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European Union · Apple App Store · Communication and transactions欧盟 · Apple App Store · 信息与交易歐盟 · Apple App Store · 資訊與交易

Can You Tell Your Customers Where Else to Buy?

你能不能告诉用户,别处怎么买?

你能不能告訴使用者,別處怎麼買?

The EU dispute over App Store steering: an outside offer can exist without becoming a practical option for the person already inside.

Apple App Store 的欧盟反引流争议:外面有一条路,和用户能够知道、比较并走上那条路,究竟差在哪里。

Apple App Store 的歐盟反引流爭議:外面有一條路,和使用者能夠知道、比較並走上那條路,究竟差在哪裡。

Han Qin · · Real-case essay · English independently written真实案例散文 · 英文独立重写真實案例散文 · 英文獨立重寫

A choice can disappear before anyone reaches the payment screen. It can disappear because the seller is not allowed to say that another offer exists.

The customer need not feel coerced. Nothing visibly interrupts the transaction. The available price looks like the price, and the available payment route looks like the ordinary way to buy. That is why the European dispute over App Store steering is worth examining before we reduce it to an argument about the right commission rate.

The central question is quite everyday: may a developer tell someone already using its app where else the same service can be bought? A second question follows immediately. Can that person use the information without first abandoning the device and environment in which the relationship began?

Staying is also a choice

Several different arrangements are often bundled together as an open or closed ecosystem. Where an app is installed, who processes a payment, what a developer can say about an outside offer, and how a resulting purchase is completed are related but distinct. Permission to install another marketplace does not settle what may be communicated inside an existing App Store app. Permission to pay elsewhere does not ensure that a customer knows where to go.

On 23 April 2025, the European Commission found that Apple had failed to comply with the Digital Markets Act's anti-steering obligation and imposed a €500 million fine. This was a regulatory decision, not merely a competitor's allegation. It was also a decision about a particular obligation and set of practices, not a final court judgment resolving every App Store charge everywhere.[1]

The Commission explained that developers distributing through the App Store should be able to inform users of alternative offers, steer them to those offers and allow purchases, free of charge. The issue concerned communication as well as transactions. An alternative outside the store does little for a user who is prevented from learning about it at the point where it becomes relevant.[1]

An answer such as buy a different phone passes over this distinction. Someone may have sound reasons to retain a device, familiar apps and an existing account. That choice does not settle the merits of every future purchase. A person who stays should still be able to hear an offer. The cost of replacing an entire environment is not a reasonable substitute for examining a restriction within it.

The platform's contribution matters too. Distribution, technical tools, payment processing and customer support involve real work. A developer can benefit from a system without having built it, and a customer can reasonably prefer a familiar purchasing process. Disagreement about a condition does not make all those benefits imaginary. It asks what the benefits justify, and how far that justification extends.

Helping two parties find each other is one contribution. Governing everything they may subsequently tell each other is another kind of power. The second does not follow automatically from the first. Once a developer and a customer have a relationship, a platform needs a further reason for controlling how they discuss the next transaction. That is the step worth watching.

A link is not the whole route

The Commission's official summary distinguished the sets of terms it examined. Original terms prohibited certain in-app promotion of outside offers. Newer terms permitted a link out but still constrained the destination and the presentation of the journey, including recurring disclosure screens. Saying that a link existed would therefore leave important parts of the assessed arrangement unexplained.[2]

An effective alternative requires more than a destination somewhere on the internet. A user must notice an offer, understand where it leads, compare the terms and complete a purchase if desired. Every intervening step can help that understanding or obstruct it. The power to design those steps is not merely decorative. It can shape which choices are practical before a user expresses a preference.

