household says “I already paid last month,” the one who hears it is the one fining that household. That is what “You cannot genuinely question yourself” looks like. That the complex is small and its people can see each other does not stand in for that position. What must be separated is functions, not agencies: the position that hears representations must not be the one that took the measure, and the committee must be unable to seal it off; making the detailed rules and taking the measures are not to be held by one position either, since the rules set how much is fined and from what day, and if those who set them are those who fine, rule-making and execution are in one hand. How to separate them, whether the assembly elects a few others or something else, the paper does not fix.

The property-management company’s position must be stated precisely. When it fines and suspends under the covenant on the committee’s instructions, that counts as the complex enforcing itself: those who write the fines and stop the spaces are the company’s staff, and the act traces back to their invoking the covenant and the instructions, with the complex as its address of attribution; as Institution Theory says, “the construct’s acts can be traced back to their invocation by particular nodes.” In between, the company is a construct acting on commission, holding its own accountability toward the complex, and does not answer to the households in the complex’s place. So one cannot say “the fine was written by the property-management company and has nothing to do with the owners’ committee,” nor, the other way, count the company as a fourth level of government. Now a branch: suppose the covenant provided that fines could be enforced only by the committee suing and the City Court giving judgment. The outer layer’s check would then be in every act of enforcement, and that item could be weaker; but if suspending the clubhouse and parking were still done by the committee itself, that item would still be at the threshold. The threshold is read item by item.

Two things are set beside it for contrast. The community level in How Is Institution Possible has as its conditions voluntary entry, frictionless exit and almost no coercive power, and so its institution is very thin; Orchard Court is often called a community too, but one moves in by buying a home and leaves by selling it, and it enforces fines and suspensions itself; sharing a name does not inherit the thinness. The same paper says of the early start-up that “five people do not need four-branch separation,” a sentence that speaks by head count; the series’ threshold does not count heads: a complex of a few dozen households that enforces its own fines reaches the threshold, an owners’ body of thousands that holds no compulsion at all does not. That paper has another sentence that puts it more exactly: “A construct’s scale cannot by itself fix the necessary number and granularity of its institutional provisions.” A last sentence: the separation of powers may weaken with conditions; being open to questioning does not.

Can One Leave?

If that resident dislikes the complex’s covenant, she can sell and move, but selling needs the committee’s consent; if she dislikes Apple City, she can move to Willow Ferry; if she dislikes the Kingdom State, she must leave the state, at greater cost. Exit is a check: where people can leave, a construct cannot do as it pleases. But how much it can carry differs from level to level.

The conditional from How Is Institution Possible was borrowed above. The paper extends it to every level, at two points. One is scale: from the nation-state case to every level of government. The other is the antecedent: that sentence speaks of member protections already undertaken; the series draws the interior by entanglement, not by membership, and a government always carries the guarantee of the recognition-based rights it has embedded, so for a government that “if” is always met. Both steps are the series’ own; each level’s exit and external routes are still read as they actually are.

The Law Series’ third paper states plainly how exit stands to law: “Exit is a condition of law’s existence”; where there is exit, law is thin, since exit is itself a counter; where there is none, law must be thick; “The thickness of law is a function of the degree to which exit is absent.” This reading was set up at national scale; extending it to every level is the series’ own step, resting on two things. Those sentences stand on exit, not on scale. And the Law Series itself carries it beyond the nation: it says a closed node such as a generation ship still reproduces the logic of national law, because “The variable of the parabola is exit, not era”; and its reading is that “Exit cost is the primary variable; relational density is the modulator.” Head count is not among its variables. Each level’s exit is read as it is: for the complex, selling and moving; for the city, moving; for the state, leaving the state; what this reads is the thickness of law, not the threshold for separating powers, which is read by level under the undertaking above. And there are people with no exit at all from a given level: Willow Ferry’s residents with respect to Apple City. For them the check on Apple City can come from two places only, the state outside and the checking position inside that they can reach.

One more point must be made clear: the thickness of law is not relational thickness. The Law Series’ thickness of law measures how thick rules, institutions and the structures of questioning must be; How Is Institution Possible has a thickness of provisions and a thickness of accountability, which that paper itself says are not the same explanandum; Institution Theory’s relational thickness is how far a construct actually organizes the lives of those in its interior. The three are not run together. Willow Ferry’s residents show why: Apple City hardly arranges their lives, so the relational thickness is thin; and they can hardly exit from Apple City, so the check on it must come from elsewhere. The two can move in opposite directions.

Riverbank Park

In Year 4 the State Legislature of the Kingdom State passed a bill taking the management of Riverbank Park from Apple City’s Parks Office and placing it with the State Parks Authority, on the ground that the flood levee was being reinforced at the state’s expense. From then on the park’s opening hours, vendor permits and event approvals were all decided by the state. Whom it concerns: Apple City, as a construct; the residents who use the park. Which line: no one person’s line is involved; what is involved is which matters are the state’s common affairs and which Apple City’s local affairs, and Apple City’s capacity to handle its local affairs. Baseline: before the taking.

