Non DubitoEssays in the Self-as-an-End Tradition
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SAE Theory of Government · Essay 03
SAE 政府论 · 第三篇
Essay 03 of 06
第 03 篇,共 06 篇

Twelve Hundred Applications

一千二百份

Han Qin (秦汉)Independent English edition中文原作 · 简/繁

The Counter Stays Open

In the winter of Year 7, the application counter of Apple City’s Housing Department is open as usual. An ordinance embeds a winter heating subsidy for low-income households: a household whose income falls below a certain line may receive a fixed amount each month in winter, applying to the Housing Department, which decides within thirty days. The provision went into the ordinance in Year 1. The counter has stayed open and applications are received as usual; but the assessment post in the Housing Department has stood vacant since the winter of Year 4, and no one has been appointed to it. By this winter twelve hundred applications have piled up, and no one is processing them.

One applicant handed in an application as winter began, and forty days later went to the counter to ask. The person at the counter said: “We take the applications. The assessment post is empty.” The ordinance is there, the counter is open, applications are still taken; on paper the subsidy lacks nothing at all. It just does not run.

Three things first. Whom it concerns: the households that have applied and meet the conditions. Which line: a post standing empty and a pile of applications do not in themselves cross anyone’s line; an embedded position has a gap in its operation. Whether a winter without heat presses on some household’s life-substrate is checked separately. Baseline: the decision within thirty days that the ordinance stipulates.

This essay asks: how far a government must guarantee what it has written into an ordinance, what a guarantee is made of, how a lapse is to be read, and how withdrawing or amending is to be questioned. Beyond compulsion, this is what a government does most. None of it looks like compulsion, yet its weight on people is often far from light: how the households behind those twelve hundred applications get through this winter rests on one empty post.

Two Ways of Putting It

About those twelve hundred there are two ways of putting it. One: the subsidy is something the government gives; it gives when it can, and when it cannot, it cannot, and owes no one anything. The other: heat in winter is everyone’s basic right; if the government does not provide it, that is a violation. Each is half right and half wrong: the first treats the subsidy as a favor, the second as a basic right.

Rights Theory divides rights into two kinds. One is basic rights, which presuppose only that others refrain from violating them, and need no one to constitute them. That a person is not enslaved, that his body is not harmed, is not given by the government, nor by anyone at all; it comes from his own side and holds against everyone: against a neighbor, against a factory, against the government alike. Institution Theory says: “basic rights are not newly made by the institution.” Not violating them, then, is no demand peculiar to government. The other kind is recognition-based rights; such a right “does not come by grace or permission; it is constituted by constitutive recognition.” The subsidy is of this kind. Rights Theory says it plainly: “If continuing supply is to become something claimable, it is constituted as an institutionally embedded position at the recognition layer; it is not constituted as the content of a basic right.” The households that have applied can claim the subsidy because Apple City wrote it into an ordinance.

Now it is clear where each is right and where wrong. The first has the source right: the subsidy was written into an ordinance by Apple City; it did not grow out of each household’s own side. It goes wrong in its second half. Once embedded, the subsidy is no longer a favor to be given or withheld at will; it is a position, on the strength of which applicants may apply, question and require an answer. The second has one thing right: everyone has a floor no one may cross, the life-substrate included. It goes wrong in counting the subsidy itself as part of that floor. That the subsidy stops is not thereby a violation of a basic right; whether there is some other violation is checked separately.

Here the series establishes an ought: a government ought to guarantee the recognition-based rights it has embedded for its internal subjects; where it does not, its power at that place is illegitimate. This ought is not derived from Rights Theory. What Rights Theory gives is a structure: recognition-based rights and power sit on the two sides of one seam; read from the side of acting, it is power; read from the side of the subject’s position, it is a right. A government holds the side of power. If it holds only the power and does not let the right’s side operate, the position breaks down, by de-righting or by hollowing-out; the Housing Department is the latter. A structure gives a reading, not an ought; Rights Theory itself says that its criterion for de-righting “judges the structure of network-processing, not whether the thing is normatively legitimate smuggled back in.” The ought is the series’ own, a normative undertaking newly added on the government’s side.

It adds no sixth heading to the five oughts; taken apart, it falls into Institution Theory’s first, second and fifth. The undertaking is peculiar to government only in this sense: within this series it is established for government alone; it does not assert that other constructs owe nothing for the positions they embed.

Must Be Questioned

“Illegitimate” has a definite landing place in this series: must be questioned, that is, must explain and must correct, through the channel of the fifth ought. Its range must be stated precisely too. Where the lapse is, there the government’s acts through that position and in that scope are illegitimate; the Housing Department’s empty assessment post is one such place. Where lapses have become the normal state, one item hollowed out after another, or de-righting, the government’s power must be questioned as a whole. A crossing of the line does not land here; it is read under the first ought.

Two expressions must be kept apart. “Open to questioning” means that the channel is always open: for every government, at all times, whether or not it has lapsed. “Must be questioned” means that a verified lapse at one place owes an explanation and a correction. The Housing Department’s case is already clear: the post has been empty for three years, twelve hundred applications have piled up, and the thirty-day limit has been kept for none of them. It must be questioned. Other departments of Apple City may at present have no verified lapse anywhere; they are open to questioning all the same; a government never achieves perfection, and being questioned is the normal state. The two are not to be mixed: being questioned is not in itself evidence of illegitimacy, and providing a channel for questioning is not proof of repair.

The Backing

The second essay told of a sentence in an Orchard Court stairwell: “Go to the management again and you won’t get out of this door.” The resident downstairs called the police; a patrol officer separated the two and helped him apply to the City Court for a temporary protection order. That the downstairs resident is not to be threatened, not to be blocked at his own door, was given neither by the protection order nor by the City Police. What the order gives it is a form written down that can be invoked; what the police give it is someone who will come and enforce it.

Rights Theory has a two-by-two table. By source, basic rights are endogenous and recognition-based rights registered; by direction, there is negation and there is emergence. Where registered meets negation is the institutional backstop for the negative floor: a constitution that writes the prohibition of slavery and of torture as untouchable clauses is “giving the basic-rights floor ‘refuse to be reduced’ a registered backing.” One and the same right has its core on the basic side and its backing on the recognition side.

Backing can be hollowed out. Where a freedom is still written in law but enforcement bodies, procedures and the network’s recognition have all been drawn away, Rights Theory says, “What is hollowed out then is the institutional backing, what is suppressed is the exercise of this basic right, and what is untouched is its core.” Suppose the City Court issued the temporary protection order, but the City Police said they were short of staff and never sent anyone to enforce it: the order is on paper and cannot be delivered. What is hollowed out is the backing; that the resident downstairs is not to be threatened is not diminished in the least. What is missing is its anchorage in Apple City.

So what a government gives in this half is backing and enforcement, not the core. This heads off two readings. One reads the government as the source of the core: if the government does not give it, there is none. Not so; the core does not move. The other turns it around: since the core does not move, the government owes nothing. Not so either. Backing and enforcement are on the recognition side and fall under this essay’s guarantee. Institution Theory says: “Protection on paper is not securing; being able to enforce does not prove that what is enforced, or the authority to enforce it, is warranted.” A protection order signed with no one to enforce it goes under the second ought: the construct guards the lines between its internal subjects, and the way it guards may not shrink to paper. If a government does not guarantee this layer of backing, its power at that place is likewise illegitimate and must be questioned.