That does not make every warning an obstruction. A person should know when a different business will handle a transaction and what protection accompanies it. In this case, the Commission said Apple had not demonstrated that the restrictions were objectively necessary and proportionate. That is a finding about the restrictions examined, not a declaration that all risk information or confirmation screens are forbidden.[1]

The summary also described a recurring commission under the assessed newer terms. Transactions completed within seven days after a link-out, including automatically renewing subscriptions, fell within its scope; the obligation could recur for as long as the user continued using the app. The Commission did not accept that this was simply payment for facilitating the initial acquisition of the customer.[2]

The distinction is between compensation for an introduction and a continuing claim on later dealings. The decision allowed, in principle, remuneration for facilitating initial acquisition, subject to conditions about its scope, value and other remuneration already received. It did not pronounce all development tools, distribution or payment services worthless or universally free. Those are separate contributions requiring their own account.[2]

So the useful question is not whether a single percentage is inherently virtuous or excessive. What exactly is being paid for? A service used in this transaction? An initial introduction? Or the continuing fact that the parties met through a gateway controlled by someone else? Similar labels on an invoice do not make those justifications interchangeable.

Nor can we assume that an outside purchase will always be cheaper, or that every developer will pass any saving to the customer. A different payment route can also mean a different route for refunds and disputes. The purpose of hearing an offer is not to declare it superior in advance. It is to give the customer material for a judgment that neither the platform nor the developer should make conclusively on the customer's behalf.

After a rule changes

On 26 June 2025 Apple announced revised options for communicating and promoting offers in the EU, including destinations such as a website or another app. It also introduced fee categories and explained its Core Technology Commission as compensation for continuing investment in tools, technologies and services. That explanation deserves to be represented as Apple's case for the arrangement, not silently treated either as an independent finding or as an obvious pretence.[3]

It is equally important not to turn that announcement into a current fee guide. Apple's developer material available on 3 November 2026 describes revised terms effective from 1 October, replacing earlier arrangements and eliminating the Initial Acquisition Fee and Store Services Fee named in the 2025 announcement. Removing those categories is not the same as making every external transaction free. The dated change is recorded here without a claim that every later provision has received regulatory approval.[4]

The 2026 material also sets out different payment options and describes services supplied through Apple In-App Purchase, including processing, foreign exchange, tax support and customer service. These are Apple's descriptions of its offering. They help explain why a user or developer might choose to keep using it. Preference for a convenient service is not evidence that someone has failed to understand the dispute.[4]

A practical alternative need not require dismantling the original route. It can make comparison possible for people who wish to remain. The customer can prefer Apple processing and still be entitled to understand another offer. The developer can value distribution through the App Store and still question a restriction on communication. Continuing participation should not have to mean surrendering either question.

There is detailed work still to do when evaluating such arrangements. Does a notice identify a real change in responsibility, or make every departure sound indiscriminately dangerous? Can a fee be connected to a service, or does renaming it preserve a charge on the outside relationship? Can an ordinary buyer understand the conditions before paying? These are questions to investigate, not results of interface testing claimed by this essay.

The regulator must remain answerable as well. An order to remove a restriction does not establish that every customer subsequently found a better price or adequate support. Additional routes can move responsibilities as well as opportunities. A serious evaluation would follow what users and developers can actually do, including whether they can obtain help when a different purchasing route goes wrong.

This is also why the European decision should not be combined with the US Epic litigation into one worldwide verdict. Different laws, proceedings and versions of terms require their own treatment. Reducing them to Apple lost or the regulator won can conceal the very thing a case should help us see: which condition was examined, what contribution remained valuable, and where the limits of the finding lie.

The broader concern is not confined to a single application store. A business can control a relationship without forbidding all departure. It may control what someone else is permitted to tell you about departing, or about completing just one transaction elsewhere. That influence works quietly, upstream of your decision. It changes the evidence available before you decide what you prefer.

It would be a mistake to answer by demanding a world without mediation. We rely on shops, search tools and other people to bring possibilities into view. Their work has value. The task is to keep that useful position from becoming an unrestricted entitlement to define the entire range of possibilities for everyone who passes through it. Being helped does not mean a person has been wholly acquired.

A good platform need not deny its own contribution. An open route need not promise that everything outside is better. Together they should at least make room for an ordinary sentence: here is one way to buy; there is another; these are the prices and responsibilities; you may compare them. That sentence is not a minor accessory to commerce. It gives the person using the service something essential to deciding for themselves.