First, convergence must be kept apart from taking. The state issuing Apple City an effluent permit is convergence: Apple City still releases, still answers to those in its interior, and holds accountability in the permit slot. Riverbank Park is taking: those matters were lifted out of Apple City’s hands entirely. The taking is a judgment of the state. To whom it answers: to those in the state’s interior affected by it, the park’s regular users among them; Apple City’s Council and Parks Office can ask through their positions. For what it answers: what is taken, on what ground, and why it belongs at the state’s level. The state’s ground is the levee; but more than the levee was taken: opening hours, vendor permits and event approvals went with it. A ground cannot hold up a scope larger than itself. After the taking, park users who have something to ask, where they once went to a council member or the Parks Office, must now go to the State Parks Authority; whether that road is within reach is checked again, independence measured against the new party questioned.

One misreading must be headed off: that once things are taken upward, the relation grows thinner. Not so. Whether opening hours count toward relational thickness is checked separately, from the structure; whether the state or the city sets them does not change the reading. The fault of swallowing is not thinning; it lies in three places: the ground does not reach the scope taken; after the taking, those affected cannot reach a road to question it; and a place where the lower level was judging and answering has been taken away, with reasons that never speak to those matters. Nor does this mean the upper level may take nothing: some matters belong to the level above, and moving upward is not in itself swallowing. What is required is only that the taking be explained, that its ground reach the scope taken, and that afterwards the road to question it be within reach.

Alexis de Tocqueville drew the line between upper and lower in Democracy in America. He says “there exist two distinct kinds of centralization, which it is necessary to discriminate with accuracy”: “Certain interests are common to all parts of a nation, such as the enactment of its general laws and the maintenance of its foreign relations. Other interests are peculiar to certain parts of the nation; such, for instance, as the business of different townships.” Concentrating the first is centralized government; concentrating the second, centralized administration. He does not oppose the first, “I cannot conceive that a nation can enjoy a secure or prosperous existence without a powerful centralization of government”; what he opposes is the second: “a central administration enervates the nations in which it exists by incessantly diminishing their public spirit.” What meets this paper is the latter half: how common and local affairs are divided, and which local capacities ought not to be replaced by concentration; Riverbank Park falls exactly here, the levee looking like a common affair, vendor permits and event approvals like local ones. They part in reasons: he opposes centralized administration because it diminishes public spirit; the series derives no requirement from effects of that kind; it asks that a taking be explained and that the road to question it be within reach.

Consent to Sell

On the lower level’s side the fault is of another kind. The same covenant has another clause: an owner who sells must have the owners’ committee’s written consent, and the committee may refuse “to maintain harmony in the complex.” Whom it concerns: an owner who wants to sell. Which line: the channel of exit. Baseline: selling without anyone’s consent.

Rights Theory has drawn this line: a constraint is a limit if it “does not seal the subject’s structural channel for exiting, refusing, or revoking a standing bond”; “Whatever crosses these is violation.” It has also said what sealing is: “it is not the presence in a relation of terms, procedures, conditions, or costs of exit; it is the subject no longer holding a structural channel for refusing, revoking a standing bond, or passing into a reviewable procedure”; “a constraint may set the conditions of a standing bond, but it may not seal exit, refusal, and revocation themselves.” So consent being required is not in itself sealing; what must be checked is whether, once refused, the owner still holds a road: to sell after all, or to bring the refusal into a procedure that can review it. “To maintain harmony in the complex” gives review no standard to measure against, and the committee can refuse as it likes; if the only road out is a suit in the City Court, it means a lawyer and a year. Which side the clause falls on must be checked by what road this owner actually still has; how the cost of exit is read, the sixth essay takes up.

Here is the side that concerns levels. The owner who sells is also in Apple City’s interior and the Kingdom State’s; leaving a complex mostly means staying in the same city. The level above guarding this line within its authority is the second ought at its level. The complex cannot say “the City Court is there; owners can go and sue”; nor can Apple City say “that is the complex’s own affair.” The first uses the level above to excuse this level’s absence, the second the level below.

The paper drafts an objection: the covenant was passed by the owners’ assembly, it is the owners’ own choice, and the level above stepping in on this clause is swallowing the level below. The reply has two parts. A vote does not prove that something is within the line; as Institution Theory says, “limit and violation are decided by structure, not by motive or feeling,” and a majority of willing owners does not change the reading. And guarding the line is not swallowing. Swallowing is lifting away the position from which the lower level handles its local affairs; guarding the line is the level above, within its authority, blocking one crossing, while the rest of the covenant stays the complex’s to run. Put together, the two halves make the sentence this part of the paper arrives at: the upper level does not swallow the lower, and the lower does not seal off exit; neither level is absent on the ground that the other exists.