Back to those households. Does a winter without heat press on some household’s life-substrate? That must be checked separately, and what is checked must be stated precisely. Rights Theory draws a restriction: “A violation on the basic layer is confined to action upon the existing thick layer and contains no claim upon future supply”; “Bare natural scarcity is not a rights event.” When an embedded supply fails, it is read on the recognition layer; it does not thereby become a violation on the basic layer. What is checked separately is whether anyone laid hands on a household’s existing circuit of maintenance, and whether the backing Apple City may have set up for that floor stands empty too. These households rest on an embedded position; their weight lies in the readings of the recognition side.

Three Legs

Back to the Housing Department. Rights Theory says a recognition-based right operates on three legs: “institutional embedding gives an invocable form, effective community recognition gives distributed predictability, real power backing gives the capacity to deliver.” Applied to the subsidy: the ordinance writing it in is the first; applicants and the counter alike treating it as something that can be applied for and asked about is the second; someone in the assessment post, a decision within thirty days, the money paid each month, is the third. It is the third that has fallen through. Rights Theory calls this hollowing-out: “Hollowing-out is power backing falling below threshold while the institutional shell remains, the position reverting to a declaration, operation gone.”

For embedded rights a government keeps three things: no de-righting; no empty shell; withdrawal or amendment made in public and open to questioning. Taken apart, the three fall into the first, second and fifth oughts, and add no sixth heading.

The Freeze Stays

De-righting is a different failure from hollowing-out: “De-righting is coercion persisting while the relevant network no longer treats the recipient as a holder who can, on the strength of this position, initiate requests, invoke procedures, and require response, the position degenerating into sheer force.” Its antecedent is that compulsion persists; the Housing Department has applied no compulsion to the applicants; it simply does not assess.

Suppose instead that the freeze on the grocer’s account from the second essay simply goes on; he files an objection and the Tax Office does not accept it; he goes to the administrative division of the City Court and no one there processes his representations either; the case officer is replaced and the new one likewise refuses his objection; the freeze stays as it was. The freeze is still there, the compulsion is still there; but the position from which he, as a taxpayer, can make representations and ask for an explanation is no longer processed by the network.

To judge whether this is de-righting, Rights Theory gives three tests: “whether the recipient can initiate a procedure on the strength of this position; whether the position can be replicated and processed identically across independent nodes; and whether, after the direct power-wielder is replaced, the position is still maintained by the network.” In this supposed branch all three answers are no. Rights Theory says: “Only when it can be sustained solely by the same power-wielder’s continued pressure, the network not processing the recipient’s request-position, is it de-righting.” The government is then acting on through a position that has degenerated into force, and the case falls under the first ought: an act that no longer passes through a rights position must have its effect on the person checked against the line, and “this was originally a lawful freeze” cannot carry it through.

Empty Shells

No empty shell is the main matter in the subsidy’s case. An empty shell has three readings, and they must be kept apart. The first: the backing of a basic right is hollowed out, as with the protection order signed and never enforced; this goes under the second ought.

The second: a person’s existing self-maintained or substitute routes are first actively sealed off, so that he can depend only on this supply, and then it is hollowed out; this goes under the first ought. Institution Theory counts dismantling, too, as an act of the construct: “the dismantling itself may not cross the line, for instance by first sealing off people’s pre-existing self-maintained or substitute circuits, so that they can depend only on that supply, and then withdrawing; this part falls under the first ought and is not discounted.” Suppose the Housing Department had earlier, for the sake of central heating, removed the stoves that households in public housing had installed themselves, so that tenants could pay for central heating only through the subsidy; then the assessment post stood empty and the subsidy stopped turning. What is hollowed out then is more than a position of supply: Apple City first sealed their old road with its own hands, and this branch is judged under the first ought, without discount. That sentence of Institution Theory speaks of withdrawing, and here the second step is hollowing-out; but Rights Theory says: “Monopolization and induced dependency are themselves the severing; the withdrawal only completes it, and splitting the act in two does not change the reading”; so the same sentence applies, a reading that is the series’ own step.

This reading must keep its threshold: no factual dependence by itself is judged under the first ought. Even if those households can in fact get through the winter only on the subsidy, that alone is not enough: “Mere factual irreplaceability is not monopolization: monopolization requires the exclusive laying of hands.”

The third: any other gap in operation enters the explanation and correction of the fifth ought. The Housing Department’s case falls here. The explanation must answer to these: what has not been delivered, how long each of the twelve hundred has been waiting and for how many the thirty days have already run out; whether the original ground still holds, whether heating for low-income households in winter is still a matter at all; and what arrangements there are for restoring operation, for transition, or for a grounded withdrawal or amendment: when the post will be filled, what becomes of the backlog until then, and, if the subsidy is not to be run any longer, on what grounds and by which route.

Explaining is not repairing. However clearly an explanation is written, while the post is still empty and the twelve hundred still go unassessed, the shell is still a shell. “No empty shell” does not shrink into “no hidden empty shell.” Where it truly cannot be done, say no one can be hired for a while, the rule the fifth essay sets out applies: inability does not cancel the burden of explanation and correction, and an explanation is not booked as having done it.

Its Own Share

If Apple City truly no longer wants to run the subsidy, the road it must take is withdrawal or amendment, not leaving the ordinance hanging and the post empty. Withdrawal or amendment checks authority, grounds, scope and transition, and is made in public and open to questioning; this falls under the fifth ought. What a government withdraws is its own share. Rights Theory separates source and operation into two layers: at the source, a recognition-based right is constituted by constitutive recognition, through vertical institutional conferral and horizontal mutual recognition; in operation, it runs on the three legs. “Source-side institutional conferral and operation-side institutional embedding are not one thing.” Apple City’s share is its conferral at the source, together with its embedding and its backing, withdrawn together and in public, no shell left behind. The subsidy as it now stands, shell in place and backing gone, is exactly the shape a withdrawal must avoid.

A public announcement neither acquires legitimacy by itself nor by itself proves that the right has been outright withdrawn. Outright withdrawal is “the exit of all constitutive sources within the relevant scope, not merely the disappearance of the old bearer”; and “After an institutional conferral is revoked, horizontal mutual recognition may still constitute the same position.” What Apple City can withdraw is its conferral, its embedding and its backing; if mutual recognition among people still constitutes this position, the withdrawal is not yet outright. That is not for the government to declare.

Suppose the City Council repeals the subsidy ordinance and sets up a new program under a different name, with applications starting over. First it must be read what this step is. If the new program constitutes the same position with only a change of bearer, Rights Theory calls it carrier migration: “Carrier migration is the bearer migrating while the right runs on in the new bearer.” Then the position continues, the applications filed under the old ordinance move over with it, and “starting over” must itself be explained. If it is another position, the old one is withdrawn by the road of withdrawal. Either way, three things do not vanish with the name. The floor of basic rights: whether any household’s life-substrate is pressed is still checked separately, and a new name for the program does not change the answer. Old accounts already incurred: the twelve hundred already filed and already past thirty days were incurred under the old ordinance and are not written off when it is repealed. Other sources and commitments that stand independently: they are checked by their own sources and their own conditions.