有些选择,并不是付钱时才消失的。

它可能在更早的时候,就停在一句话之外:同一个服务,别处也可以买。用户不知道有这回事,自然不会觉得自己放弃了什么。眼前的价格于是像唯一的价格,眼前的付款方式也像事情本来就该有的样子。

我们谈平台,常常一下子跳到抽成多少。Apple App Store 在欧盟的反引流争议,却把一个更靠前的问题推了出来:开发者能不能告诉已经在用自己应用的人,外面还有什么报价;用户又能不能带着这个消息,真正去比较和购买?

不是换一台手机,才配有别的选择

先把几件容易混在一起的事分开。应用从哪一家商店安装,付款由谁处理,开发者能否介绍应用外的报价,介绍以后怎样成交,这些问题相互关联,却不能用开放或封闭两个字一起带过。允许安装别家商店,不自动回答现有应用里能说什么;允许外部付款,也不一定说明用户知道去哪里付。

欧盟《数字市场法》对被指定为守门人的平台提出特定义务。2025年4月23日,欧盟委员会认定 Apple 没有遵守其中的反引流义务,并处以五亿欧元罚款。这里已经不只是竞争对手的指控,但仍要说清楚:这是委员会作出的监管决定,不是把全球所有 App Store 收费一次判完的法院终局裁判。[1]

按照委员会的说明,通过 App Store 分发应用的开发者,应能免费向用户介绍其他报价,引导他们前往,并让他们购买。这个要求保护的,不只是开发者多一个收款入口,也是用户能够听见另一种报价,而不用先离开熟悉的设备和日常使用的应用。[1]

这点很容易被一句你可以不用 Apple 带过去。但一个人愿意继续使用手机、保留照片和已有应用,并不等于他已经回答了关于每笔交易的所有问题。留下来的人,也应该能知道还有别的买法。让选择存在,与要求人先付出更换整个环境的代价,才能接近选择,不是一回事。

不过,平台也确实提供了东西。应用分发、技术工具、交易处理和用户服务,都有实际工作在里面。Apple 对自身价值的解释,不该因为发生争议就被一笔划去。我们要问的是这些贡献能支持什么条件,而不是先假定平台做的一切都无需付费。

问题由此变得精确:帮助一段关系开始,能不能转化为对这段关系以后每一次交流和成交的控制?如果用户与开发者已经认识彼此,平台还能在多大范围内规定他们只能怎样谈下一笔交易?这一步需要理由,不能只由最初贡献自动推出。

一条链接,也可能有很多条件

委员会公布的决定摘要区分了被审查的几套条款。旧条款对开发者在应用内介绍外部报价有禁止性限制;后来的一套条款允许外链,却仍限制了通往什么页面、怎样呈现信息,并反复显示提示页。我们读到这里,不宜把它简化成从不准链接到准许链接,就已完成全部改变。[2]

想一想链接实际承担什么工作。一个人得先知道有另一个报价,再明白自己会去哪里,最后才有可能比较。多走一步不必然不合理,安全提示也可能必要。但每个步骤都能影响一项选择是容易理解,还是令人放弃。界面上的小字、跳转和提示,未必比合同里的大字更不重要。

在本案中,委员会不是仅凭有人讨厌多点几下,就宣布提示违法。其公告说明,Apple 未能证明有关限制具有客观必要性和相称性。这个判断有具体审查对象,不等于任何风险提示、任何外部交易提醒从此都不许出现。[1]

收费也有类似的区别。当时被审查的新条款中,有一项反复适用的佣金:用户每次从应用外链后七天内完成交易,包括自动续订,都可能进入该项收费范围,而且这种义务随着用户继续使用应用而延续。委员会认为,这不只是对最初帮助开发者获得用户的报酬。[2]

最初把顾客带来,与以后顾客每回来一次都继续收费,不必天然相同。决定摘要允许在条件约束下,为促成最初获得用户收取报酬,但要求与那次获得用户的价值相称,也要考虑其他已经取得的报酬。它没有据此宣布所有技术、分发和支付服务必须免费。[2]