What Each Level Organizes

Back to that resident, this time to read which parts of her life each level organizes. The complex organizes her daily comings and goings: the card at the building door, which space the car goes in, whether the clubhouse is open to her. Apple City organizes much of what lies beyond the gate: her child attends a city primary school, and the day’s routine follows the school; the street at her door is the city’s. The Kingdom State organizes her livelihood: the license for her line of work is issued by the state, and its conditions set what she may do and how she may advance. Some things are there and are not counted: if she calls the police at night, the City Police come; the state courts are there too; not using them, she loses nothing. Institution Theory says that “conditions that carry no direction and whose refusal costs no one his position are not counted.”

This is relational thickness. Institution Theory says: “Relational thickness is how far a construct, in a given relation, actually organizes the lives of its internal subjects”; “it is read from the structure, not from the construct’s own account”; what it looks at is “how much of their time, attention, livelihood and path of development it arranges.” Read from the structure, the three levels have no fixed order: in daily time, the complex and the city organize more; in livelihood and the path of development, a license may weigh more than the whole covenant. Relational thickness is ranked neither by administrative level nor by distance; it is read as it actually is, level by level, matter by matter.

What is the reading for? Whichever level actually organizes more of her time, attention, livelihood and path of development, the third ought weighs more on that level: for what it has organized, taken up or restricted, it must correspondingly explain how room is left and provided for her. If the license’s conditions fix the only way her line of work can go, it is the state that must explain. What relational thickness does not govern must be said too: the first and fifth oughts, the not-sealing half of the fourth and the trigger of the second do not vary with it. However little the complex organizes her life, it may not seal off her road to selling; however thin Apple City’s relation to Willow Ferry’s residents, it must answer them.

What the fourth essay has said comes to this: every level of government is a construct, each with a jurisdiction and an interior, the interior drawn by entanglement; fulfilling one’s accountability to the level above is not achieving one’s ought toward one’s own interior; there is an interior beyond the jurisdiction, and reach of influence is not reach of authority; every government is open to questioning; that the threshold is reached from the city level up, and wherever a complex enforces its own covenant, is the series’ normative undertaking, not a factual claim; at the threshold checking is placed inside, and no one hand holds the three; the separation of powers may weaken with conditions, being open to questioning does not; the upper level does not swallow the lower, the lower does not seal off exit; relational thickness is read from the structure, not by rank or distance. Levels are one dimension. The other is time: when matters are urgent and judgment cannot wait for the channels to run their course, what holds as before, and what may go faster. The fifth essay takes this up.

柳渡镇

柳渡镇在苹果城的下游。镇上的水务所从河里取水,供全镇饮用。苹果城的排水处把处理过的城市污水排进同一条河;排放有州环境厅发的许可,也合乎许可。第五年起,柳渡镇水务所在取水口测到一种物质,超过了州定的饮用水标准。柳渡镇的居民要苹果城说明,并且改。苹果城答了两句:“我们的排放合乎许可。柳渡镇的居民不是苹果城的居民。”

三样先写。对谁:柳渡镇的居民;还有苹果城的居民,若要改,改造的费用落在他们身上。在哪条线:柳渡镇居民饮水的生命基底,若超标到有害。基线:州定的饮用水标准。

这件事里有三处政府:排水的苹果城,取水的柳渡镇,发许可、定标准的王国州。还有更近的一层:苹果城里第二篇写过的果园里小区。小区里的一位住户,同时在小区、苹果城、王国州三层的内部。一件事几层都管,是政府的常态;这一篇写层级。

每一级都是一个构

那位住户每天刷卡进出单元楼,门禁归小区管;她的车停在小区的地面车位上,车位也归小区管。出了小区门,门前的街归市里管。她做的那一行,要一张州发的执照。三样东西,三级政府。果园里小区按它实际承担的公共决定与执行职能,算这个系列说的政府;替小区提供服务的物业公司不算。

每一级都是一个构。这个系列不为层级另立应当:制度论的五条应当,整条落在每一级身上,小区也在内。每一级各有自己的内部;内部怎样划,制度论说得清楚:「构所处理的纠缠里的人,与其施为所及、又无从以退出避开它的人,合为内部」。这位住户在三层的内部,不看她在哪一层登记了什么身份,看三层各自处理的纠缠里有没有她,各自的施为落不落在她身上。三样她都避不开。

几层既嵌套,又交叠。嵌套,是辖区一层套一层:小区在苹果城的辖区里,苹果城在王国州的辖区里。交叠,是内部不跟着辖区走:一个人住在柳渡镇、在苹果城上班,就在两座城的内部;后面会看到,柳渡镇的居民不在苹果城上班,也可能在苹果城的内部。

许可那一格

上下两层之间,有一种关系要先说准。州环境厅给苹果城发排污许可,许可的条件收住了排水处能做的事。苹果城在这一格持的是什么?是职责,不是义务。职责专论说:「只有主体能持义务,构与主体都能持职责」;理由是「义务的源必在承担者内部,构无内部之源」,而「职责的源在收敛这个位置的权力,构可被收敛」。苹果城没有自己的法;它在许可那一格持的负荷,来自收住它的那份权力。