What is held to is the ways. The three things lie on the side of holding to: they are not discounted for lack of resources and do not stop in an emergency. Yet what is held to is these three ways, not the continued existence of every embedded position. The subsidy can be amended or withdrawn; the ways of amending and withdrawing are not withdrawn. Institution Theory has stated the same shape: “what is held to is the ought, not a particular structure.”

The Stone Bridge

In Apple City’s old quarter stands the Stone Bridge. Long ago the City Council granted a private company a fifty-year toll franchise on it. The franchise was embedded in an ordinance, tolls have been collected as usual, and the revenue long ago far exceeded the cost of building the bridge. In Year 7 some residents cross without paying, and the company asks the City Police to help collect. Whom it concerns: the company; the residents who cross. Which line: within the line. Crossing a bridge is an action that may be limited; neither collecting tolls nor crossing without paying crosses anyone’s line; what is involved is an embedded position, and the compulsion of helping to collect. Baseline: a public bridge with no franchise.

The company’s reasoning can be written in three steps: the franchise is a recognition-based right embedded in an ordinance; a government ought to guarantee the recognition-based rights it has embedded; so the City Police should come. The first step is only half right: the franchise is a position embedded in an ordinance, but the company is a construct, and by On Accountability, “A company does not hold a recognition-based right in its own name”; at this position it serves as an address of attribution; and the ought the series established speaks of rights embedded for internal subjects. The second step leaves something out: that a position is embedded and operating does not mean it should be kept operating by the government; whether it should is checked separately. And the third does not follow either: from “ought to guarantee” to “should come” there still lies a chain of proof for compulsion.

When Rights Theory sets out how recognition-based rights operate, it adds a sentence at the end: “Neither constitution nor operation succeeding is the same as normative legitimacy.” That a franchise is constituted and operating says what it is in structure; it does not say whether it should exist, still less what the government should use to keep it up. Earlier: without the guarantee, power is illegitimate; here, the other face: with it, power is not thereby legitimate. Read together, the guarantee is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. Rights Theory’s sentence says only that structure issues no legitimacy; requiring that the scope of the guarantee itself be under review is a step the series takes from there. The three things are kept for every embedded position; scope review concerns something else: whether a position should continue, whether the government should deliver its operation, and whether, in delivering it, it may use compulsion.

The review checks against that sentence of Institution Theory: “continuation and dismantling are both checked against the persons protected, the task, the authority, the cost and existing commitments.” On the Stone Bridge: does it protect the company recovering its cost, or those who cross having a good bridge; with revenue long past the cost, does the task remain; the cost falls on everyone who crosses; the fifty-year franchise is itself an existing commitment, to be checked as such. Institution Theory also says that a construct’s own continued existence “is not an independent sufficient reason to close off questioning, or to continue a particular arrangement automatically”. That an arrangement has lasted long is not in itself a reason for it to continue either; that step is the series’ own.

The paper does not judge whether the franchise should be withdrawn or kept; it judges one thing: Apple City cannot answer the company with “it is embedded, it is operating.” To withdraw it, it takes the road of withdrawal, with the existing commitment among the things checked; to keep it, keeping too must be explained. If the City Police come to help, they are enforcing this position; as enforcement lands on residents who cross without paying and converges their action, the right the position carries shows its face as power, which Rights Theory calls “conditioned on convergence, not a standing state of any running right.” Once that face shows, what the police do is compulsion and goes through its own chain, as in the second essay; that a franchise is embedded does not wave this compulsion through.

Fuel Vouchers

The subsidy is a supply. A government gives out more than one kind of supply, and they do not all sit in one slot; there are three. What is embedded: the heating subsidy is in this slot. It is guaranteed as a recognition-based right, under the three things; it can be withdrawn only by the road of withdrawal, and the withdrawing itself passes through the first ought.

What is not embedded. Suppose that for the past five years the mayor has, every winter, issued “fuel vouchers” by a temporary decision, written into no ordinance and embedded in no other form. In the winter of Year 7 the mayor says there will be none this year. Whom it concerns: the households that received vouchers in past years. Which line: stopping a supply does not in itself cross anyone’s line. Baseline: the heating each household had before Apple City began issuing the vouchers. The vouchers are not in the embedded slot; they are an entitlement, or one of the conditions Apple City provides according to relational thickness. But not embedded does not automatically mean they may be stopped at will. Institution Theory, having said that continuation and dismantling are checked against the persons protected, the task, the authority, the cost and existing commitments, goes on: “beyond that, existing rights, commitments and dependencies are checked as in the preceding sentence.”

Bare entitlement. On Rights and Entitlements says the granting side may stop giving, and that in the slot of bare entitlement stopping is not violation, “but only so far as the granting end has not first exclusively monopolized, manufactured dependence, and sealed off alternative routes”; and it goes on, “a giving already loaded through promise, institution, trust, or guardianship is no longer bare entitlement.” The first sentence sets a limit on stopping; the second moves a great swath of supply out of the slot.

The vouchers must be gone through item by item. Did the mayor promise to issue them every year? The branch supposes not; had he, they would no longer be a bare entitlement. Did Apple City manufacture dependence? Five years of issue, if households now get through winter on them, is factual dependence; factual dependence is not manufactured dependence, and what must be seen is whether Apple City first sealed off people’s old ways of heating. Whether there was monopolization, whether alternative routes were sealed off, is likewise checked down to whether there was an exclusive laying of hands. If all of these pass, stopping in this slot is not read as violation. Not violation, yet it must still be explained; as Institution Theory puts it, “For what the construct has organized, taken up or restricted, it must correspondingly explain how room is left and provided.” Whether a supply is in the slot of bare entitlement cannot be settled by its name; it must be tested item by item.

Carried over to government, the slot must also be narrowed. Stopping is not violation because a supplier withdrawing its own supply, as Rights Theory puts it, “is disposing of one’s own exercise under one’s own law.” Apple City is a construct; a construct has no law of its own, and so no such exercise of its own to dispose of. What carries over, then, is only the half that concerns the reading: in this slot, stopping is not read as violation; whether it may stop, and how, goes back to the third ought and the explanation it owes; carrying it over so is the series’ own step.

Here the paper draws a one-sentence contrast with T. H. Marshall. Marshall divides citizenship into three elements, the third being the social element: “By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” Both place welfare within the structure of rights, not as a favor. They part at one point: on the line of reading that takes his essay as its principal reference, social rights are drawn by membership and attach to citizenship; the series’ two guarantees are addressed to internal subjects, and the interior is drawn by entanglement, not by identity. Who is a member belongs to the Theory of the State.

The Assessment Post

Twelve hundred applications are piled up there, and the root of it is one post. The subsidy is delivered through the assessment post; the post standing empty is a matter of administration. Rights Theory says that real power backing “is not only the prevention and repair that follow a violation, but also everyday performance, the allocation of resources, access to procedures, and the honouring of qualifications.” Filling a post, ordering the assessments, making a decision within thirty days, paying the money each month: all of this is delivery. Whether a recognition-based right goes hollow often depends not on some great violation but on whether these everyday things get done.

The paper gives administration two roots. One is making embedded rights really deliverable: no empty shell, brought down to the everyday, is administration. The other is providing conditions for cultivation according to relational thickness. Institution Theory’s third ought says: “An institution provides conditions for the cultivation of its internal subjects according to relational thickness; it is concerned with conditions, not with outcomes.” Apple City opening a community arts center and paying for it is administration on this root. Neither root comes from Rights Theory: it tells us only which everyday things delivery includes; why administration must do them comes, for the first, from the guarantee, and for the second, from the third ought.