从这里看,争执的重点不是替整个平台找出一个永远正确的百分比。更重要的是,某一项收费究竟对应了什么:实际服务、最初介绍,还是因为这扇门长期由我看守,所以后来的交易都得经过我同意?名字听起来相近,理由却未必能互相代用。

我们也不能由此推断,外部购买一定便宜,开发者一定会把省下的钱交给用户。付款出了问题,谁处理退款和争议,同样不能消失。一个报价值得比较,不等于它必然更好;保护用户知道的机会,正是为了让判断不必预先交给平台或开发者任何一方。

规则变了,还要继续看什么

2025年6月26日,Apple 宣布调整欧盟应用的外部报价沟通方式,允许开发者选择网站、其他应用等目的地,也公布了新的收费分类。公司把相关核心技术佣金解释为,对其持续提供工具、技术和服务价值的回报。这是 Apple 对新方案的说明,不能代替监管机关对方案是否合规的判断。[3]

而这又不是今天可以原样照抄的费率表。按 Apple 在2026年11月3日可见的开发者说明,8月修订、10月1日生效的统一条款,已经替代部分旧安排,并取消了2025年公告中的初始获客费与商店服务费。本文只交代这一变化,不把旧类别继续写成现行条件,也不把类别取消说成所有外部交易都不再收费。[4]

同一份2026年说明列出不同付款途径,也说明 Apple 内购提供交易处理、外汇、税务和客服等服务。这些是平台对自身服务的说明。有些用户愿意为熟悉的一套流程付费,完全可以理解;有些开发者愿意继续使用它,也不需要先被说服自己受了骗。[4]

因此,一条真正可走的替代路线,未必要求把原来的路线拆掉。更有意义的目标,是留下来的用户与开发者也能比较不同条件,而不必在继续使用平台与获知别的报价之间,被迫二选一。愿意使用一种便利,不等于承诺永远不听另一种可能。

实际判断仍要细。提示有没有告诉用户谁负责交易,还是把所有离开都写成危险?费用有没有清楚对应服务,还是换个名称便继续把外面的成交收入囊中?不同开发者面对的条件是否容易理解,普通人能不能在付款之前知道后果?这些是阅读规则时应带的问题,不是本篇已经逐项实测得出的答案。

监管同样需要被追问。它可以要求停止一种具体限制,却不能仅靠宣布开放,就保证每位用户得到了更好的价格与保障。新规则增加了哪些真实机会,又把哪些责任转给了开发者和购买者,都需要后续证据。平台说自己完成了调整,与公众已经能顺利使用那些选择,中间仍有一段距离。

这也是为什么本文没有把欧盟决定与美国 Epic 诉讼拼成一个全球判决。不同程序、法律与条款版本各有边界。若只留下平台输了一次或监管赢了一次,读者反而看不见具体哪一种控制受到限制,哪一种服务仍有价值。

App Store 这个案例让人留意到,权力有时并不表现为禁止你去别处,而表现为规定别人能不能告诉你,别处有什么。它安静地发生在比较之前,使一个本来可以由你作出的判断,提前没有了材料。

好的平台不必假装自己没有贡献,好的开放也不必保证外面的东西总是更好。它们至少应该容得下这样一句普通的话:这里是一个办法,那里还有另一个;各自的价格与责任,请你看清楚,再决定。

能把这句话说出来,往往不是一笔交易的小配件。它是把判断交还给正在使用服务的人,而不是要求他先离开,才配得到判断的机会。

有些選擇,並不是付錢時才消失的。

它可能在更早的時候,就停在一句話之外:同一個服務,別處也可以買。使用者不知道有這回事,自然不會覺得自己放棄了什麼。眼前的價格於是像唯一的價格,眼前的付款方式也像事情本來就該有的樣子。

我們談平台,常常一下子跳到抽成多少。Apple App Store 在歐盟的反引流爭議,卻把一個更靠前的問題推了出來:開發者能不能告訴已經在用自己應用的人,外面還有什麼報價;使用者又能不能帶著這個消息,真正去比較和購買?