这份职责有一处看起来不像职责:职责「源在收敛这个位置的权力,束缚位置,退出有效」,可苹果城退不出州的许可制度。职责专论举过相近的一例:「受宪制收敛的政府不能单方退出」,并且说,这一类情形里,退出都无可用性,效力却都在。退出有效,说的是那一格若真的终止,负荷就不再持有,不是说总有一条退出的路可走。所以苹果城在许可那一格持的仍是职责;尽没尽到,按许可的条件核。

于是,同一个构身上挂着两样东西,不互相顶替:一样是它对自己内部的应当,这个系列说给它;一样是它在被上一级收住的那一格持的职责,来自上一级的权力。尽了后一样,不等于做到了前一样。“我们的排放合乎许可”卡的,正是这一处。

层级还改变一件事:通道的独立要对着谁核。制度论说,独立「对着实际被问的一方核,被问者换了层级,独立要重核」。州监察专员公署受理居民对州内各级政府的投诉。对苹果城的决定,它在苹果城之外,苹果城封不住它;可若被问的是州环境厅自己发的许可,监察专员与环境厅同在州里。「独立是功能义,不要求在制度之外」;要核的是环境厅能不能独自封住对它自己的审查。同一个监察专员,对市是独立的,对州要重核。

合乎许可

回到苹果城的两句话,各自核。“我们的排放合乎许可。”这一句是实情,说的是苹果城在许可那一格的职责尽到了。它答不了三件事。第一,柳渡镇居民的线越没越。制度论的第一条应当说,制度的施为对每一个内部主体都不越线,「未在该构登记位置、却无从以退出避开它的人也在内」。线由结构定,「越线不需要有人存心」;照许可办了,也不改这一点:「程序的名分不证明照做就在线内」。

第二,超标的那种物质从哪里来。柳渡镇测到的,是取水口的超标;它是不是出自苹果城的排放,论文不设定。这正是苹果城要说明的。第三,许可本身定得够不够。那是州环境厅的账。两个构的账,各按来源去核:苹果城的账,不因为州发了许可就转到州那里;州的账,也不因为苹果城照办了就结掉。这一步由这个系列自担,根据在制度论:「嵌套只是一个例子,不是保证:上一层不一定在,在了也不一定有这个权限」。它还说得更直:「如果上面还有一层制度,又有相应的权限,那一层再承担它范围里的守线;但不能把『上面还有一层』当成这一层可以缺位的理由」。

不是居民

“柳渡镇的居民不是苹果城的居民。”居民是辖区里的身份;内部不按身份划,按纠缠划。苹果城排进河里的东西流到柳渡镇的取水口,柳渡镇的人在它的施为所及;他们避不开,要避开,就得放下镇上取水的这条河,或者离开自己的家。所以他们在苹果城的内部,不在它的辖区里。辖区是决定与强制落地的一块地方,内部是纠缠里的人。苹果城的条例管不到柳渡镇,市警局也不去那里执勤;可苹果城的施为到了那里。

在内部,不等于归苹果城管。制度论说:「影响所及不等于权限所及」。苹果城不因为柳渡镇的人在它的内部,就取得管他们用水、罚他们、替他们定规矩的权限。在内部,加给的是苹果城自己:它的施为对他们不越线;它受问的通道,他们够得着,第五条的“可以发动”推及一切内部的人,「含未登记位置者」;他们问了,它要答,并须答到被问的那件事上。柳渡镇的居民问的是:超标从哪里来,改不改。苹果城答的是:合乎许可,你们不是居民。这一答没有答到被问的那件事上,缺的是说明之责。

苹果城与柳渡镇居民之间的关系很薄。关系厚度是构实际组织内部的人的生活的程度,「只计安排,不计损害」;制度论举过同样的例:「排污毁了下游的生计,那是被影响,不是被安排」。苹果城几乎不安排柳渡镇居民的生活,第三条应当在这里几乎不及;可这不减前面那几样:「第一条、第五条、第四条的『不封通道』,和第二条的触发,都不随它调节」。关系薄,线照样不能越,问了照样要答。

这件事归谁写?制度论把「所有制度之间的冲突」交给国家论,自己只处理一个具体构的内部,与可能的上下嵌套。柳渡镇这一件,这个系列不当作两座城之间的冲突来接:柳渡镇的居民在苹果城的内部,这是一个具体构的内部;两座城之上有王国州,这是上下嵌套。交给国家论的,是国家一级的对外与边界、成员资格;同一州之内跨辖区的外溢,在这里接。论文不判柳渡镇的线实际越没越,那要看超标是否有害、从哪里来,是事实上的事;它说的是,苹果城那两句话各自没有答到什么。

谁来查苹果城

柳渡镇的居民问了,苹果城答得不对题。他们还能到哪里去问?谁来查苹果城?论文分三步答。第一步:所有政府都受问,不以退出困难为前提。苹果城要可被追问,柳渡镇、王国州、果园里小区也一样;能不能退出,不改这一条。苹果城的居民可以搬走,搬走答不了“超标从哪里来”。《制度如何可能》讲各层的自修凿时,社区一层退出最容易,它照样列了「组织者可被质疑」。退出与追问是两样,前一样不替后一样。