The two roots ground only administration that uses no compulsion. If administration is to use compulsion, say to check a household’s declaration by compulsory means, that step goes separately through the second essay’s chain: what cannot retrace to a negative root does not stand by being renamed administration; a grounded administrative aim does not by itself ground compulsory means.

One more matter of accounts. When the person at the counter says “The assessment post is empty,” that is the fact, not an evasion. The entry for the empty post is not at the counter; it is at the positions that set the staffing, provide the funding and decide whether to fill the post. The first essay, on the front line, said the accounts must be kept apart: one falls on the front-line position, the other on the positions that set its rules and allocate its resources. What these positions must explain is exactly the list in the third reading of the empty shell.

What Did My Taxes Get Me?

The grocer from the second essay had his account frozen with an amount left for basic living. Property tax is the main source of Apple City’s general budget, and the heating subsidy is funded from that budget too. The grocer asks: “What did the taxes I paid get me?” The question can be read in two ways. One reads it as a price: so much paid, so much back; if nothing comes back, pay less or pay nothing. The other reads it as a demand for an account: where the money comes from, on whom it presses, where it is spent, who bears the shortfall. The paper takes the second, and must also make clear why the second is not simply the first.

On what grounds does Apple City collect tax? The paper’s answer: the root of tax and funding is the funding of the functions that carrying the five oughts and the two guarantees requires. The assessment post needs someone in it, review officers need to be employed, the hotline needs someone to answer it, the courts need to open, protection orders need someone to enforce them; the oughts and the guarantees come down to functions, functions to positions, and positions need funding. Hanging the root of tax on the functions that the oughts and the guarantees require is a step the series takes on its own account.

Where the root is, the account follows: on whom the burden of raising the money falls, which people property tax presses on; where the funding goes, how much of the general budget reached the subsidy and how much the assessment post; who bears the shortfall, and where, in the three years the post stood empty, it fell. If no position comes forward to explain the last, the answer settles by itself: it falls on the households that are waiting. A shortfall no one explains must itself be questioned.

Freezing an account to collect tax must retrace through tax’s own root. The Law Series requires that the legitimacy of affirmative provisions retrace to a negative root: “the prevention of suppression, the safeguarding of channels for questioning, or the maintenance of co-constructive space.” Review officers, the hotline and the courts safeguard the channels for questioning; protection orders enforced prevent suppression; embedded positions delivered maintain the positions people already share; retracing through these functions is the series’ own step. The part raised for conditions on the side of striving for, such as the arts center’s funding, can be read only as the maintenance of co-constructive space, and providing conditions goes a step beyond maintaining. Until the retracing is finished, the series does not vouch for the standing of this part of the compulsion and leaves it as a remainder, registered together with two places in the second essay: the land taken for the levee, and the compensation after the Levee Street bus shelter was smashed.

Paying taxes is no universal quid pro quo. On Accountability has: “A recognition-based right is not got in exchange for recognizing a power.” And then: “The generation, the continuance, and the termination of a chain’s accountability are judged by that chain’s own content and conditions; an accountability is not generated automatically because the other chain has been performed, nor released automatically because the other chain has not.” Apple City, through the Tax Office, collects tax from the grocer, and at that place he holds a taxpayer’s accountability; the embedded positions he holds in Apple City ask it for delivery, and Apple City owes them its guarantee. The first sentence blocks joining the two into a sale: the guarantee is not bought with taxes. The second blocks two automatisms: having paid taxes does not automatically generate a claim to any particular benefit; Apple City’s hollowing out the subsidy does not automatically release him from his accountability to pay tax. Conversely, being in arrears does not automatically cancel positions he has already established elsewhere. Once the subsidy is hollowed out, that chain is gone and what remains is the guarantee owed; applying the sentence there is the series’ own step.

Nor does the guarantee of the subsidy come from taxes: whether the households that applied paid taxes, and how much, is no condition of it. On Accountability keeps one more sentence: “Whether a particular arrangement makes some fact a condition of application is judged separately, by that arrangement.” A fee charged per use, a service stated to be conditional on payment, are judged by their own conditions. So paying taxes is no universal quid pro quo, and particular claims already established are not thereby erased.

A Thirty Percent Cut

In the winter of Year 7 Apple City’s revenue falls, and the City Council discusses cutting next year’s budget by thirty percent. Three proposals are on the table: abolish the Housing Department’s complaints desk and merge complaints about the subsidy into the Mayor’s Office complaint hotline; suspend new applications for the heating subsidy for one year; cut the community arts center’s funding by half. Whom it concerns: those who complain, those who apply for the subsidy, those who use the arts center. Which line: none of the three directly crosses anyone’s line; the first touches the fifth ought’s channel for questioning, the second an embedded position, the third a condition on the side of striving for. Baseline: last year’s budget. With less money, something must be cut. The question is what cannot be.

What cannot be cut is the oughts and the necessary channels, not any old post, program or budget figure. On the series’ own grouping, what lies on the side of holding to is not discounted for lack of resources: the first and second oughts, basic rights not being violated among them; the half of the fourth that does not seal the channels of refusal, revision, exit and change of direction; the fifth ought’s channel for questioning; the ways of guaranteeing recognition-based rights; the limits of substitute exercise. Institution Theory also says: “This series grants that in practice an ought may not be achieved, and does not on that account withdraw or discount any of them.” That sentence governs all five, holding to and striving for alike, so the oughts on the side of striving for are not discounted either. What can be ranked when money is short is the conditions on the side of striving for: ahead or behind, more or less, never the ought itself; this division is the series’ own.

Item by item. The first: merging the complaints desk into the hotline. The desk is a structure, and structures can change; the three conditions cannot be withdrawn: “it is independent of the party questioned, internal subjects can actually initiate it, and initiating it brings no retaliation.” What must be checked is how things stand after the merger. The hotline sits in the Mayor’s Office, not the same party as the Housing Department; but independence is functional: “it is checked against the party actually questioned.” The party questioned is the Housing Department, and also the positions that set the staffing and provide the funding; if those sit in the Mayor’s Office, the hotline is not independent of them, and another route within reach is needed. Does the hotline take complaints about the subsidy; having taken them, can it make the questioned party answer; when the answer misses the point, where can the complaint go next? If these check out, the item is a change of structure. If not, complaints about the subsidy have nowhere to go at Apple City’s level; and what is cut is not a desk but this level’s channel under the fifth ought.

The second: suspending new applications for a year. This touches an embedded position and can go only by the road of withdrawal or amendment, made in public and open to questioning. Authority: the ordinance was enacted by the City Council, and suspending part of it is within the Council’s authority. Grounds: falling revenue is a ground; whether the subsidy’s original ground, heat for low-income households in winter, is still there must be stated too. Scope: only new applications are suspended; the twelve hundred already filed are outside it; they are old accounts. Transition: there must be an arrangement for households that newly qualify during the year. The suspension itself must also pass the first ought: has Apple City first closed off anyone’s existing way? And one more point: if the suspension becomes another way of leaving the empty shell hanging, the post still empty and the backlog untouched, it has not answered “no empty shell.”