不是換一台手機,才配有別的選擇

先把幾件容易混在一起的事分開。應用從哪一家商店安裝,付款由誰處理,開發者能否介紹應用外的報價,介紹以後怎樣成交,這些問題相互關聯,卻不能用開放或封閉兩個字一起帶過。允許安裝別家商店,不自動回答現有應用裡能說什麼;允許外部付款,也不一定說明使用者知道去哪裡付。

歐盟《數字市場法》對被指定為守門人的平台提出特定義務。2025年4月23日,歐盟委員會認定 Apple 沒有遵守其中的反引流義務,並處以五億歐元罰款。這裡已經不只是競爭對手的指控,但仍要說清楚:這是委員會作出的監管決定,不是把全球所有 App Store 收費一次判完的法院終局裁判。[1]

按照委員會的說明,通過 App Store 分發應用的開發者,應能免費向使用者介紹其他報價,引導他們前往,並讓他們購買。這個要求保護的,不只是開發者多一個收款入口,也是使用者能夠聽見另一種報價,而不用先離開熟悉的設備和日常使用的應用。[1]

這點很容易被一句你可以不用 Apple 帶過去。但一個人願意繼續使用手機、保留照片和已有應用,並不等於他已經回答了關於每筆交易的所有問題。留下來的人,也應該能知道還有別的買法。讓選擇存在,與要求人先付出更換整個環境的代價,才能接近選擇,不是一回事。

不過,平台也確實提供了東西。應用分發、技術工具、交易處理和使用者服務,都有實際工作在裡面。Apple 對自身價值的解釋,不該因為發生爭議就被一筆划去。我們要問的是這些貢獻能支持什麼條件,而不是先假定平台做的一切都無需付費。

問題由此變得精確:幫助一段關係開始,能不能轉化為對這段關係以後每一次交流和成交的控制?如果使用者與開發者已經認識彼此,平台還能在多大範圍內規定他們只能怎樣談下一筆交易?這一步需要理由,不能只由最初貢獻自動推出。

一條連結,也可能有很多條件

委員會公佈的決定摘要區分了被審查的幾套條款。舊條款對開發者在應用內介紹外部報價有禁止性限制;後來的一套條款允許外鏈,卻仍限制了通往什麼頁面、怎樣呈現資訊,並反覆顯示提示頁。我們讀到這裡,不宜把它簡化成從不准連結到准許連結,就已完成全部改變。[2]

想一想連結實際承擔什麼工作。一個人得先知道有另一個報價,再明白自己會去哪裡,最後才有可能比較。多走一步不必然不合理,安全提示也可能必要。但每個步驟都能影響一項選擇是容易理解,還是令人放棄。界面上的小字、跳轉和提示,未必比合同裡的大字更不重要。

在本案中,委員會不是僅憑有人討厭多點幾下,就宣佈提示違法。其公告說明,Apple 未能證明有關限制具有客觀必要性和相稱性。這個判斷有具體審查對象,不等於任何風險提示、任何外部交易提醒從此都不許出現。[1]

收費也有類似的區別。當時被審查的新條款中,有一項反覆適用的傭金:使用者每次從應用外鏈後七天內完成交易,包括自動續訂,都可能進入該項收費範圍,而且這種義務隨著使用者繼續使用應用而延續。委員會認為,這不只是對最初幫助開發者獲得使用者的報酬。[2]

最初把顧客帶來,與以後顧客每回來一次都繼續收費,不必天然相同。決定摘要允許在條件約束下,為促成最初獲得使用者收取報酬,但要求與那次獲得使用者的價值相稱,也要考慮其他已經取得的報酬。它沒有據此宣佈所有技術、分發和支付服務必須免費。[2]

從這裡看,爭執的重點不是替整個平台找出一個永遠正確的百分比。更重要的是,某一項收費究竟對應了什麼:實際服務、最初介紹,還是因為這扇門長期由我看守,所以後來的交易都得經過我同意?名字聽起來相近,理由卻未必能互相代用。