第二步:逐层诊断。一级政府受到的制约,可以来自三处:人可以走;外面有别的路可以告;里面有别的位置可以查。《制度如何可能》在民族国家一层写过:「退出受限,用脚投票的制约因此失效,制约须另有来源」;它的条件句是,当退出不足以承担所需的制约,又没有可独立调用的外部路径时,若仍要维持已经承担的成员保障,就须在内部保留真实可用的制约功能。它随即自陈,这一条写在本例之内,「不是一条一般定理」。这个系列借的是这一条件句的形状,不把它当一般定理,所以要逐层诊断,退出与外层各读各的。

拿苹果城来读。退出:居民可以搬走,可搬走有代价;更要紧的是,退出答不了日常的事。巡警按倒、上铐,税务处冻结账户,都在搬走之前就落下了;搬走答得了“不想再受这座城管”,答不了“这座城今天按倒我、冻结我”。柳渡镇的居民连搬走这一条都没有:搬不搬,河都流过来。外部路径:王国州有。州环境厅发许可、监测河流;州法院受理对市一级决定的上诉与诉讼;州监察专员可以调卷、要求书面说明、公开报告、把案件移送州法院,却不能自己撤销或改写市的决定。这些路在,单件的大事可以走。可苹果城每天在立规、在执行,州法院远、贵、慢,够不着这些日常的事;监察专员够得着,却担不起日常的制约。这些是苹果城一例的事实,不是“一般城市的外部救济必不可用”的证据。

门槛于是清楚了。它在条件,不在人数:持有强制,且退出与外层路径都承担不了日常的制约。苹果城持有强制,退出与外层又担不起日常的制约,它到了门槛。这个系列在这里承担一句话:市一级起,都到门槛。这是规范承担,一项实践判断,不是对一般城市的事实断言;持有强制、退出与外层担不起日常的制约,是这一承担的理由与说明,不是逐例先要核过的前件。某一座城的外层实际够不够得着日常,是那座城的事实,不改这一结论。“市一级”按功能划:自己立规、自己执行强制的一般地方政府都在内;柳渡镇有自己的镇议事会与镇长,自己立规、自己执行,也在内。

你不可能真正追问自己

第三步:到了门槛,为什么要多权分立。这一步由这个系列自担,靠两条腿。一条是独立,制度论自己就有:「追问须独立,理由在被审的一方不能独占对质疑是否存在、是否结束的决定;自查可以做,不替代独立受问的位置」。苹果城自己立规、自己执行强制,外层又够不着日常,检查就须设在苹果城里面;设在里面的检查,要独立于被检查的一方。

另一条是三项分开,要从法学系列借。法学第三篇把权力分成三项:制定,执行,检查。制定产生规则;执行把规则落到具体的事上,执行的人难免把自己的偏差带进去;检查追问前两者有没有偏。它说:「三权是处理余项的最小闭环」;少一项,链条就在某处短路。同一个人或同一个机构若兼任多权,它的第四条,法不得不可被追问,就名存实亡:「你不可能真正追问自己」。

这两处原立在国家尺度上,借过来要说清借的是哪一半。法学说,「在小群体里,这个递归的链条短,每一环都可以被其他成员观察到」;到了国家尺度链条太长,「解决方案不是拉长链条(那只是增加断裂点),而是把链条变成闭环」。这两句依尺度,这个系列不借。借的只是两处不靠尺度的理由:三项少一项,链条就在某处短路;同一方不能真正追问自己。一级政府里为什么要有这个闭环,不靠链条的长短,靠第二步的门槛。

两腿合起来:到了门槛,检查设在这一级里面,独立于被检查的一方;制定、执行、检查三项,不由同一个位置兼任。兼任,指同一个位置握着两项的全部;部分的参与、相互的控制不算,法学说的「多角制衡:各权的余项由其他权追问」,正要它们。这是一个强的说法。上游同一件事有强弱两式时,这个系列默认取弱;多权分立是明写取强式的一处。弱式在《制度如何可能》:「本文所取的权力分立是这种功能的一种实现,不是唯一一种」;强式在法学:最少三权,可以更多。

强式与“不定形态”同时成立,靠的是数什么:数的是功能与独立的检查位置,不数机构,不定宪制形态。苹果城有市议会、市长与各局、市法院,三处机构;机构数到三,不等于检查独立。市法院的法官由市长提名、市议会确认,第二篇已经说过,这一任命关系要核,不自动证明俘获;被查的一方若能撤换、停掉检查的位置,机构再多也不算。落到柳渡镇这一件:外层也有路,可门槛按这一级读,不按这一件读。苹果城到了门槛,它里面的检查就要有,柳渡镇的居民也要够得着:排水处与市长封不住它,它的答复要答到被问的那件事上。论文不替苹果城设计这个位置,只说它要有。