The third: halving the arts center’s funding. This is a condition on the side of striving for; it can be ranked and it can be cut; if some item in it has already been embedded or promised, that item is checked separately. But ranking is itself a judgment. The Law Series says law suffers a structural discount at the level of enforcement, one strand of which is the priority of resources: “not every instance of suppression can be processed”; and ranking brings the one who ranks into the matter. Carrying this over to a government’s budget is the series’ own step; the ground lies in the first essay: when Apple City ranks its budget, people sitting in positions are judging, and judgment must answer. So ranking must be explained: the matters to be judged, the subjects concerned, and how the responsibility for making up the shortfall is to be questioned.

Who makes up the shortfall below the threshold? Institution Theory, in conversation with Sen and Nussbaum, left this question: “when a person falls below some threshold, which construct is to make it up, and by what division, is a question of distribution and design.” The paper answers as far as structure: an embedded position is guaranteed by the level that embedded it; for conditions on the side of striving for, each construct owes corresponding conditions and an account as far as it actually organizes the person’s life; who bears the shortfall must be stated by some position, and open to questioning. To whom, how much, and how the levels share it belong to specific theories of institutions; the paper sets up no theory of distributive justice of its own.

Where it truly cannot be done, where a thirty percent shortfall cannot be filled however it is ranked, the rule the fifth essay sets out applies: admit the inability, without withdrawing or discounting the ought, and explain the transition. What the third essay has said comes to this: the two kinds of rights are kept apart; for basic rights a government gives backing and enforcement, not the core; for embedded recognition-based rights it keeps three things, no de-righting, no empty shell, withdrawal or amendment made in public and open to questioning; a guarantee kept does not make power legitimate by itself; taxes are not the price of a guarantee; when money is short, what can be cut is structures and conditions, never the oughts and the channels. Someone will still come, later, to ask about those twelve hundred applications.

窗口照常开着

第七年冬天,苹果城住房局的申请窗口照常开着。条例里载着一项低收入家庭的冬季供暖补助:家庭收入在一条线以下的,冬季每月可领一定数额,向住房局申请,三十日内决定。这一条第一年就写进了条例。窗口一直开着,收件照常;可住房局负责审核的那个岗位,从第四年冬天出缺,此后一直没有补人。到这一年冬天,积压的申请有一千二百份,没有人处理。

一位申请人入冬时递了申请,四十天后去窗口问。窗口的人说:“收件归我们。审核的岗空着。”条例在,窗口开着,申请照收;纸面上,这项补助一样也不缺。它只是不运行。

三样先写。对谁:已经申请、符合条件的家庭。在哪条线:空着一个岗位、积着一批申请,本身不越谁的线;是一项已经载入的位置,出了运行的缺口。冬天没有暖气,会不会压到哪一户的生命基底,另核。基线:条例写明的三十日内决定。

这一篇问:一项写进条例的东西,政府要保证它到什么程度,保证由什么组成,落空了怎样读,要撤要改又怎样受问。强制之外,政府做得最多的就是这一类事。它们看上去不像强制,落在人身上的分量却常常不轻:一千二百份申请后面的那些家庭,这个冬天怎样过,压在一个空着的岗位上。

两种说法

关于那一千二百份,可以有两种说法。一种说:补助是政府给的,给得了就给,给不了就是给不了,谈不上欠谁。一种说:冬天有暖气,是每个人的基本权利;政府不给,就是侵犯。两种说法各对一半,也各错一半:前一种把补助当成恩惠,后一种把它当成基础权利。

权利论把权利分成两类。一类是基础权利,它预设的承认,只是别人克制、不去侵犯,用不着谁来构成。一个人不被奴役、身体不被伤害,不是政府给的,也不是任何人给的;它从这个人自己那边来,对谁都成立:对邻居,对一家厂,对政府,一样。制度论说:「基础权利不是制度新造的」。不侵犯它,也就不是政府独有的一条要求。另一类是承认性权利,它「不是凭恩赐或许可而来,是由构成式承认成立的」。补助在这一类。权利论说得直:「持续供给若要成为可主张的东西,它成立为承认层的已载入位置,不成立为基础权利的内容。」递了申请的家庭可以主张补助,是因为苹果城把它写进了条例。

这样,两种说法对在哪里、错在哪里,就清楚了。前一种说对了来源:补助是苹果城写进条例的,不是从各户自己那边长出来的;它错在后半句。补助一经载入,就不是随手给、随手不给的恩惠,而是一个位置,申请人可以凭它申请、追问、要求答复。后一种说对了一件事:每个人都有一条谁也不得越过的底线,生命基底在内;它错在把补助本身算进了那条底线。补助停了,不由此就是对基础权利的侵犯;另有没有侵犯,另核。

这个系列在这里立一条:政府应当保证它为内部主体载入的承认性权利;不保证,政府的权力在那一处就不正当。这一条不从权利论推出。权利论给的是结构:承认性权利与权力在同一条接缝的两侧,从施为一侧读出的是权力,从主体位置一侧读出的是权利。政府握着权力那一侧。它若只握着权力,不让权利一侧运行,位置就会坏掉,或脱权,或掏空;住房局属后一种。结构给的是读法,不给应当;权利论自己说,它判脱权的那几问「判的是网络处理的结构,而不是把规范上的正当与否偷渡进来」。应当是这个系列立的,是政府一侧新增的一项规范承担。

它不给五条应当另添第六个总名,拆开看,落进制度论原有的第一、二、五条。说它是政府特有的,只在这个意义上:它在这个系列里只对政府立,不断言别的构对它们载入的位置一概不欠。

须被追问

“不正当”在这个系列里有确定的落点:须被追问,即须说明,须修正,走第五条应当的通道。范围也要说准。失守在哪一处,政府经那一处位置、在那一作用域的施为就不正当;住房局空着的审核岗,是这样一处。失守成了常态,一项又一项地掏空,或者脱权,政府的权力就整体须被追问。越线不走这一落点,另照第一条读。

这里要把两个词分开。“可被追问”说的是通道常开:对一切政府、一切时候,不论它有没有失守。“须被追问”说的是一处已核的失守欠下了一份说明与修正。住房局这一处已经核得清:岗位空了三年,积压一千二百份,三十日的时限对这些申请一份也没有守住。它须被追问。苹果城别的部门,此刻也许没有哪一处已核的失守,照样可被追问;政府永远做不到完美,受追问是常态。两样不混:受问本身,不是不正当的证据;开了受问的通道,也不是修复的凭证。

背靠

第二篇写过果园里小区楼道里的那一句:“再去找物业,就让你出不了这个门。”楼下的住户报了警,巡警把两人分开,协助他向市法院申请临时保护令。楼下的住户不被威胁、不被堵在自家门口,这一条不是保护令给的,也不是市警局给的。保护令给它的,是一个写下来、可以援引的形态;市警局给它的,是一个会来执行的人。

权利论有一张二乘二的表。按来源分,基础权利是内生的,承认性权利是注册的;按方向分,有否定,有涌现。注册与否定相交的那一格,是对否定底线的制度兜底:宪法把禁奴役、禁酷刑写成不可触动的条款,是「给基础权利那条拒绝被化约的底线加一个注册式的背靠」。同一项权利,核在基础一侧,背靠在承认一侧。

背靠可以被掏空。法上仍写着某项自由,执行机构、程序与网络的承认却都被抽走,权利论说,「这时被掏空的是制度背靠,被压制的是这项基础权利的行使,未被动的是它的核」。设若市法院签发了临时保护令,市警局却说人手不够,从不派人执行:保护令写在纸上,兑现不了。被掏空的是背靠;楼下的住户不被威胁这一条,一分也没有少。少的是它在苹果城的着落。