我們也不能由此推斷,外部購買一定便宜,開發者一定會把省下的錢交給使用者。付款出了問題,誰處理退款和爭議,同樣不能消失。一個報價值得比較,不等於它必然更好;保護使用者知道的機會,正是為了讓判斷不必預先交給平台或開發者任何一方。

規則變了,還要繼續看什麼

2025年6月26日,Apple 宣佈調整歐盟應用的外部報價溝通方式,允許開發者選擇網站、其他應用等目的地,也公佈了新的收費分類。公司把相關核心技術傭金解釋為,對其持續提供工具、技術和服務價值的回報。這是 Apple 對新方案的說明,不能代替監管機關對方案是否合規的判斷。[3]

而這又不是今天可以原樣照抄的費率表。按 Apple 在2026年11月3日可見的開發者說明,8月修訂、10月1日生效的統一條款,已經替代部分舊安排,並取消了2025年公告中的初始獲客費與商店服務費。本文只交代這一變化,不把舊類別繼續寫成現行條件,也不把類別取消說成所有外部交易都不再收費。[4]

同一份2026年說明列出不同付款途徑,也說明 Apple 內購提供交易處理、外匯、稅務和客服等服務。這些是平台對自身服務的說明。有些使用者願意為熟悉的一套流程付費,完全可以理解;有些開發者願意繼續使用它,也不需要先被說服自己受了騙。[4]

因此,一條真正可走的替代路線,未必要求把原來的路線拆掉。更有意義的目標,是留下來的使用者與開發者也能比較不同條件,而不必在繼續使用平台與獲知別的報價之間,被迫二選一。願意使用一種便利,不等於承諾永遠不聽另一種可能。

實際判斷仍要細。提示有沒有告訴使用者誰負責交易,還是把所有離開都寫成危險?費用有沒有清楚對應服務,還是換個名稱便繼續把外面的成交收入囊中?不同開發者面對的條件是否容易理解,普通人能不能在付款之前知道後果?這些是閱讀規則時應帶的問題,不是本篇已經逐項實測得出的答案。

監管同樣需要被追問。它可以要求停止一種具體限制,卻不能僅靠宣佈開放,就保證每位使用者得到了更好的價格與保障。新規則增加了哪些真實機會,又把哪些責任轉給了開發者和購買者,都需要後續證據。平台說自己完成了調整,與公眾已經能順利使用那些選擇,中間仍有一段距離。

這也是為什麼本文沒有把歐盟決定與美國 Epic 訴訟拼成一個全球判決。不同程序、法律與條款版本各有邊界。若只留下平台輸了一次或監管贏了一次,讀者反而看不見具體哪一種控制受到限制,哪一種服務仍有價值。

App Store 這個案例讓人留意到,權力有時並不表現為禁止你去別處,而表現為規定別人能不能告訴你,別處有什麼。它安靜地發生在比較之前,使一個本來可以由你作出的判斷,提前沒有了材料。

好的平台不必假裝自己沒有貢獻,好的開放也不必保證外面的東西總是更好。它們至少應該容得下這樣一句普通的話:這裡是一個辦法,那裡還有另一個;各自的價格與責任,請你看清楚,再決定。

能把這句話說出來,往往不是一筆交易的小配件。它是把判斷交還給正在使用服務的人,而不是要求他先離開,才配得到判斷的機會。

Sources & reading note来源与阅读说明來源與閱讀說明

The core record is the official summary and announcement of the Commission's 23 April 2025 DMA anti-steering decision, followed by Apple's accounts of June 2025 changes and terms effective October 2026. The official summary was readable through indexed text; direct PDF retrieval was blocked. The unabridged decision is not represented as read page by page. This is not an account of the US Epic litigation, a finding that every later term received regulatory approval, or current fee or legal advice. Sources checked on 3 November 2026.