与《联邦党人文集》

权力怎样不落在一处,一方怎样不查自己,《联邦党人文集》讲得最有名,两篇各有所指。第 47 篇说:「立法、行政、司法一切权力集于同一手中,无论是一人、少数人还是多数人,无论是世袭的、自封的还是选举的,完全可以说就是暴政的定义」。同一篇又说,孟德斯鸠的意思「并不是说这几个部门对彼此的行为不应有部分的参与或控制」;他说的只是,「一个部门的全部权力由掌握另一个部门全部权力的同一双手行使时,自由宪制的根本原则就被颠覆了」。这一篇同向:拒绝全部集中,也不要求各部门互不往来。这个系列说的兼任,正是“全部”对“全部”那一种。

第 51 篇说:「防止几种权力逐渐集中于同一部门的最大保障,在于给每个部门的主持者以必要的宪制手段和个人动机,去抵御其他部门的侵犯」;「必须以野心对抗野心」。这两句在一个前提之下:「对人民的依赖无疑是对政府的首要控制;但经验教人需要辅助的预防」。在辅助的一层,它靠的是让各部门的人有手段、有动机互相抵御;这与“你不可能真正追问自己”不是一件事。它还说,复合共和国里,「不同的政府互相控制,同时各自受自己控制」:外层的控制与内部的分立是两样,不互相替代,这也同向。分开在:文集把两样当作叠加的保障;这个系列要里面的检查,理由是外层担不起日常的制约;市一级起要它,是这个系列的规范承担,不等逐城核过外层才要。

论文代第 51 篇拟了一条最强的反驳:只数功能、不管人的动机,分权就是纸上的边界;不让各部门的人有手段、有动机去抵御侵蚀,检查的位置迟早被吞掉。回应:手段那一半,制度论的独立说的正是它,独立「要防的是被审的一方独自封住对自己的审查」;一个检查位置,若被查的一方能撤掉它、换掉它的人、停掉它的经费,它就不独立。分开只在动机那一半:这个系列不对人写动机,也不指望哪一个位置上的人的野心,把这一半放在内部的人够得着、发动不被报复的通道上。这一反驳有它的分量:这个系列不担保检查的位置不被吞掉;它给的是判据,独立一旦没有了,要说明,要修正;通道落到被问的一方手里,是捕获,第六篇再接。

小区

果园里小区的规约,第三年由业主大会通过。第二篇用过其中欠费处置的一款:欠物业费满六个月的,按月罚款,停用会所与地面车位;由业委会作出决定,物业公司照指令执行。欠费满六个月怎样起算、每月罚多少、停用从哪天起,由业委会定细则。欠费户对处置不服,向业委会申辩,也由业委会受理。欠费户可以向市法院起诉业委会,但要请律师,一审通常要一年。对谁:欠费户;其他业主。在哪条线:罚款、停用会所与车位,作用在可约定的设施与财产上,线内。基线:按时交费的业主。

照三步走。第一步不用多说:小区受问,不因为业主可以卖房搬走就免。第二步,诊断。持有强制:罚款、停用由业委会决定、物业公司照办,从头到尾不经小区以外的任何位置;小区自己执行规约,罚款与停用就是它持有的强制。外层:小区自己执行,外层的检查就不在每一次执行里,剩下的是事后的路,请律师、等一年,对一笔按月累加的罚款、一个今天就停用的车位,担不起日常的制约。退出:卖房要时间,还要业委会书面同意,答不了今天就停的车位。三样都到了,小区在门槛上。这又是这个系列的规范承担:“自己执行”是规范上的触发,小区自己执行规约,就到门槛,不自己执行,不到。外层与退出担不起,是它的理由与说明;一审要一年、卖房要同意,是说明它的本例事实。

第三步,看三项落在谁手里。规约由业主大会通过,制定有一部分在别处;可执行的细则由业委会定,处置由业委会作,申辩还是业委会受理。欠费户若说“我上个月已经交了”,听这句话的,正是罚这一户的那一方。这就是“你不可能真正追问自己”的样子。小区人少、彼此看得见,不替那个位置。要分的是功能,不是机构:受理申辩的那个位置,不是作出处置的那一个,业委会封不住它;定细则与作处置,也不由同一位置兼任,细则定的是罚多少、从哪天停,定它的若就是罚人的,制定与执行就在一手。怎样分,是业主大会另选几个人,还是别的安排,论文不定。

物业公司的位置要说准。它照规约、受业委会的指令罚款、停用时,算小区自己执行:开罚单、停车位的是物业公司的人,这一施为还原到他们对规约与指令的调用,归责地址是小区;制度论说,「构的施为可还原到具体节点对它的调用」。物业公司在中间是受托的构,对小区持它自己的职责,不替小区向欠费户作答。所以不能说“罚单是物业公司开的,与业委会无关”,也不能反过来,把物业公司算成第四级政府。再看一个分支:设若规约规定,罚款只能由业委会起诉、经市法院判决后执行,外层的检查就已经在每一次执行里,这一项可以弱;可停用会所与车位若仍由业委会自己做,那一项仍到门槛。门槛逐项读。