所以政府在这一半里给的,是背靠与执行,不是核。这一句挡两种读法。一种把政府读成核的来源:政府不给,就没有。不对,核不动。另一种倒过来:核既然不动,政府就没有什么可欠的。也不对。背靠与执行在承认一侧,正归这一篇的保证。制度论说:「纸面上的保护不算保障;执行得了,也不证明执行的内容与权限正当」。保护令签了没人执行,走的是第二条应当:构守住内部主体彼此之间的线,守的办法不能只剩纸面。这一层背靠不保证,政府的权力在那一处同样不正当,须被追问。

回到那些家庭。冬天没有暖气,是否压到了某一户的生命基底?这要另核,并且要说准核的是什么。权利论划过一道限缩:「基础层之侵限于对既有厚层的作用,不含对未来供给的请求」;「纯自然匮乏是非权利事件」。一项已载入的供给失效了,按承认层的读法读;它不因此直接成为基础层的一次侵犯。另核的是:有没有人对这一户既有的维持回路动了手;苹果城若为这一层底线另设过背靠,那背靠是不是也空了。这些家庭凭的是一个已载入的位置,它们的重量在承认一侧那一套读数里。

三支

回到住房局。权利论说,一项承认性权利靠三支运行:「制度载入给可援引形态,共同体有效承认给分布式可预期性,真实权力支持给兑现能力」。放到补助上:条例把它写进去,是第一支;申请人和窗口都把它当作一项可以申请、可以追问的东西,是第二支;审核岗上有人,三十日内作出决定,钱按月发到,是第三支。跌破的是第三支。权利论管这叫掏空:「掏空是权力支持跌破阈值而制度外壳仍在,位置退为宣告,运行消失」。

对已载入的权利,政府守三件:不脱权;不留空壳;撤改公开受问。三件拆开,落进第一、二、五条应当,不另增第六个总名。

冻结还在

脱权是另一种失效:「脱权是强制仍在,而相关网络不再把受位者作为可凭该位置发起请求、调用程序、要求响应的权利持有人,位置退化为强力」。脱权的前件是强制仍在;住房局对申请人没有施加什么强制,它只是不审。

设若第二篇那家杂货店,账户的冻结一直延续;店主提出异议,税务处不受理;他去市法院行政庭,也没有人处理他的申辩;换了经办人,新经办人照样不受理他的异议;冻结照旧。冻结还在,强制还在;可他作为纳税人能申辩、能要求说明的那个位置,网络已经不处理了。

判它是不是脱权,权利论给了三问:「一是受位者能不能以这个位置发起程序,二是这个位置能不能跨独立的节点被同一地复制和处理,三是换掉直接的施权者之后,这个位置是否仍由网络维持。」设若的这一支,三问都答否。权利论说:「只有当它只能靠同一个施权者持续施压,网络并不处理受位者的请求位置,才是脱权」。这时政府是在经一个已经退化成强力的位置继续施为,这一件归第一条:一项施为已经不经由权利的位置,它对人的作用就要照线去核,不能拿“这原是一项依法的冻结”替它过关。

空壳

不留空壳,是补助这一件的正题。空壳有三种读法,要分开。第一读:基础权利的背靠被掏空,保护令签了没人执行那样,走第二条。

第二读:先主动封掉人原有的自维或替代的通路,使他只能依赖这一项供给,再掏空,走第一条。制度论说拆除也是构的施为:「拆除本身不得越线,比如先封掉其原有自维或替代通路,使其只能依赖该供给,再撤出,这一部分归第一条,不打折」。设若住房局早先以统一供暖为由,拆掉了公租房里各户自装的取暖炉,住户只能靠补助去付统一供暖的费用;随后审核岗空着,补助停转。这时被掏空的就不只是一个供给位置:苹果城先动手封了他们原有的路,这一支照第一条判,不打折。制度论那一句原说的是撤出,这里后一步是掏空;可权利论说,「独占与致依赖本身已是切断,撤出只是它的完成,分两步走不改读数」,所以照同一句读;这样读,是这个系列自己的一步。

这一读要守住门槛:不由任何事实上的依赖直接判第一条。那些家庭即便事实上只能靠补助过冬,这本身也不够;「仅仅事实上无可替代不是独占,独占要有排他的动手」。

第三读:其余的运行缺口,进入第五条的说明与修正。住房局这一件落在这一读。说明要答到这几样:什么没有兑现,即一千二百份各压了多久,三十日的时限对多少份已经过去;原根据是否仍成立,即低收入家庭冬季的供暖,这件事还在不在;恢复运行、过渡,或者有根据地撤改,作何安排,即岗位什么时候补,补上之前积压的那些怎么办,若不想再办这项补助,凭什么、走哪一条路。

说明不等于修复。一份说明写得再清楚,岗位仍空着,一千二百份仍没人审,空壳仍是空壳。“不留空壳”不缩成“不隐瞒空壳”。真做不到时,比如一时招不到人,照第五篇立的那一条:不以做不到为由取消说明与修正之责,也不凭说明就记作已经做到。

撤的是自己那一份

苹果城若真不想再办这项补助,它要走的是撤改这一条路,不是让条例挂着、让岗位空着。撤改要核权限、根据、作用域与过渡,并公开受问;这归第五条。政府撤的,是它自己那一份。权利论把来源与运行分成两层:来源上,一项承认性权利由构成式承认成立,有纵向的制度授予,也有横向的相互承认;运行上,靠前面那三支。「来源侧的制度授予与运行侧的制度载入不是一回事」。苹果城那一份,是它在来源上的授予,连同它的载入与它的支持,一并公开撤,不留外壳。眼下这项补助的样子,外壳在,支持没了,正是撤改要避开的样子。

公开宣布,不独自取得正当性,也不独自证明这项权利已经明撤。明撤是「相关作用域里全部构成来源退出,不是仅旧载体消失」;而「一项机构授予被撤回之后,横向的相互承认仍可能构成同一个位置」。苹果城能撤的,是它的授予、载入与支持;人们彼此之间的相互承认若仍构成这一个位置,这一撤就还不是明撤。这一点不由政府宣布。

设若市议会废止补助条例,另设一个名目不同的新项目,申请从头来过。先要读清这一步是什么。新项目构成的若是同一个位置,只换了载体,权利论叫转载:「转载是载体迁移而权利在新载体上继续运行」。那时位置续行,旧条例下递进来的申请随它移过去,“从头来过”本身就要说明。若是另一个位置,旧的那一个照撤改的路撤。不论哪一种,有三样东西不跟着名目消失。基础权利的底线:哪一户的生命基底是否受压,照旧另核,不因项目换了名目就换了答案。已发生的旧账:已经递进来、已经超过三十日的那一千二百份,是旧条例下欠下的,不因旧条例废止就销账。独立成立的其他来源与承诺:照它们自己的来源、自己的条件核。

坚持的是方式。三件在“坚持”一边:不随资源打折,不因紧急停下。可坚持的是这三样方式,不是每一个已载入位置的存续。补助可以改,可以撤;改与撤的方式不撤。制度论说过同一个形状:「坚持的是应当,不是构造」。