本文以欧盟委员会2025年4月23日 DMA 反引流决定的官方摘要与公告为主,另注明 Apple 2025年6月及2026年10月生效规则的自述。官方摘要可通过索引文本读取,直接PDF获取受阻;不声称逐页读过未删节决定。本文不总结美国 Epic 诉讼,不认定后续所有条款已经获监管认可,也不提供现行费率或法律建议。资料核对于2026年11月3日。

本文以歐盟委員會2025年4月23日 DMA 反引流決定的官方摘要與公告為主,另注明 Apple 2025年6月及2026年10月生效規則的自述。官方摘要可通過索引文本讀取,直接PDF獲取受阻;不聲稱逐頁讀過未刪節決定。本文不總結美國 Epic 訴訟,不認定後續所有條款已經獲監管認可,也不提供現行費率或法律建議。資料核對於2026年11月3日。

  1. European Commission, Apple anti-steering non-compliance announcement, 23 April 2025欧盟委员会:2025年4月23日 Apple 反引流不合规认定公告歐盟委員會:2025年4月23日 Apple 反引流不合規認定公告

    Supports the character of the finding, €500 million fine, and necessity and proportionality statement. The Apple part is kept separate from Meta and other Apple investigations.

    用于认定性质、五亿欧元罚款及必要性、相称性说明;只讨论 Apple 部分,不混入 Meta 或其他 Apple 调查结论。

    用於認定性質、五億歐元罰款及必要性、相稱性說明;只討論 Apple 部分,不混入 Meta 或其他 Apple 調查結論。

  2. Official Journal, summary of decision DMA.100109, published 16 June 2025官方公报:DMA.100109 决定摘要(2025年6月16日刊)官方公報:DMA.100109 決定摘要(2025年6月16日刊)

    Indexed official text supports paragraphs 6–10 and 19–24 on the assessed terms, link-out restrictions, recurrent commissions and initial-acquisition remuneration. Direct PDF retrieval was blocked; no claim of exhaustive review of the full decision or of these terms remaining current.

    按摘要第6—10、19—24段核对被审查条款、外链限制、持续收费和初始获客报酬的边界。通过索引原文阅读,直接PDF获取受阻;不是声称通读完整决定,旧条款不冒充现行规则。

    按摘要第6—10、19—24段核對被審查條款、外鏈限制、持續收費和初始獲客報酬的邊界。通過索引原文閱讀,直接PDF獲取受阻;不是聲稱通讀完整決定,舊條款不冒充現行規則。

  3. Apple Developer, Updates for apps in the European Union, 26 June 2025Apple Developer:2025年6月26日欧盟应用更新公告Apple Developer:2025年6月26日歐盟應用更新公告

    Retains Apple's explanation of continuing service value. Announced fee categories and transition plans are not treated as permanently applicable terms or evidence of regulatory approval.

    保留 Apple 的服务价值解释;公告中的收费分类与未来计划,不作永久有效条款或监管认可证明。

    保留 Apple 的服務價值解釋;公告中的收費分類與未來計劃,不作永久有效條款或監管認可證明。

  4. Apple Developer, Changes for apps in the European Union, checked 3 November 2026Apple Developer:欧盟应用变更(核对于2026年11月3日)Apple Developer:歐盟應用變更(核對於2026年11月3日)

    Dates the revised unified terms to August 2026 with October effectiveness, as described by Apple. This company account is not a conclusion about subsequent legal proceedings. Elimination of the Store Services Fee is not represented as elimination of every service commission.

    按页面记述区分2026年8月修订、10月生效的统一条款及付款选项。属于公司现行说明,不作后续法律程序结论;不把商店服务费取消误写成所有服务佣金取消。

    按頁面記述區分2026年8月修訂、10月生效的統一條款及付款選項。屬於公司現行說明,不作後續法律程序結論;不把商店服務費取消誤寫成所有服務傭金取消。

Optional philosophical background ↗可选深读:政治经济学原论文 ↗可選深讀:政治經濟學原論文 ↗ · Questions to bring to the evidence, not a conclusion the evidence must prove.带着问题读证据,不要求证据证明预定结论。帶著問題讀證據,不要求證據證明預定結論。