两样东西放在旁边作对照。《制度如何可能》写的社区一层,条件是自愿入会、无摩擦退出、几乎无胁迫权力,所以制度很薄;果园里也常被叫作一个社区,可住进来是买了房,走要卖房,它又自己执行罚款与停用,不能因为同名就继承“制度很薄”。同一篇写早期创业公司,「五个人不需要四权分离」,那一句以人数说话;这个系列的门槛不按人数:几十户的小区自己执行罚款,也到门槛;几千户的业主组织一样强制都不持,不到。那一篇自己另有一条,说得更准:「构的规模不能单独给出其制度条款的必要数量和粒度」。最后一句:分权可以随条件弱,可被追问不弱。

走得了吗

那位住户若嫌小区的规约不好,可以卖房搬走,可卖房要业委会同意;若嫌苹果城不好,可以搬到柳渡镇去;若嫌王国州不好,要搬出州去,代价更大。退出是一种制约:人能走,构就不能为所欲为。可它到底能担多少,各层不一样。

前面借过《制度如何可能》的条件句。论文把它推到各级,推了两处:一处是尺度,从民族国家一例到每一级政府;一处是前件,那一句说的是若仍要维持已经承担的成员保障,这个系列按纠缠划内部,不按成员划,政府总承担着它所载入的承认性权利的保证,那个“若”在政府这里总是满足的。两处都由这个系列自担;每一级的退出与外部路径,仍按实际读。

法学第三篇把退出与法的关系说得很直:「退出权是法的存在条件」;有退出权的地方,法薄,因为退出本身就是一种反制;没有退出权的地方,法必须厚;「法的厚度是退出权缺失程度的函数」。这一读法原立在国家尺度;推到各级,是这个系列自己的一步,根据有两样。一是那两句立论在退出上,不在尺度上。二是法学自己就把它推出了国家:它说代际飞船这样的封闭节点仍复现国家法的逻辑,因为「抛物线的变量是退出权,不是时代」;它的读法是,「退出成本是主变量,关系密度是调制项」。人数本身不在它的变量里。每一级的退出按实际读:小区要卖房、搬家,市要搬家,州要搬出州;读出来的是法的厚度,不是分权的门槛,门槛照前面的承担按级读。还有一种人,对某一级根本没有退出这一条:柳渡镇的居民对苹果城。对他们来说,苹果城受的制约只能来自两处,外面的州,与里面那个他们够得着的检查位置。

还要说清一句:法的厚度不是关系厚度。法学说的法的厚度,量规则、机构与追问的结构要多厚;《制度如何可能》说的条款厚度与职责厚度,那一篇自己写明两样「不是同一个被解释量」;制度论说的关系厚度,是构实际组织内部的人的生活的程度。三样不混称。柳渡镇的居民正好说明为什么:苹果城几乎不安排他们的生活,关系厚度很薄;他们对苹果城又几乎无从退出,对苹果城的制约须另有来源。两样可以朝相反的方向走。

河滨公园

第四年,王国州议会通过法案,把河滨公园的管理权从苹果城的公园管理处收归州公园管理局,理由是防洪堤由州出资加固。此后,公园的开放时间、摊贩许可、活动审批,都由州决定。对谁:苹果城,作为一个构;常去公园的居民。在哪条线:不涉某一个人的线;涉的是哪些是州的共同事务,哪些是苹果城的地方事务,以及苹果城处理地方事务的能力。基线:收走之前。

先分开收敛与收走。州给苹果城发排污许可,是收敛:苹果城仍在排水,仍向它内部的人作答,只在许可那一格持职责。河滨公园是收走:那几样事,从苹果城手里整个拿走了。收走是州的一项判断。它向谁作答:向州内部受这一收走影响的人,常去公园的居民在内;苹果城的市议会与公园管理处,可以经它们的位置去问。就什么作答:收什么,凭什么,为什么属于州这一层。州给的理由是堤;可收走的不只是堤,开放时间、摊贩许可、活动审批也一并收了。一项根据,撑不起比它大的范围。收走以后,常去公园的人有话要问,原先找市议员、找公园管理处,现在要找州公园管理局;这条路够不够得着,独立对着新的被问者重核。

这里要挡一个误读:收上去,关系就变薄了。不是。开放时间计不计入关系厚度,照结构另核;由州定还是由市定,都不改这一读数。“吞”的毛病不在变薄,在三处:根据够不着收走的范围;收走以后,受影响的人够不着问它的路;下一层本来在作判断、在作答的地方被拿走了,拿走的理由却没有说到那些事务上。这也不是说上一层什么都不能收:有些事本来就要上一层来管,上移本身不是吞。要的只是:收要说明,根据要够得着所收的范围,收了以后受问的路要够得着。

上下之间怎样分,托克维尔在《论美国的民主》里分过。他说,「有两种截然不同的集权,必须准确地加以区分」:「有些利益是全国各地共有的,比如普遍法律的制定、对外关系的维持;另一些利益是国家某些部分特有的,比如各个乡镇的事务」。前一种集中起来,是政府的集权;后一种集中起来,是行政的集权。他不反对前一种:「我无法设想,一个国家没有强有力的政府集权而能安全或繁荣地生存」;他反对的是后一种:「行政的集权不断削减所在国家的公共精神,使这些国家萎靡」。对上的是后一半:共同事务与地方事务怎样分,哪些地方处理事务的能力不应被集中替代;河滨公园正好落在这里,堤像是共同的事,摊贩许可与活动审批像是地方的事。分开在理由:他反对行政集权,理由在它削减公共精神;这个系列不从这一类效果推出要求,它要的是收要说明、受问的路够得着。