石桥

苹果城老城区有一座石桥。很久以前,市议会授予一家私营公司这座桥五十年的过桥收费特许权。特许载入了条例,收费照常运行,收入早已远超建桥的成本。第七年,有居民过桥不交费,公司要求市警局协助收费。对谁:公司;过桥的居民。在哪条线:线内。过桥是可限制的行动,收费与过桥不交费都不越谁的线;牵涉的是一项载入的位置,与协助收费的那一下强制。基线:没有特许的公共桥。

公司的理由可以写成三步:特许是条例载入的一项承认性权利;政府应当保证它所载入的承认性权利;所以市警局该来。第一步只对一半:特许是条例载入的一个位置,可公司是构,照职责专论,「一家公司不自持一项承认性权利」,它在这一位置上作的是归责的地址;这个系列立的那一条,说的也是为内部主体载入的权利。第二步漏了一处:一项位置载入了、在运行,不等于它该由政府维持运行,该不该,要另核。第三步也不跟着来:从“应当保证”到“市警局该来”,中间还隔着一条强制的证明链。

权利论在立承认性权利怎样运行时,末尾加了一句:「构成成功与运行成功,都不等于规范正当。」一项特许成立了、运行着,说的是它在结构上是什么,不说它该不该在,更不说政府该用什么去维持它。前面说,不保证,权力不正当;这里是另一面:保证了,权力也不因此正当。两句并读,保证是必要条件,不是充分条件。权利论那一句只说结构不发正当性;要保证的范围本身受审查,是这个系列由此走出的一步。三件对每一个已载入的位置都守;范围审查管的是另一件:一项位置该不该续,政府该不该替它兑现运行,兑现时动不动强制。

审查照制度论那一句去核:「续存与拆除,都回到所保护的人、任务、权限、代价与既有承诺去核」。放到石桥上:保护的是公司收回成本,还是过桥的人有一座好桥;收入早已远超成本,任务还在不在;代价落在每一个过桥的人身上;五十年的特许本身是一项既有承诺,要照它核。制度论也说,构自身的存续,「不构成关闭追问、或自动续存一项具体安排的独立充分理由」。一项安排存续得久,这本身也不是续存的理由,这一步是这个系列自己的。

论文不判这项特许该撤还是该留,只判一件事:苹果城不能拿“它是载入的,它在运行”回答公司。要撤,走撤改的路,既有承诺在要核的事项之内;要留,留也要说明。市警局若来协助,就是在执行这一项位置;执行落到过桥不交费的居民身上,收敛他们的行动,这时位置所载的权利显出了权力面,权利论说,这是「条件于收敛而不是常态」。一显出权力面,市警局的那一下就是强制,照第二篇过它自己的链;一项特许载入了,不替这一下强制过关。

燃料券

补助是一项供给。政府发出去的供给不止这一种,它们不都在同一格里,分三格。已载入的:供暖补助在这一格。它按承认性权利保证,守那三件;能撤,只照撤改的路撤,撤本身也过第一条。

未载入的。设若过去五年,市长每年冬天以一个临时决定发“燃料券”,没有写进任何条例,也没有以别的形式载入。第七年冬天,市长说,今年不发了。对谁:往年领燃料券的家庭。在哪条线:停发一项供给,本身不越谁的线。基线:苹果城发券以前,各户原有的取暖办法。燃料券不在已载入那一格;它是权益,或者是苹果城按关系厚度提供的条件。可未载入,不自动等于可以随手停。制度论说续存与拆除要回到所保护的人、任务、权限、代价与既有承诺去核,接着说:「此外既有的权利、承诺与依赖,照上一句去核」。

裸权益。权益专论说,授予的一方可以停付,裸权益这一格里停付不是侵,「但以授予端未先排他性独占、未制造依赖、未封死替代回路为限」;它接着说,「付出若已承诺、制度、信托或监护载入,便已非裸权益」。前一句给停付划了限;后一句把一大片供给移出了这一格。

燃料券要逐项过。市长有没有承诺过以后每年都发?这一分支设定没有;若有,它便已不是裸权益。苹果城有没有制造依赖?五年照发,若各户已靠它过冬,那是事实上的依赖;事实上的依赖不等于制造依赖,要看苹果城有没有先封掉人们原有的取暖办法。有没有独占、有没有封死替代回路,同样要核到有没有排他的动手。几样都过了,停发在这一格里不读作侵。不是侵,也要说明;制度论说:「构已组织、占用或限制的,须相应说明怎样留出与提供空间」。一项供给在不在裸权益格里,不能凭名目定,要逐项检验。

这一格搬到政府身上,还要收窄。停付不算侵,理由是供给者撤出自己的供给,权利论说,这「是以自己的法处置自己的行使」。苹果城是构;构没有自己的法,也就没有那样一份自己的行使可以处置。所以搬过来的只是读数那一半:停付在这一格里不读作侵;许不许停、怎样停,回到第三条应当与说明之责;这样搬过来,是这个系列自己的一步。

论文在这里与马歇尔作一句对照。马歇尔把公民身份分成三个要素,第三个是社会要素:「我所说的社会要素,指的是从享有一份适度的经济福利与安全的权利,到充分分享社会遗产、按社会通行的标准过文明人生活的权利,这整个范围」。两边都把福利放进权利的结构里,不当作恩惠。分开在一处:照以他这篇文章为主要参照的那一路读法,社会权利按成员资格划,挂在公民身份上;这个系列的两类保证说给内部主体,内部按纠缠划,不按身份划。谁是成员,归国家论。

审核的岗

一千二百份积在那里,根子在一个岗位上。补助靠审核岗兑现;岗位空着,是行政的事。权利论说,真实权力支持「不只是侵害发生后的制止与修复,也包括日常的履行、资源的配置、程序的接入与资格的兑现」。补一个岗,排一个审核的次序,在三十日内作一个决定,把钱按月发出去,这些都是兑现。一项承认性权利空没空掉,常常不取决于哪一次大的侵害,取决于这些日常的事有没有人做。

论文给行政两条根。一条是让已载入的权利真能兑现:不留空壳落到日常,就是行政。一条是按关系厚度为涵育提供条件。制度论第三条应当说:「制度按关系厚度,为它的内部主体的涵育提供条件;只管条件,不管结果。」苹果城开一间社区艺术中心,付它的经费,是这一条根上的行政。两条根都不从权利论来:权利论只告诉我们兑现包括哪些日常的事;行政为什么必须做这些,前一条来自保证,后一条来自第三条应当。

两条根只给不动强制的行政。行政若要动强制,比如以强制手段核查一户的申报,那一步另过第二篇的链:回溯不到否定性的根的,不因改称行政而成立;行政目标有根据,不独自使强制手段有根据。

还要说一处账。窗口的人说“审核的岗空着”,说的是实情,不是推脱。岗位空着这一笔,不记在窗口,记在定编制、给经费、决定补不补人的那些位置上。第一篇写一线时说过,账要分开落:一笔落在一线的位置,一笔落在给一线定规矩、配资源的位置。这些位置要说明的,正是空壳第三读列的那几样。

我交的税换来了什么

第二篇那家杂货店,冻结的账户里留了一个维持基本生活的额度。房产税是苹果城一般预算的主要来源,供暖补助的经费也出自这一般预算。店主问:“我交的税换来了什么?”这一问可以有两种读法。一种读成价钱:交了多少,换回多少;换不回来,就该少交或者不交。一种读成要一份说明:钱从哪里来,压在谁身上,花在哪里,缺口由谁担。论文取后一种,并且要说清后一种为什么不就是前一种。

苹果城凭什么收税?论文的回答是:税与经费的根,是承担五条应当与两类保证所需的那些功能的经费。审核岗要有人坐,复核员要有人当,热线要有人接,法院要开门,保护令要有人去执行;应当与保证落到功能上,功能落到位置上,位置要经费。把税的根挂在应当与保证所需的功能上,这一步由这个系列自担。

根在那里,要说明的就跟着来:筹资的负担落在谁身上,房产税压在哪些人身上;经费用在哪里,一般预算里有多少到了补助,有多少到了审核岗;缺口由谁承担,审核岗空着的这三年,缺口落在哪里。最后一问若没有一个位置出来说明,答案就自己落下来了:落在等着的那些家庭身上。没有人说明的缺口,本身须被追问。

为征税而冻结账户,强制要经过税自己的根回溯。法学系列要肯定性条款的正当性回溯到否定性的根:「对压制的防止,对追问通道的保障,或对共构空间的维持」。复核员、热线、法院,保追问的通道;保护令有人执行,防压制;已载入的位置兑现得了,维持人们已经共有的那些位置;经由这些功能回溯,是这个系列自己的一步。为争取一侧的条件征的那一部分,比如艺术中心的经费,只能读作对共构空间的维持,而提供条件比“维持”多走一步。回溯没有走完以前,这一部分强制的资格,这个系列不担保,留作余项,与第二篇的两处合在一起登记:防洪堤的征地,河堤街公交站被砸后的赔偿。

交税不构成普遍对价。职责专论有一条:「承认性权利不由承认权力换来。」它接着说:「一链职责的发生、继续与终止,依该链自身的内容和条件判断,不因另一链已经履行就自动生成,也不因另一链未履行就自动免除。」苹果城经税务处向店主收税,他在那一格持纳税之责;他在苹果城持有的那些已载入的位置,向苹果城要兑现,苹果城对它们负保证。前一句挡住的是把两样接成一笔买卖:保证不是交税换来的。后一句挡住的是两个自动:交了税,不自动生出对某一项具体给付的请求;苹果城把补助办空了,也不自动免掉他的纳税之责。反过来,欠了税,也不自动取消他在别处已经成立的位置。补助办空了,那一条链已经不在,剩下的是欠下的保证;把这一句用到这里,是这个系列自己的一步。

补助这一项保证,也不从税来:递了申请的家庭交没交税、交了多少,不是这项保证的条件。职责专论还留了一句:「具体安排是否把某项事实作为适用条件,另按该安排判断」。一项按次收的规费,一份写明以缴费为条件的服务,照它们自己的条件判。所以交税不构成一条普遍对价;已经成立的具体请求,也不因此消除。

砍三成

第七年冬天,苹果城的财政收入下降,市议会讨论下一年预算缩减三成。桌上有三项提案:撤掉住房局的投诉窗口,补助的投诉并入市长办公室的投诉热线;暂停供暖补助的新申请一年;社区艺术中心的经费削减一半。对谁:投诉的人,补助的申请者,艺术中心的使用者。在哪条线:三项都不直接越谁的线;第一项碰第五条的受问通道,第二项碰一项已载入的位置,第三项是争取一侧的条件。基线:上一年的预算。钱少了,总要砍些什么。要问的是:什么不能砍。

不能砍的,是应当与必要的通道,不是哪一个旧岗位、项目或预算数额。照这个系列的合列,坚持一边的几样,不随资源打折:第一、二条应当,基础权利不受侵犯在内;第四条里不封拒绝、修订、退出与改向的通道那一半;第五条的受问通道;承认性权利保证的方式;代行之限。制度论还说:「这个系列承认实际可能做不到,不因此撤回或打折哪一条应当」。这一句管五条,不分坚持与争取,所以争取一边的应当也不打折。钱少了,可以排序的是争取一边的条件:排前排后,给多给少,不是应当本身;这一分是这个系列自己的。

逐项读。第一项,投诉窗口并入热线。窗口是构造,构造可以改;三项条件不能撤:通道要「独立于被追问的一方,内部主体实际可以发动,发动不被报复」。要核的是并入以后的样子。热线设在市长办公室,与住房局不是同一方;可独立是功能义,「它对着实际被问的一方核」。被问的是住房局,也包括定编制、给经费的那些位置;那些位置若在市长办公室,热线对它们就不独立,就要另有一条够得着的路。热线收不收补助的投诉,收了能不能要被问的一方答,答不到点上还能往哪里送:这几样核得过,这一项是构造的改动。核不过,补助的投诉在苹果城这一级就无处可送;砍掉的就不是一个窗口,是这一级的第五条通道。

第二项,暂停补助的新申请一年。这碰一项已载入的位置,只能照撤改的路走,公开受问。权限:条例是市议会立的,暂停它的一部分,在市议会的权限之内。根据:财政收入下降,是一个根据;补助原来的根据,低收入家庭冬季的供暖,还在不在,也要说。作用域:只停新申请,已经递进来的一千二百份不在暂停之内,它们是旧账。过渡:这一年里新符合条件的家庭怎么办,要有安排。暂停本身还要过第一条:苹果城有没有先封掉谁原有的路。还有一处:暂停若成了让空壳挂着的另一种说法,岗位照旧空着,积压照旧不动,它就没有回答“不留空壳”那一件。

第三项,艺术中心的经费减半。这是争取一侧的条件,可以排序,可以减;其中若有某一项已经载入或者承诺,那一项另核。可排序本身是判断。法学系列说,法在执行层有一种结构性的折扣,其中一重是资源的优先级:「不是每次压制都能被处理」;排序本身,就把排序的一方自己带了进来。推到政府的预算,是这个系列自己的一步,根据在第一篇:苹果城排预算,也是坐在位置上的人在判断,判断就要作答。所以排序要说明:写明须判断的事项,相关的主体,补缺的责任怎样受问。

门槛之下由谁补?制度论与森、努斯鲍姆对话时,留下过这一问:「一个人落在某条门槛之下,由哪一个构、按什么分担去补,是分配与设计的问题」。论文答到结构为止:已载入的位置,由载入它的那一级保证;争取一侧的条件,每一个构按它实际组织这个人生活的程度,欠相应的条件与说明;缺口由谁承担,要有一个位置写明,能被问。具体给谁、给多少、各层怎样分担,归具体的制度论;分配的正义,论文不另立一套。

真做不到时,比如三成的缺口怎样排都填不上,照第五篇立的那一条:承认做不到,不撤回、不打折应当;过渡要说明。第三篇说的,合起来是这样:两类权利分开;基础权利那一半,政府给背靠与执行,不给核;已载入的承认性权利,政府守三件,不脱权,不留空壳,撤改公开受问;保证了,也不因此正当;交税不是买保证的价钱;钱少了,砍的可以是构造与条件,不能是应当与通道。那一千二百份,后面还会有人来问。

Academic original: Qin, Han (2026). Guarantee (SAE Theory of Government, Paper 3). self-as-an-end.net ↗ · DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23413112

学术原文:Qin, Han (2026). 保证(SAE 政府论 第三篇)。self-as-an-end.net ↗ · DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23413112