卖房要同意

下一层这一面,是另一种毛病。同一份规约里还有一款:业主出售房屋,须经业委会书面同意;业委会可以“为维护小区和睦”拒绝。对谁:要卖房的业主。在哪条线:退出的通道。基线:不经同意即可出售。

权利论划过这条线:一项约束是限,要它「不封死主体退出、拒绝或撤回持续绑定的结构通道」;「越出此者是侵」。封死是什么,它也说清了:「它不等于关系中存在期限、程序、条件或退出成本,它指主体不再保有拒绝、撤回持续绑定或转入可审查程序的结构通道」;「一项约束可以设定持续绑定的条件,不可以封死退出、拒绝与撤回本身」。所以“须经同意”本身,还不就是封死;要核的是,被拒绝以后,这位业主还保不保有一条路:卖得出去,或者把这次拒绝转进一个能审查它的程序。“为维护小区和睦”不给审查一个可以对照的依据,业委会说拒就拒;唯一的外路若是市法院的一场官司,要请律师、等一年。这一款落在哪一边,要按这位业主实际还剩哪条路去核;退出的代价怎样读,第六篇接。

层级上的一面在这里。卖房的业主,也在苹果城的内部,也在王国州的内部;从一个小区退出,多半还在同一座城里。上一层在它的权限里守这条线,是它那一层的第二条。小区不能说“市法院在,业主可以去告”;苹果城也不能说“那是小区自己的事”。前一句是拿上面一层替这一层缺位,后一句是拿下面一层替这一层缺位。

论文代拟了一条反驳:规约是业主大会通过的,是业主们自己的选择;上一层来管这一款,就是吞下一层。回应有两处。一处:表决通过了,不证明在线内;制度论说,「限与侵由结构定,不由动机与感受定」,多数业主愿意,也不改读数。一处:守线不是吞。吞,是把下一层处理地方事务的位置收走;守线,是上一层在它的权限里挡住一处越线,规约其余的条款,照旧由小区自己管。两半合起来,就是论文在这里落下的那一句:上一层不吞下一层,下一层不封死退出;哪一层都不以另一层的存在为由缺位。

三层组织她什么

回到那位住户,这一次读三层各组织她生活的哪些部分。小区组织的,是她每天的进出:刷卡进单元楼,车停哪一格,会所能不能用。苹果城组织的,是她出了小区门以后的许多事:孩子在一所市立小学上学,每天的作息跟着学校走;门前的街归市里管。王国州组织的,是她的生计:她那一行的执照由州发,执照的条件定着她能做什么、怎样往上走。还有几样在那里,却不计入:夜里报警,来的是市警局;州法院也在那里;她不用它们,也不失什么。制度论说,「不附方向、拒用不失位置的条件不计入」。

这就是关系厚度。制度论说:「关系厚度是构在这段关系里实际组织内部主体的生活的程度」,它「由结构读,不由构的自述读」,看的是人的「时间、注意力、生计、发展的路,被它安排了多少」。照结构读,三层没有一个固定的先后:论每天的时间,小区与市组织得多;论生计与发展的路,一张执照可能比小区的全部规约都重。关系厚度不以行政级别排序,也不以地理距离排序,一层一层、一件一件按实际读。

读出来做什么用?哪一层实际组织她的时间、注意力、生计与发展的路更多,第三条应当在那一层就更重:那一层对它已经组织、占用或限制的东西,要相应说明怎样给她留出、提供空间。执照的条件若定死了她这一行只能怎样走,要说明的是州。关系厚度管不到的,也要说清:第一条、第五条、第四条的不封通道与第二条的触发,都不随它调节。小区组织她的生活再少,也不能封死她卖房的路;苹果城对柳渡镇居民的关系再薄,也要答他们的问。

第四篇说的,合起来是这样:每一级政府都是一个构,各有辖区,各有内部,内部按纠缠划;尽了对上一级的职责,不等于做到了对自己内部的应当;辖区之外也有内部,影响所及不等于权限所及;所有政府都受问;市一级起与自己执行规约的小区到了门槛,这是这个系列的规范承担,不是事实断言;到了门槛,检查设在里面,三项不由一手兼任;分权可以随条件弱,可被追问不弱;上一层不吞下一层,下一层不封死退出;关系厚度由结构读,不按级别与距离排序。层级是一维。另一维是时间:事情急了,判断等不及通道走完,什么照旧,什么可以快。第五篇接。

Academic original: Qin, Han (2026). Levels (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 4). self-as-an-end.net ↗ · DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23413192

学术原文:Qin, Han (2026). 层级(SAE 政府论 第四篇)。self-as-an-end.net ↗ · DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23413192